In Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Delphonse, 64 A.D.3d 624 (2d Dept. 2009) the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department found that the lender, Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide), had standing to foreclose on the Delphonses, the homeowners in the case, because the court found that the Delphonses waived the issue at the pre-trial stage, and furthermore that Countrywide met its burden of proof. The court held, “[the Delphonses] waived the defense of lack of standing (see CPLR 3211[a][3]) by failing to either make a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground or by asserting that defense in their answer. . . . On its motion for summary judgment, [Countrywide] established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the mortgage, the underlying note, and evidence of a default.”
Tag Archives: mortgage
United States Bankruptcy Court Bound by Precedent to Recognize Bank’s Standing in Foreclosure Action, but Opines on MERS’s Flawed Assignment Process and Status as Agent
In In re Agard, 444 BR 231, 235 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated in part sub nom. Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., BR 8-10-77338 REG (E.D.N.Y. 2012), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York held that U.S. Bank, the assignee bank in this case, had standing to foreclose because the state court had already determined that the assignment of the mortgage by MERS to U.S. Bank was a valid assignment. The court stated the issue as follows: “[homeowner] argues that the only interest U.S. Bank holds in the underlying mortgage was received by way of an assignment from. . . MERS, as a ‘nominee’ for the original lender. [Homeowner]’s argument raises a fundamental question as to whether MERS had the legal authority to assign a valid and enforceable interest in the subject mortgage.”
In holding for U.S. Bank, the court stated the homeowner’s argument had to be rejected because of the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court stated, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which together stand for the proposition that lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct appellate review of state court judgments.” Also, the court found that res judicata precludes the homeowner from prevailing here: “The state court already has determined that U.S. Bank is a secured creditor with standing to foreclose and this Court cannot alter that determination in order to deny U.S. Bank standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.”
However, the court in this case found it necessary to expound upon whether it believed that U.S. Bank had standing to foreclose, despite the state court’s binding opinion. “[T]he Court believes that it is appropriate to set forth its analysis on the issue of whether [U.S. Bank], absent the Judgment of Foreclosure, would have standing to bring the instant motion.” The court began its analysis by stating, “in order to have standing to seek relief from stay, [U.S. Bank]. . . must show that [it] holds both the Mortgage and the Note. . . [U.S. Bank] can prove that [it] is the holder of the Note by providing the Court with proof of a written assignment of the Note, or by demonstrating that [it] has physical possession of the Note endorsed over to it. . . the Assignment of Mortgage is not sufficient to establish an effective assignment of the Note.” Therefore, U.S. Bank would have to show that MERS both assigned the note and that it had authority to assign the note. Regarding MERS’s authority to assign the note, the court held, “[w]hat remains undisputed is that MERS did not have any rights with respect to the Note and other than as described above, MERS played no role in the transfer of the Note… [U.S. Bank]’s failure to show that [it] holds the Note should be fatal to the Movant’s standing.”
Furthermore, the court took issue with MERS’s status as agent of the original mortgagee. The court stated, “the record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency relationship exists under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members. According to MERS, the principal/agent relationship among itself and its members is created by the MERS rules of membership and terms and conditions, as well as the Mortgage itself. However, none of the documents expressly creates an agency relationship or even mentions the word “agency.” MERS would have this Court cobble together the documents and draw inferences from the words contained in those documents.” The court went even further in its criticism, saying, “Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon the statutory definition of ‘mortgagee,’ MERS’s position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best. . . . even if MERS had assigned the Mortgage acting on behalf of the entity which held the Note at the time of the assignment, this Court finds that MERS did not have authority, as ‘nominee’ or agent, to assign the Mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific written directions by its principal. This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a ‘common agent’ for undisclosed principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its distortion of its alleged ‘nominee’ status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: ‘The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on which part they were touching at any given time.’ ”
Absent the state court precedent that the court was bound to follow, the court likely would have emphatically refused to recognize MERS’s authority to assign the note as well as the mortgage, and in turn would have prevented U.S. Bank from proceeding with the foreclosure. Thus, in future cases before the court with similar facts that are not bound by state law precedent, MERS and any assignee bank will not have standing to foreclose.
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Holds that Assignee Bank Lacks Standing to Foreclose for Failure to Provide Evidence of Valid Note Assignment
In Bank of New York v Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274 (2d Dept. 2011), the court stated, “[t]he principal issue ripe for determination by this Court . . . is whether MERS, as nominee and mortgagee for purposes of recording, can assign the right to foreclose upon a mortgage to a [bank] in a foreclosure action absent MERS’s right to, or possession of, the actual underlying promissory note.” In making this determination, the court outlined the following rules regarding standing in foreclosure proceedings: “[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, a [bank] has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced. . . . [A]n assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery.”
The court found that in this case, “as ‘nominee,’ MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the [original mortgagee]. Hence, although . . . MERS [had] the right to assign the mortgages themselves, it did not specifically [have] the right to assign the underlying notes, and the assignment of the notes was thus beyond MERS’s authority.” Based on these findings, the court concluded, “MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the [bank]. Consequently, the [bank] failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”
New York Supreme Court Holds that Assignee Bank Lacks Standing to Foreclose for Failure to Validate MERS’s Authority to Assign and Condemns Frivolous Conduct Relating to “Robosigning”
In HSBC Bank v Taher, 32 Misc. 3d 1208(A) (Sup. Ct. 2011), the New York Supreme Court of Kings County held that an assignee bank conducting a foreclosure action must submit proof of the assignor’s authority to assign the mortgage, including the underlying note, on behalf of the original mortgagee in order for the assignee to lawfully conduct a foreclosure.
In this case, the court found that the assignee bank, HSBC, did not have standing to foreclose on Taher, the homeowner. The court stated, “the instant action must be dismissed because plaintiff HSBC lacks standing to bring this action. MERS lacked the authority to assign the subject Taher mortgage to HSBC and there is no evidence that MERS physically possessed the Taher notes.”
The court went on to explain that MERS must have authority to assign both the mortgage and the underlying note in order for an assignee to lawfully conduct a foreclosure. The court stated, “even if MERS had authority to transfer the mortgage to HSBC… MERS [was not] the note holder. . . . MERS cannot transfer something it never proved it possessed. . . . [Thus,] MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the . . . assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to [HSBC]. Consequently, [HSBC] failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”
In addition to finding that the assignee bank lacked standing, the court also took the opportunity in this case to highlight its intention to prevent the degradation of the foreclosure process, particularly concerning the practice of “robosigning.” Citing the need to “protect the integrity of the foreclosure process and prevent wrongful foreclosures,” the court announced its institution of a new filing requirement in any foreclosure action. This requirement is that assignees must “file an affirmation certifying that counsel has taken reasonable steps—including inquiry to banks and lenders and careful review of the papers filed in the case—to verify the accuracy of documents filed in support of residential foreclosures.” The court scrutinized HSBC’s foreclosure filing practices, which included instances where the court believed robosigning occurred, and reprimanded the bank and its counsel for its conduct. The court concluded that the conduct bordered on frivolous, and determined that further inquiry, by way of a hearing, was necessary.
The Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court Holds that Assignee Lenders Must Produce Evidence of MERS’s Authority to Assign Mortgage Notes to Lawfully Conduct a Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department in Aurora Loan Services v Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609 (App. Div. 2011) held that a mortgage lender does not have standing to foreclose if it cannot establish its lawful status as assignee. In this case, MERS assigned both a mortgage and mortgage note to Aurora Services (“the Assignee”), who subsequently moved to foreclose on the subject property. At the time of the assignment, MERS was the holder of the mortgage, but not the note, which was held by the original mortgagee. MERS claimed that the assignment was valid because it was acting on behalf of the original mortgagee when it assigned the note. The court rejected this argument and held that the assignment was not valid because the Assignee failed to prove that MERS received an explicit grant of authority to assign the note from the original mortgagee. The court explained that, in general, MERS can legitimately assign notes. However, if the assignee moves to conduct a foreclosure, it must produce evidence of MERS’s authority to assign, which must be granted from the original lenders. The court further held that the evidence must show that the original mortgagee explicitly granted MERS such authority to assign.
Here, the lender failed to produce any evidence of MERS’s authority to assign the notes. Thus, the court found that MERS could not assign the note and therefore the lender did not have standing to foreclose.
Oregon District Court Holds that MERS Must Record Every Assignment of Trust Deed to Lawfully Conduct a Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The District Court of Oregon in Hooker v Northwest Trustee Services, Inc., 2011 WL 2119103 (D.Or. May 25, 2011) granted homeowners’ motion for declaratory judgment preventing MERS from continuing with a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. The court first held that MERS could only be a nominee or agent of a lender, and not have a beneficial interest in the trust deed, where MERS was not listed as the beneficiary on the note. However, the court did not hold that this precluded MERS from lawfully initiating a non-judicial foreclosure. The problem in this case was that MERS only recorded the final assignment of the trust deed, instead of recording every assignment as required by law. In failing to record every assignment of the trust deed in this case, the court found that MERS could not lawfully conduct a non-judicial foreclosure.
MERS Must Possess Note or Have Authority to Act on Behalf of Note Holder in Order to Foreclose, According to Massachusetts Supreme Court
In Eaton v Federal National Mortgage Association, 462 Mass. 569 (Mass. 2012), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed “the propriety of a foreclosure by power of sale undertaken by a mortgage holder that did not hold the underlying mortgage note.” In this case, the homeowner executed both a promissory note, solely to the lender, and a mortgage to the lender and to MERS. Under the terms of the mortgage, the lender was referred to as “lender” and MERS was referred to as “mortgagee.” As mortgagee, MERS was stipulated to hold legal title to the property with the power of sale “solely as nominee.” MERS was also given explicit authority under the mortgage to exercise the right to foreclose the property as nominee for lender. Subsequently, MERS assigned its interest to Green Tree servicing, LLC (Green Tree). The assignment was recorded in the county register of deeds, but without evidence of transfer of the note.
Eventually, the homeowner fell behind on his mortgage payments and Green Tree moved to foreclose. Green Tree was the highest bidder at the foreclosure auction, and assigned the rights to its bid to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae later moved to evict the homeowner from the property. In response, the homeowner filed a counterclaim, arguing that the underlying foreclosure was invalid because Green Tree did not hold the note at the time of the foreclosure action. The housing court and the superior court found in favor of the homeowner, holding that a mortgagee must possess both the mortgage and the mortgage note to have authority to foreclose.
However, the Supreme Court, transferring the case to its court on its own motion, came to a different conclusion. The Supreme Court found that the lower courts relied only on common law for their holdings, and that statutory law, particularly G.L.c. 183, § 21 and G.L.c. 244, § 14, changes the analysis. Relying on these stautes, the court held “that where a mortgagee acts with the authority and on behalf of the note holder, the mortgagee may comply with these statutory requirements without physically possessing or actually holding the mortgage note.” Whether a mortgagee is acting with authority and on behalf of the note holder is a an agency question, which the Supreme Court could not address based on the record.
The court also held that the ruling only had prospective effect, and thus the ruling “appl[ies] only to mortgage foreclosure sales for which the mandatory notice of sale has been given after the date of this opinion.” However, the court also applied the ruling to the parties in the case, and the court remanded the case to the superior court to determine whether Green Tree was acting with authority and on behalf of the lender at the time of the closing.
