Tag Archives: standing

Homeowner Can Challenge Mortgage Assignment

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Judge Kennelly has ruled that a homeowner can challenge a mortgage assignment under Illinois law in Elesh v. MERS et al., No. 12 C 10355 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2013). The Court stated that

Defendants argue that Elesh is not a party to the assignment and thus lacks standing to challenge it. Only one of the cases upon which defendants rely, however, is an Illinois case, and that case makes it clear that this supposed “rule” has exceptions. See Bank of America Nat’l Ass’n v. Bassman FBT, LLC, No. 2-11-0729, 2012 IL App (2d) 110729, 981 N.E.2d 1, 6-11 (2012). The basic requirements of standing are that the plaintiff suffered an injury to a legally cognizable interest and is asserting his own legal rights rather than those of a third party. See id. at 6. Elesh unquestionably meets the first requirement; the recorded assignment constitutes a cloud on his title, and Deutsche Bank recently relied on the assignment to prosecute a foreclosure action against him. Elesh also has a viable argument that in challenging the validity of the assignment, he is asserting his own rights and not someone else’s rights. For example, given Deutsche Bank’s apparent lack of possession of the original note, Elesh is put at risk of multiple liability as long as Deutsche Bank claims to hold the mortgage. See id. at 7-8 (citing cases indicating that an obligor has an interest in ensuring that he will not have to pay the same claim twice). In any event, Illinois law, to the extent there is much of it on this point, appears to recognize an obligor’s right to attack an assignment as void or invalid under certain circumstances. (3)

This is a pretty significant case, at least in Illinois, as it provides homeowners with a way to defend against a foreclosure action that does not rely upon whether the loan is in default or not. The Court takes seriously the possibility that the homeowner could otherwise be liable for the same debt twice.  Commentators and courts have downplayed that risk, so it is notable that this Court has taken this position. Time will tell if other courts do so as well.

 

 

 

 

[HT April Charney]

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, in Favor of Borrower, Vacates and Dismisses Judgment

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The court in Nelson v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 97 So.3d 770 (2012) the Court granted Fannie Mae’s summary judgment as to its ejectment action against the borrower because the Court found that Fannie Mae received valid title to the property from MERS subsequent to the foreclosure sale conducted by MERS. However, on appeal, court of civil appeals of Alabama vacated the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.

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The court of civil appeals reversed a decision by the lower court holding that under the state’s law MERS had the power and authority to conduct the foreclosure sale in its own name and the special warranty deed from MERS to Fannie Mae was valid and gave Fannie Mae superior legal title to the property. On appeal this was reversed.

Likewise, the lower court also originally held that an assignment of mortgage from MERS to the servicer was unnecessary for MERS to proceed with the foreclosure on behalf of the servicer. Accordingly the court of civil appeals also vacated this.

Alabama Court Rules That Demonstration of Note Ownership is Not Needed

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The court in Farkas v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc, et al., 447 F. App’x 972 (11th Cir. 2011) found that Alabama is a non-judicial foreclosure state and that the party seeking foreclosure was not required to demonstrate ownership of the promissory note before taking action on the corresponding mortgage. This action involved MERS as the foreclosing mortgagee.

The debtor claimed that Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) required that the party seeking foreclosure had to prove an interest in the note. However, the court reasoned that the UCC was not relevant to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.

Hawaiin Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Allegations of Fraud Against MERS and Grants Summary Judgement

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The court in Sakugawa v. MERS et al, D. Hawaii, 1:10-cv-00028 (Feb. 25, 2011) granted summary judgment in favor of MERS. Thus rejecting the plaintiff’s accusations for fraud and claims of state law violations regarding loan origination.

The court also found that MERS was not involved in the loan origination process and was not in contact with the plaintiff regarding the transaction. Thus the court found that there was no basis to find that MERS committed any fraudulent, unfair or deceptive acts regarding the loan consummation.

The Court found that MERS was the correct mortgagee under the security instrument, thus the mortgage permitted MERS to foreclose and sell the property.

Pennsylvania Appellate Court Affirms MERS’ Standing to Foreclose

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The Pennsylvania appellate court in MERS v. Estate of Harriet L. Watson, et al., Superior Court of Pennsylvania # 637 WDA (2006), affirmed the standing of MERS to foreclose.

The case involved counter-claims as well as affirmative defenses filed by the estate of a deceased borrower in response to a foreclosure suit brought by MERS in 2003. The estate’s defenses and counter-claims included the theory that MERS, in someway, lacked standing because it was not the “real party-in-interest.” Moreover, MERS could not bring a foreclosure suit in Pennsylvania since it did not register as a foreign corporation doing business in Pennsylvania.

After consideration of the estate’s claims, the appellate court disregarded the estate’s challenges to MERS standing to foreclose due to the clear language of the mortgage itself. The court then held that MERS was not required to register as a foreign corporation because the act of acquiring, recording, or enforcing a mortgage lien constituted a specific exception under 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 4122 to the general requirement that companies “doing business” in Pennsylvania must obtain a certificate of authority in order to file suit in Pennsylvania. Such actions, by statutory definition, do not constitute “doing business.”

Illinois Federal Appellate Court Rules That MERS Had Sufficient Authority to Commence Foreclosure Proceeding in its Capacity as an Agent

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The federal appellate court in MERS v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522 [7th Cir. 2004] ruled that MERS had a sufficient authority to commence a foreclosure proceeding, in its capacity as an agent on behalf of its principal.

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At issue in this case was an application to confirm a sale. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal based upon well-established law that Court orders denying confirmation to judicial sales are not final decisions, and thus are not appealable.

Additionally, implicit in the court’s holding was recognition that MERS has standing to commence a foreclosure proceeding as agent on behalf of its principal. Indeed, the Estrella Court did not dismiss the proceeding in its entirety for lack of standing by the agent, rather cited to Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 141 F.3d 314, 319 [7th Cir. 1998] which recognized the capacity of an agent to commence a proceeding “[w]hen the principal’s interests are affected by the litigation, the principal’s citizenship counts even if the agent is the sole litigant.”

The federal appellate court did not issue a blanket ban to suits commenced by MERS as an agent on behalf of its principals. Instead, in suits brought by agents, it directs federal district courts to ascertain the citizenship of the principal of the plaintiff to determine whether federal diversity jurisdiction exists.

Georgia Court Authoritatively Recognizes MERS’ Right to Foreclose

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The court in American Equity Mortgage, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Chattahoochee National Bank, # 05-cv-1951 (Forsyth Cty. Sup. Ct., Dec. 29. 2005) authoritatively recognized the right of MERS to foreclose. This case involved an action to enjoin an immediate judicial sale due to equitable subrogation in which the court recognized the validity of a lien held by MERS and MERS’ ability to enforce it.

After considering arguments and an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that “MERS, in its capacity as grantee in the deed to secure debt and as nominee for American, or its successor in interest as the holder of the note, is the entity that would suffer irreparable harm if [Chatahoochee] foreclosed on its judgment lien and is the entity entitled to seek an injunction in this case. MERS is entitled to enforce the American Deed to Secure Debt per its terms.”

The court awarded MERS a permanent injunction precluding Chatahoochee or its successors or assigns from selling or foreclosing on the property as long as the deed held by MERS remained in effect.