Benefit Ratios for Qualified Residential Mortgages

As I had noted previously,

the long awaited Proposed Rule that addresses the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgages has finally been released, with comments due by October 30th. The Proposed Rule’s preferred definition of a QRM is the same as a Qualified Mortgage. There is going to be a lot of comments on this proposed rule because it indicates that a QRM will not require a down payment. This is a far cry from the 20 percent down payment required by the previous proposed rule (the 20011 Proposed Rule).

The Proposed Rule notes that in “developing the definition of a QRM in the original proposal,” the six agencies [OCC, FRS, FDIC, FHFA, SEC and HUD] responsible for it “articulated several goals and principles.” (250)

First, the agencies stated that QRMs should be of very high credit quality, given that Congress exempted QRMs completely from the credit risk retention requirements.

Second, the agencies recognized that setting fixed underwriting rules to define a QRM could exclude many mortgages to creditworthy borrowers. In this regard, the agencies recognized that a trade-off exists between the lower implementation and regulatory costs of providing fixed and simple eligibility requirements and the lower probability of default attendant to requirements that incorporate detailed and compensating underwriting factors.

* * *

Fourth, the agencies sought to implement standards that would be transparent and verifiable to participants in the market.” (250)

After reviewing the comments to the 2011 Proposed Rule, the agencies concluded that “a QRM definition that aligns with the definition of a QM meets the statutory goals and directive of section 15G of the Exchange Act to limit credit risk, preserves access to affordable credit, and facilitates compliance.” (256)

I was somewhat disturbed, however, by the following passage. The agencies are

concerned about the prospect of imposing further constraints on mortgage credit availability at this time, especially as such constraints might disproportionately affect groups that have historically been disadvantaged in the mortgage market, such as lower-income, minority, or first-time homebuyers. (263)

While it is important to make residential credit broadly available, the agencies will be doing borrowers no favors if their loans are not sustainable and they end up in default or foreclosure. The agencies should come up with a metric that balances responsible underwriting with access to credit and apply that metric to the definition of a QRM.

Quercia et al. have developed one such metric, which they refer to as a “benefit ratio.” The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to QRM mortgages.” (20) A metric of this sort would go a long way to ensuring that there is transparency for homeowners as to the likelihood that they can not only get a mortgage but also pay it off and keep their homes.

Misleading CoreLogic Report on Qualified Mortgage Rules

The Wall Street Journal reported (behind its paywall) uncritically on a recently released CoreLogic report about the supposed impact of the new Qualified Mortgage rules issued last month by the CFPB on the mortgage market.  The report is very flawed.

The report states that “the issuance of final Dodd-Frank related regulations now underway represent a watershed moment that will impact the size of mortgage market [sic] and performance for many years to come.” (3) In particular, it argues that the new CFPB Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential Mortgage rules “remove 60  percent of loans.” (4)

The methodology here is superficially sophisticated, employing a

waterfall approach . . . where loans that do not qualify for QM were sequentially removed.  The loan features that do not meet the QM requirements include loans with back-end [Debt To Income] above 43 percent, negative amortizations, interest only, balloons, low or no documentation, and loans with more than a 30 year term. (3)

The report thus implies that the QM regulations will reduce the number of mortgages originated by nearly two thirds.  But the report ignores the obvious dynamics that one would find in a well-functioning market.  Once certain products are banned  (let’s say interest only mortgages), borrowers will have at least three options.  First, they can take the path implied by CoreLogic and exit the mortgage market thereby becoming one of the supposedly 60 percent of loans that are “removed” from the market.  Or, they can seek a mortgage product that complies with the new rules (perhaps an ARM) that will allow them to buy the home of their choice.  Or, they can choose to buy a cheaper house with a mortgage that complies with the rules and is affordable to them.  It is very likely that many borrowers will go with the second or third option, resulting in a different but not severely diminished mortgage market.

Yes, the new rules will change the types of mortgages that are available.  Yes, loans will be more conservatively underwritten to ensure that they are sustainable.  Yes, home prices will need to find a new equilibrium.  But no, CoreLogic, the new rules will not destroy the mortgage market.