Tag Archives: MERS

Michigan Supreme Court Rules MERS’s Foreclosure Valid

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The Michigan Court of Appeals considered two cases involving MERS-related foreclosures, Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman and Bank of New York v. Messner, 292 Mich. App. 321 (April 21, 2011) deciding whether MERS is an entity permitted to foreclose by advertisement or if it must go through a judicial foreclosure. The Court of Appeals held that MERS doesn’t meet the statute’s requirements to foreclose by advertisement, however, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that MERS had standing to foreclose.

In both cases the original lender was Homecoming Financial, LLC, with the mortgages providing rights to foreclose upon default. MERS was named as the mortgagee and nominee for the lender. After default, MERS began foreclosure by advertisement on both properties, purchasing the properties at their respective sales, and quit-claiming title to the plaintiffs, Residential Funding and Bank of NY. Upon eviction, the homeowners questioned MERS’s authority but were denied by the district court. The circuit courts affirmed the district court’s decision, and the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether MERS, as mortgagee but not note-holder, can foreclose non-judicially by advertisement.

The Court of Appeals discussed implications of the MERS system, which allows entities to transfer loans without having to record the transactions, since the mortgagee, MERS, is never changed despite the change of ownership among other entities. The statute in question, MCL § 600.3204(1)(d), states that a party may foreclose by advertisement if: “the party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.” Since MERS is not the servicing agent or the owner of the debt, the Court of Appeals held MERS lacked authority to foreclose by advertisement under the statute. The court further explained “in order for a party to own an interest in the indebtedness, it must have a legal share, title, or right in the note,” and that an interest in the mortgage is not enough, as these are two separate instruments with different rights. The mortgage provides an interest in the property, while the note documents a debt to be repaid. Since the statute requires that the foreclosing party must own an interest in the indebtedness, the court held that MERS cannot act on behalf of Homecoming as agent or nominee to advertise the foreclosure. The decision of the Circuit Court enforcing the eviction was reversed, granting defendant-homeowners’ summary judgment.

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Judge Wilder dissented, believing MERS to have an ownership interest in the loan by way of the language in the mortgage giving MERS explicit rights to foreclose upon default. As mortgagee, MERS owned a “contractual interest” in the indebtedness, with the ability to take any action required by it, including its right to foreclose if the debt is not paid. The purpose of the mortgage is to create a security interest “specifically linked to the debt” to ensure payment. Since the mortgage gives MERS the right to “take any action required of it,” MERS has “a greater interest than just an interest in the property as security for the note,” giving MERS the right to act on behalf of Homecomings.

Plaintiffs Residential Funding and Bank of NY appealed the decision and the case was considered by the Michigan Supreme Court in late 2011, ultimately reversing the Court of Appeals order. 807 N.W.2d 412, rev’d 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011). The Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals, holding that the foreclosure was valid. MERS has an ownership interest in the indebtedness, and therefore the right to foreclose because MERS’s “contractual obligations as mortgagee were dependent upon whether the mortgagor met the obligation to pay the indebtedness which the mortgage secured.” Though this does not give MERS an ownership interest in the note, the court held that the note and mortgage do not need to be held by the same entity in order to foreclose under Michigan law.

Massachusetts District Court Interprets Ibanez Narrowly in Deciding That Plaintiff-Homeowner Lacked Standing to Challenge Bank’s Standing to Foreclose

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This action arose out of an attempted foreclosure by defendant Aurora Loan Services on plaintiff David Kiah’s property. Based on the recent holding from U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011), Kiah sought a declaratory judgment to make the “mortgage on record legally null and void.” The Massachusetts District Court in deciding Kiah v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No. 10-40161-FDA, 2011 WL 841282 (D.Mass. Mar.4, 2011) considered the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s holding from Ibanez, along with the plaintiff-homeowners’ arguments, and concluded that granting the defendant’s dismissal was proper.

The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were merit-less, as he challenged neither the note nor the note’s assignment to Aurora. As expressed in Ibanez “By law, the transfer of the note automatically transfers an equitable interest in the underlying mortgage, even without a formal assignment.” An equitable right to the mortgage was thus transferred to Aurora along with the note.

The court noted that the Ibanez holding did not require a reconsideration of the lower court’s judgment. In Ibanez the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a foreclosure sale made by a party who holds the note but not the mortgage is void as a matter of law. In that case, the note holder provided no evidence of assignment prior to foreclosure. However here, there was a facially valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS to Aurora prior to the foreclosure sale. To the extent the assignment was defective, the court interpreted Ibanez required, at most, that a confirmatory assignment be executed and recorded.

Rhode Island Superior Court Deems PennyMac Foreclosure Proper

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In Rutter v. MERS, et al., C.A. No. PC 10-4756 (R.I. Super. March 12, 2012) the Rhode Island Superior Court held that PennyMac’s foreclosure sale was proper, as the court upheld Rhode Island case law supporting the validity of MERS’s assignments and subsequent foreclosures.

In July 2007, the Rutters procured a loan with First National Bank of Arizona (FNBA) as lender. MERS was designated the mortgagee acting as nominee for the lender, FNBA. The loan was ultimately assigned by MERS to PennyMac.

The Rutters defaulted in November 2008, and received proper notice of both the intent to foreclose and the foreclosure sale, scheduled for February 2010. Although the Rutters attempted to submit a qualified written request under RESPA, PennyMac found their request insufficient and proceeded with the foreclosure sale. After the sale, the Rutters filed the within action to quiet title and sought damages for alleged RESPA violations by MERS and PennyMac, who counterclaimed for slander. Here, the court considers MERS and PennyMac’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that notice of foreclosure and the foreclosure sale were proper and that the assignment to PennyMac was valid. The motion further argues that even if the assignment were invalid, the Rutters lack standing to challenge it.

The court first considers the role MERS plays in current mortgage transactions, giving a brief history of MERS’s origination and its operational aspects. MERS was designed to promote efficiency and accuracy in transactions and recordkeeping, though the system is not without fault. Although some courts differ on how to manage MERS-affected foreclosures, the “clear majority” holds the MERS foreclosures are valid. The court criticizes the Rutters’ argument as lacking substance and failing to distinguish recent case law. The Rutters’ argument merely claimed that those decisions enforcing the MERS foreclosures were “flawed.”  Rhode Island courts have continuously held that “foreclosure sales conducted by MERS or one of MERS’s assignees [a]re valid.” Kriegel, 2011 WL 4947398, slip op. at 5. Here, the clear and unambiguous language in the Rutters’ mortgage is identical to the language of mortgage documents in precedent MERS cases, giving MERS statutory power with the right to foreclose as mortgagee and nominee of the lender.

The Rutters raised the show me the note argument claiming that the note and mortgage must be held by the same entity under Rhode Island law, citing case law only from other states, such as Eaton v. Fed. Nat‟l Mortg. Ass‟n, No. 11-1382 (Mass. Super. Jun. 17, 2011). The court cites Bucci, which held that requiring an entity to possess both the note and mortgage would prevent loan servicing, which is a major part of the mortgage industry. 2009 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110. The court did not, however, have to do decide whether the contradicting Eaton decision was binding in Rhode Island because PennyMac held both the note and mortgage at the time of the foreclosure sale.

As to the assignment from MERS to PennyMac, the court found the assignment valid under Rhode Island law. Even if the assignment were found to be invalid, the Rutters, as a non-party to the assignment lack standing to challenge its validity. Regarding allegations of “robosigning,” the court cited Payette, stating that the “contention that MERS’s assignments were executed by an unauthorized signatory is a mere conclusion or legal opinion that is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat [a] Motion for Summary Judgment.” 2011 WL 3794700, slip op. at 19. Furthermore, MERS and PennyMac set forth the full chain of the note’s indorsements, which are presumed authentic.

The court found that PennyMac responded properly in rejecting the Rutters’ QWR attempt under RESPA, as RESPA no longer applied and the Rutters failed to prove that they suffered any actual damages. The fact that the Rutters submitted their QWR just days before the scheduled sale is emphasized heavily, as they had over 2 years to submit the QWR to PennyMac after their default. The Rutters also failed to act on a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure agreement which would have extended their occupancy in the property by 60 days.

The court granted MERS and PennyMac’s motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff homeowners failed to prove any existence of material factual disputes.

Michigan District Court Dismisses Borrower’s Complaint After Failure to Redeem Property within Statutory Period

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In Vollmar v. Federal National Mortgage Association, (12-cv-1119, E.D. Mich. 2012), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss each of the plaintiff’s complaints that sought to invalidate the foreclosure sale of his property and to quiet title. The judge ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing after failing to redeem the property within the allotted period.

In the case at hand, the plaintiff took out a $128,000 mortgage on his property with Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the mortgagee. MERS assigned its interests to BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. (“BACHLS”) in a recorded deed on July 23, 2010. The plaintiff defaulted on his payments and BACHLS instituted foreclosure proceedings in March 2011. The property was purchased in a sheriff sale by Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”), the successor by merger to BACHLS.

The Court addressed the plaintiff’s claims in conjunction with the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

1. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the sheriff’s sale due to his failure to redeem the property within Michigan’s 6-month statutory redemption period. At the close of the statutory period, title is vested with the purchaser and the mortgagor loses standing to challenge the sale. Rather than preserving his right to challenge the foreclosure sale by remaining in the home, as the plaintiff argued, the Court held that the ownership interest “terminated at the conclusion of the sheriff’s sale,” and the plaintiff was merely an “illegal holdover.”

2. Defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain allegations of “fraud or irregularity” that are sufficient to annul the foreclosure sale under a breach of contract claim. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were required to demonstrate by whom the foreclosure proceedings were initiated and failed to produce evidence that BANA acquired BACHLS interest in the mortgage. The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s allegations, noting that the Defendant’s motion papers, foreclosure advertisements, and the initial collection letter to the plaintiff each established that BACHLS both received the mortgage interest from MERS and initiated the foreclosure proceedings. In regards to BANA’s role, the Court referenced Texas Business Organization Codes (Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §10.008(a)(2)(C)), under which BACHLS and BANA merged on July 1, 2011), which established that after the merger of the two companies, BANA acquired all of BACHLS rights, titles, and interests without the need for “any transfer or assignment.”

3. The Court addressed the plaintiff’s slander of title and quiet title claims even though they were abandoned for failure to address them in the response brief. Because slander of title and quiet title “presuppose that plaintiff possesses the ability to establish title” and the Court has already established that the plaintiff’s rights to the property were extinguished at the end of the statutory period, both claims were dismissed.

4. Since the plaintiff failed to allege that the contract left the manner of performance open to the defendant’s discretion, and that the “manner of performance” of the mortgage rested in the defendants hands, an element required to raise a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, the Court refused to accept the cause of action, citing Meyer v. CitiMortgage, Inc. 11-13432, 2012 WL 511995 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2012) which stated that Michigan law does not recognize an independent action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the contract cannot be construed to imply such a covenant by having left the manner of performance open to the defendant’s discretion.

5. Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiffs “seemingly abandoned” claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to reassert that “emotional damages are not available for breach of contract” claims. Citing Kevelighan v. Orlans  Assocs., P.C., 498 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2012) which upheld the dismissal of an emotional distress claim in a breach of mortgage contract suit.

Massachusetts District Court Limits Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Broad Holding From Ibanez By Limiting Challenges to Assignments

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In Aliberti v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 779 F.Supp.2d 242 (D.Mass.2011), the plaintiff homeowner relied on the seemingly broad-reaching holding handed down by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011). On facts similar to Ibanez the plaintiff challenged the assignment from MERS to GMAC, thus challenging GMAC’s ability to foreclose.

The Supreme Court in Ibanez stated “any effort to foreclose by a party lacking jurisdiction and authority to carry out a foreclosure under Massachusetts law is void.“ Then adopted case law stating that attempts to foreclose on a mortgage by a party that “had not yet assigned the mortgage results in a structural defect that goes to the very heart of the defendant’s ability to foreclose and renders foreclosure sale void.”

This holding left the question still open as to whether mortgagors have a legally protected interest in assignments to which they are not a party. The district court read the holding from Ibanez as not providing an independent basis for mortgagors to collaterally contest previously executed mortgage assignments to which they are not a party. Further, the holding granted neither an interest nor rights to the third party.

The court noted that in Ibanez, the land court was specifically tasked with evaluating the sufficiency of the assignment process, and the banks, as foreclosing parties and actual parties to the mortgage assignment, had standing to seek court review of the validity of the assignment process.

Ohio Bankruptcy Court Rules in Favor of Wells Fargo: Failure to Properly Record Mortgage Assignment Does Not Invalidate Mortgage

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In In re Williams, 395 B.R. 33 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008), the Ohio Bankruptcy Court granted the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint, holding that mortgage assignments must be recorded under Ohio law, but that failure to do so does not terminate the underlying mortgage. Additionally, the Trustee could not be a bona fide purchaser and avoid the mortgage since he possessed constructive knowledge of this mortgage.

On May 2, 2005, Earl and Belinda Williams (the Debtors) executed a promissory note in the amount of $137,730 to United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM), secured by Debtors real property, and named MERS as a “nominee for UWM, its successors and assigns.” In November 2007, the Debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11, under the US Bankruptcy Code. Plaintiff Thomas Nolan was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee. In February 2008, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay on the Property, and subsequently the Trustee initiated an adversarial proceeding to avoid the mortgage lien filed in the name of  MERS and alleged that under Ohio law, the assignment of the mortgage must be recorded on behalf of the holder of the note.

The plaintiff brought suit on two accounts. First, under the Trustee’s strong arm powers granted by the Bankruptcy Code § 544,  he alleged that “as a bona fide purchaser for value, he may avoid the mortgage held by Wells Fargo on account of the failure to record an assignment of the Mortgage.” The court elucidates that the Bankruptcy Code gives the Trustee power of a bona fide purchase for value if a hypothetical purchaser could have obtained that bona fide status. Under Ohio law, the assignment of a mortgage must be “recorded to protect those lien interests from avoidance by a bona fide purchaser of real property.” The parties disagree whether mortgages must be recorded under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Court ultimately determined that the Bankruptcy Code did include mortgages under the requirement to record “instruments of writing properly executed for the conveyance or unencumbrance of lands. . . . ” but that the failure to record the assignment of the mortgage did not terminate “the underlying mortgage and the lien of the underlying mortgage.” Since the Trustee had constructive knowledge of the mortgage, he could not then avoid and acquire bona fide purchaser status due to Wells Fargo’s failure to record its assignment. The Court then dismissed the first cause of action.

Second, the Trustee argued for the Disallowance of Wells Fargo’s claim on based his ability to avoid the mortgage (as argued above). The Trustee’s claim falls under § 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which establishes “grounds upon which a claim that has been objected to by a party in interest may be disallowed.” The Court relied upon subsection 1 which permits disallowance of a claim that is “unenforceable against the debtor or property of the debtor.” The claim was then dismissed “without prejudice to the Trustee’s ability to object under Code § 502 and the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure to any proof of claim filed by Wells Fargo or any other party claiming to be a creditor of the Debtors in connection with the Note on grounds not determined through this adversary proceeding.”

Oregon District Court Dismisses Borrower’s Suit to Invalidate Foreclosure in Favor of BOA and MERS, Stating Lack of Merit

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In Moreno v. Bank of America., N.A., 3:11-CV-1265-HZ, (D. Or. Apr. 27, 2012) the U.S. District Court of Oregon, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff had alleged violations under several federal and state Acts, each of which the Judge rejected based on lack of merit.

The plaintiff brought action to invalidate a foreclosure sale, which, although dated earlier than the filed complaint, had not yet occurred. On March 29th, 2007, Moreno borrowed $220,000 from Aegis Wholesale Corporation. A promissory note in favor of Aegis was secured by a Deed of Trust (DOT) against the plaintiff’s real property and identified Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of Oregon (Fidelity) as trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the “beneficiary under this Security Instrument.” MERS later assigned the DOT to BAC Home Loans Servicing (BACHLS) in June of 2010. On the same day, BACHLS appointed ReconTrust Co. as successor trustee to Fidelity. Fidelity filed a Notice of Default and Election to Sell (NODES), initiating foreclosure proceedings against Moreno, who had been in default since July, 2009.

The Court dismissed each of the plaintiff’s complaints in turn, starting with his first two claims of relief based on violations of the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA). The plaintiff claimed that under the DOT, MERS lacked authority to assign beneficial interests to BACHLS, who in turn, lacked power to appoint ReconTrust as successor trustee. The Judge, Marco A. Hernandez, stated that he had previously held that “naming MERS as a beneficiary in a DOT does not violate the OTDA,” and while other judges in the district have found otherwise, he would continue to uphold this ruling. The plaintiff alleged that a 3-year gap between the execution of the DOT and MERS’s assignment to BACHLS  showed there “must have” been unrecorded assignments (in violation of ORS 86.735(1)). The Court found that allegation was both speculative and based on an erroneous assertion of fact (the Complaint mistakenly names Bank of America as the original lender, whereas the DOT names Aegis, and subsequent documents state Bank of America was assigned interest only in 2010). The second OTDA based claim was that the defective notice was invalid for failure to include a correct statement of the amount in default. The Court dismissed it because the plaintiff had not “plead his ability to cure the default, that his damages resulted from the lost opportunity to cure the default, and that he requested information from the trustee under O.R.S. § 86.757 and O.R.S. § 86.759.”

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Next, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim brought under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for both the failure to meet the 1-year statute of limitations and for having incorrectly brought the action against Bank of America rather than Aegis, the original lender. Under TILA a claim may only be brought against the Creditor, who is the person who “regularly extends… consumer credit” and “to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable.” 15 U.S.C. Sect. 1602(g). The plaintiff further argued that he is Hispanic and “as a result” did not understand the nature of the loan documents. He therefore requested equitable tolling, which suspends the “limitation period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosure that form the basis of the TILA action,” which he stated was in 2011 after having spoken to a translator who explained his loan audit. The Court found this unconvincing on several accounts. First, since the complaint brought no allegations in support of equitable tolling, it failed to state a TILA violation. Second, the plaintiff never alleged he did not speak English. Third, equitable tolling is applied when the 1-year period would be “unjust” or “frustrate the purpose” of the TILA. Fourth,  the plaintiff must bring allegations “that the defendant had fraudulently concealed information that would have allowed plaintiff to discover his claim,” engaged in action to prevent plaintiff from discovering a claim, or encountered “some other extraordinary circumstance would have made it reasonable for Plaintiff not to discover his claim within the limitations period.” Garcia v Wachovia Mortg. Corp. 676 F. Supp.2d 895, 905 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) for failure to meet the statute of limitations since his claim arose out of the origination of the loan in 2007, and his arguments for equitable tolling “are unavailing.”  Plaintiff also failed to allege that a RESPA violation resulted in actual damage, a requirement of a RESPA claim.

The plaintiff’s claim under Oregon’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) was dismissed because at the time of the loan, in 2007, UTPA had not yet been amended to include “loans and extensions of credit,” O.R.S. 646.605(6) (2010), therefore plaintiff’s loan was not covered by the Act. Additionally, UTPA claims must be brought within a year from the discovery of the “unlawful method, act or practice,” but the plaintiff failed to assert that the discovery of a UTPA violation could not have been made at the time of the loan