California Court Finds Plaintiff Lacked Standing to Bring Action

The court in deciding Mottale v. Kimball Tirey & St. John, LLP, 2013 U.S. Dist. 146293 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) ultimately granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged unnamed investors brought an unlawful detainer action in state court foreclosed his home. Plaintiff also alleged his loans were securitized from a pool of funds provided by unknown investors who misrepresented the identities of the actual lenders. Plaintiff alleged that the assignment was invalid and fraudulent because the assignment documents were forged and defective. Plaintiff further alleged the notice of default (“NOD”) was void because BAC had “no prior recorded interest” in the Property when Recontrust recorded the NOD. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged that the NTS 2 was also fraudulent because Reconstrust had no legal right to record a substitution of trustee.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on several grounds. First, defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to show he tendered the amount owed under default, and thus plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure.

Second, defendants argue several courts in California have rejected plaintiff’s securitization theory. Defendants further contend that possession of the promissory note was not a pre-requisite to commence a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. Defendants also pointed to a number of deficiencies in the complaint, including failure to joint an indispensible party and defective and insufficient claims under other statutes.

After considering both arguments, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

California Court Dismisses Claim Due to lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim

The court in deciding Britto v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146978 (N.D. Cal. 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In this foreclosure action, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs alleged a host of violations during the securitization process. Realty Mortgage allegedly did not endorse or record a sale or assignment of the deed of trust to any entity and Countrywide Home Loans allegedly did not endorse or record a sale or assignment to BNY Mellon.

Plaintiffs also argued that BOA did not retain servicing rights to the deed of trust, BNY Mellon did not have any interest as legal trustee of the trust, and “no entity . . . had any valid lien or legal, recorded, documentable, standing on the plaintiff’s mortgage loan”

Moreover, defendant (MERS) was named beneficiary and nominee in the deed of trust prior to the securitization. In 2011, MERS transferred all of its beneficial interest under the deed of trust to BNY Mellon. Plaintiffs thus alleged that after the deed of trust and promissory note were securitized in 2006 and improper transfers of ownership to the deed of trust occurred, MERS’ nominal rights were extinguished. Thus, MERS could not have properly transferred its interests to BNY Mellon in 2011, and BNY Mellon cannot foreclose on the property.

The court rejected these arguments finding that the plaintiff’s argument failed.

Supreme Court of Vermont Denied a Motion Requesting a Declaration That U.S. Bank Had Violated Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)

The court in deciding Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc., 2013 VT 96 (Vt. 2013) reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the counts that alleged irregularities in the transfer of the note and mortgage unconnected to the PSA. The court also partially remanded certain claims.

Plaintiff borrowers brought suit against defendant bank in which they sought a declaratory judgment that defendant had no right to enforce either a note or a mortgage and that defendant had violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal for failure to state a claim, of their action for (1) a declaratory judgment that defendant U.S. Bank National Association cannot enforce the mortgage and promissory note for the debt associated with plaintiffs’ purchase of their house based on irregularities and fraud in the transfer of both instruments, (2) a declaration that U.S. Bank has violated Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by asserting its right to enforce the mortgage and note, and (3) attorney’s fees and costs under the CFA.

Plaintiffs also appealed the trial court’s failure to enter a default judgment against defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). After considering the merits of both claims, the court ultimately affirmed in part and reversed in part.

District Court Rejects Claims That MERS Lacked Standing

The court in deciding Pratt v. Bank of Am. NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151671 (D. Me. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged that the existence of forged documents related to a mortgage loan and that MERS lacked standing to transfer the plaintiff’s deed to Bank of America. The plaintiff wanted his promissory note returned to him along with the deed of trust.

The plaintiff’s assertion revolved around the claim that the separation of the deed of trust from the promissory note by the intervention of MERS as a nominee for Quicken Loans somehow breached the contracts between Pratt and Quicken or Bank of America. Plaintiff claimed that MERS, as nominee, had no “standing” to transfer the note and/or mortgage to Bank of America and that Bank of America has no “standing” to enforce these instruments.

Bank of America filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand and his motion for entry of default. The court also granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Ohio Court Finds That Plaintiffs Were Not Bona Fide Purchasers

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth Appellate District, in deciding Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Casey, 2013-Ohio-4686 (Ohio Ct. App., Fairfield County Oct. 21, 2013) affirmed the lower court’s judgment and held that the plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers and the defendants had standing.

The court found that under the doctrine of lis pendens plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of a property encumbered by the mortgage because they took title during the pendency of a declaratory judgment action to which they were a party. Consequently, they did not take the property free from unrecorded liens. The claim that the mortgage was invalid was barred by res judicata as the validity of the mortgage was fully litigated in the declaratory judgment action.

Lastly, the court found that the defendant had standing to seek the foreclosure, as it was the current holder of the note and mortgage, and that it had physical possession of the note and mortgage documents.

Michigan Court Finds All Six of Plaintiff’s Claims Without Merit

The court in deciding McGlade v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152610 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2013) granted defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff, McGlade brought six causes of action: Count I-Fraudulent Misrepresentation; Count II-Estoppel; Count III-Negligence; Count IV-Violation of the state Regulation of Collection Practices Act; Count V-Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; and Count VI-violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act.

The court in granting defendant summary judgment noted that the plaintiff’s factual basis for the fraudulent misrepresentation claim that defendant “knew or should have known that she would not qualify for a loan modification when she inquired about one” was insufficient.

Ultimately, the court found that the misconduct alleged by McGlade did not relate to the foreclosure procedure itself, and therefore she had failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Tennessee Court Grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as Wells Fargo Had Ownership Interest in the Note & Deed

The court in deciding McKee v. Am. Brokers Conduit, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152657 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs claimed that (1) Wells Fargo didn’t have lawful ownership or a security interest in the property because the note and deed of trust were unlawfully sold; (2) Leak was not authorized to execute the assignment from MERS to Wells Fargo; (3) Wells Fargo could not show possession or ownership of the original note or deed and therefore had an imperfect security interest; and (4) ABC had no authority to execute the assignment because it was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the assignment.

The court found the plaintiff’s line of reasoning factually incorrect. The court noted that the note was made payable to Wells Fargo and the deed was assigned to Wells Fargo. Both the endorsed note and the assignment agreement were recorded. Furthermore, counsel for Wells Fargo had the original note in his possession. Finally, both the note and the deed allowed for such an assignment. Plaintiffs had presented the court with no evidence to rebut these facts. As such, the plaintiffs had not offered enough to challenge Wells Fargo’s enforcement of the note and the court granted summary judgment.