Tag Archives: MERS

Texas Court Finds That MERS Had Authority to Assign, Thus Defendant Could Enforce Note

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The plaintiff in Hines v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153895 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2013), contended that defendants could not show an unbroken chain of title to enforce the note because MERS had no authority to assign the note to Deutsche Bank. However, the court eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.

The plaintiff sought a declaration from the court that any foreclosure of her home would be wrongful because none of the defendants had standing to foreclose. The plaintiff claimed that this was due to defects in the assignment and securitization process.

The plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure allegations could be grouped into two categories: (1) MERS lacked authority to assign the deed and note from First NLC to Deutsche Bank; and (2) defendants did not comply with the securitization requirements of the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”). However, the court found that under recent Fifth Circuit case law, both of the plaintiff’s grounds for her claims failed. Thus, the court decided that her wrongful foreclosure claim must be dismissed.

Texas Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Wrongful Foreclosure Action, as MERS was Authorized to Assign the Note and Deed of Trust to Defendant

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The court in deciding Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153947, 2013 WL 5781208 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s foreclosure action was wrongful. Also plaintiff alleged that the deed of trust was not enforceable due to that lack of ownership in the note by the defendants.

Plaintiff asserted that First NLC, rather than MERS, was the only party authorized to assign the note and deed of trust to the defendant; she asserted that assignment is only complete upon recording, and recording has not been effectuated; and she asserted that the deed of trust and the transfer of lien document were fraudulently created, and therefore ineffective as a security instrument and assignment, respectively. Additionally, plaintiff asserted that the note and deed of trust were not enforceable because they had been split.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant argued that plaintiff has not stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure because she has not alleged that her home had been foreclosed.

Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims and the broader legal theories she asserted; however, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend to allow her an opportunity to assert a valid claim.

Indiana Court of Appeals Holds HSBC Assignment Valid Despite Blank and Undated Allonge

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In Buchanan v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., 993 N.E.2d 275, 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 404, 2013 WL 4507932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that HSBC had the right to foreclose on the homeowners’ mortgage, dismissing homeowners’ allegations that the HSBC assignment was unauthorized. The Buchanans procured a loan from Accredited Mortgage Lenders in 2006, which named MERS as mortgagee and nominee. Later that year, MERS sold the loan to HSBC, who began foreclosure proceedings in 2008 after the homeowners defaulted. HSBC’s motion for summary judgment was granted in 2012, which homeowners appeal from here. The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court, finding that the homeowners presented no evidence that MERS lacked authority to assign the note and mortgage. The Buchanans alleged that the assignment was rendered invalid because an endorsement was not attached to the note in the complaint, and because the allonge was blank and not dated. However, the court held the assignment was valid and endorsed to HSBC in blank under Indiana Code Section 26-1-3.1-109(a)(2) which states “A promise or order is payable to bearer if it: . . . (2) does not state a payee,” showing that HSBC was the holder of the “bearer instrument” pursuant to Indiana Code Section 26-1-3.1-301(1). The court further found no evidence that the allonge was not affixed to the note, and states that HSBC is permitted to amend its complaint to attach the allonge to the note. Homeowners also failed to produce evidence that the signatory of the HSBC assignment lacked authority to sign on behalf of Accredited. Ultimately the court found that no issue of genuine or material fact existed.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Intentional Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims

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The court in Hoffman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155092, 2013 WL 5797623 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2013) dismissed both of the plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Plaintiffs asserted two claims in their complaint: intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. In regards to the first claim, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claim for the misrepresentation failed because it was not pled with specificity as required by Rule 9(b). Nowhere in the complaint did plaintiffs allege who made the fraudulent statements, when the statements were made, or where they were made.

Plaintiffs failed to allege the specific content of the fraudulent statements—their allegations include only broad generalizations. Plaintiffs also failed to identify precisely what reliance they placed on the “misrepresentations” such that plaintiffs are entitled to damages or equitable relief.

Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs also nakedly assert a claim for “negligent misrepresentation,” and that the claim suffered from the same deficiencies as the first claim.

United States District Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA Claims

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The court in deciding Hopkins v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155547, 2013 WL 5888086 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA claims.

Plaintiff referenced three statutes in their complaint: TILA, RESPA, and GLBA. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated TILA by “withholding certain disclosures and documentation.” Plaintiff also claimed that defendant violated RESPA by making “loan servicing errors.” Plaintiff, however, did not state which provisions of these statutes defendant violated. With regard to the GLBA, Plaintiff alleged neither how defendant violated the statute, nor which provision defendant violated.

Accordingly, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and the complaint did not include any of the basic information necessary to be properly considered a complaint. Defendant also claimed that plaintiff’s complaint contained none of the information required by Rule 8(a). Specifically, with regard to Rule 8(a)(2)‘s requirement of “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”

The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s complaint was nothing more than an unadorned collection of vague and conclusory statements, in which the plaintiff failed to plead any specific facts supporting the claim that Green Tree somehow violated the law. Additionally, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to identify a single provision of RESPA and TILA that Green Tree allegedly violated. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Wrongful Foreclosure, Wrongful Ejectment, and Quiet Title Claims

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The court in deciding Billete v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155544, 2013 WL 5840105 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2013) dismissed with prejudice the portions of plaintiff’s actions, including: Count I (wrongful foreclosure, wrongful ejectment, and quiet title), Count III (fraud), and Count V (unfair and deceptive acts and practices) based upon the closure of Deutsche Bank’s trust, to which MERS purportedly assigned plaintiffs’ loan, and any other alleged violations of the Trust’s Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”).

The court granted in part and denied in part Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, the defendant’s motion was denied as to the portions of Amended Counts I, III, and V based on the assertion that the assignment was invalid because HCL was dissolved prior to the assignment.

Further, the defendant’s motion regarding the portions of the plaintiffs’ claims that alleged that the foreclosure was invalid because Deutsche Bank failed to comply with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 667-5 were denied without prejudice.

Northern District of California Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

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The court in deciding Murphy v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155923, 2013 WL 5883675 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action without prejudice.

The plaintiff in this case brought this action against defendants [Bank of New York Mellon and MERS] for (1) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (2) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (3) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (4) violations of California’s Business and Professions Code Section 17200; (5) slander of title; (6) cancellation of void instruments; (7) quiet title; and (8) wrongful foreclosure. Compl., ECF No. 1.

The plaintiff’s complaint revolved around the main theory that the defendants lacked the authority to execute any foreclosure proceedings. After considering the plaintiff’s arguments, the court first concluded that the plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the court found that the federal claims in the operative complaint failed as a matter of law.