Tag Archives: stay foreclosure

Michigan Dissmisses Plaintiff’s Action Seeking to Set Aside Sale of His Residence

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The court in deciding Liddell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153897 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff commenced the action seeking to set aside a sheriff’s sale of his residential property. Plaintiff’s Complaint raised the following claims: Count I, Fraudulent Misrepresentation; Count II, Estoppel; Count III, Negligence; Count IV, Violation of Michigan’s Occupational Code, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 339.915 and .918; and Count V, Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

Defendants maintained that all of plaintiff’s claims challenging the foreclosure sale were subject to dismissal because plaintiff failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. Defendants further argued that even if plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the expiration of the statutory redemption period, his claims were subject to dismissal because he failed to state any valid claims upon which relief can be granted.

The Court agreed that plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege any claims upon which relief may be granted.

Texas Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Wrongful Foreclosure Action, as MERS was Authorized to Assign the Note and Deed of Trust to Defendant

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The court in deciding Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153947, 2013 WL 5781208 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s foreclosure action was wrongful. Also plaintiff alleged that the deed of trust was not enforceable due to that lack of ownership in the note by the defendants.

Plaintiff asserted that First NLC, rather than MERS, was the only party authorized to assign the note and deed of trust to the defendant; she asserted that assignment is only complete upon recording, and recording has not been effectuated; and she asserted that the deed of trust and the transfer of lien document were fraudulently created, and therefore ineffective as a security instrument and assignment, respectively. Additionally, plaintiff asserted that the note and deed of trust were not enforceable because they had been split.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant argued that plaintiff has not stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure because she has not alleged that her home had been foreclosed.

Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims and the broader legal theories she asserted; however, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend to allow her an opportunity to assert a valid claim.

Supreme Court of New York Grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss and Denied Defendant’s Cross-Motion

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The court in deciding Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Arthur, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4875, 2013 NY Slip Op 32625(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2013) granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and denied the defendant’s [Arthur] cross-motion.

The Plaintiff commenced a foreclosure of a mortgage. Plaintiff moved for an order: (i) pursuant to CPLR § 3212 granting summary judgment on its foreclosure claim; (ii) pursuant to CPLR § 3211(b) and § 3212, dismissing with prejudice each of the affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by the defendant in his answer.

The court noted that in a mortgage foreclosure case, “a plaintiff may establish a prima facie right to foreclosure by producing the mortgage documents underlying the transaction and undisputed evidence of nonpayment.” Thus, once the plaintiff established its right to foreclosure, the burden is on the defendant “to raise a triable issue regarding his affirmative defenses and counterclaims in opposition to foreclosure.”

Here, the plaintiff made out its prima facie by producing undisputed affidavits. The court found that Arthur’s response failed to produce competent evidence of any defense to raise an issue of fact. Thus, the court eventually granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied Arthur’s cross-motion.

United States District Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA Claims

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The court in deciding Hopkins v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155547, 2013 WL 5888086 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA claims.

Plaintiff referenced three statutes in their complaint: TILA, RESPA, and GLBA. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated TILA by “withholding certain disclosures and documentation.” Plaintiff also claimed that defendant violated RESPA by making “loan servicing errors.” Plaintiff, however, did not state which provisions of these statutes defendant violated. With regard to the GLBA, Plaintiff alleged neither how defendant violated the statute, nor which provision defendant violated.

Accordingly, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and the complaint did not include any of the basic information necessary to be properly considered a complaint. Defendant also claimed that plaintiff’s complaint contained none of the information required by Rule 8(a). Specifically, with regard to Rule 8(a)(2)‘s requirement of “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”

The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s complaint was nothing more than an unadorned collection of vague and conclusory statements, in which the plaintiff failed to plead any specific facts supporting the claim that Green Tree somehow violated the law. Additionally, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to identify a single provision of RESPA and TILA that Green Tree allegedly violated. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Wrongful Foreclosure, Wrongful Ejectment, and Quiet Title Claims

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The court in deciding Billete v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155544, 2013 WL 5840105 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2013) dismissed with prejudice the portions of plaintiff’s actions, including: Count I (wrongful foreclosure, wrongful ejectment, and quiet title), Count III (fraud), and Count V (unfair and deceptive acts and practices) based upon the closure of Deutsche Bank’s trust, to which MERS purportedly assigned plaintiffs’ loan, and any other alleged violations of the Trust’s Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”).

The court granted in part and denied in part Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, the defendant’s motion was denied as to the portions of Amended Counts I, III, and V based on the assertion that the assignment was invalid because HCL was dissolved prior to the assignment.

Further, the defendant’s motion regarding the portions of the plaintiffs’ claims that alleged that the foreclosure was invalid because Deutsche Bank failed to comply with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 667-5 were denied without prejudice.

California Court Determines Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by Res Judicata

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The court in deciding Maxwell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155930, 2013 WL 5882457 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata and therefore granted [with prejudice] the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants Deutsche, OneWest, and MERS. Plaintiff alleged various violations of California and federal consumer protection statutes. The plaintiff asserted a claim for an invalid transfer of a trust deed, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The defendants moved to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that the claims were barred by res judicata. The court, after considering the evidence presented, concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Northern District of California Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

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The court in deciding Murphy v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155923, 2013 WL 5883675 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action without prejudice.

The plaintiff in this case brought this action against defendants [Bank of New York Mellon and MERS] for (1) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (2) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (3) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (4) violations of California’s Business and Professions Code Section 17200; (5) slander of title; (6) cancellation of void instruments; (7) quiet title; and (8) wrongful foreclosure. Compl., ECF No. 1.

The plaintiff’s complaint revolved around the main theory that the defendants lacked the authority to execute any foreclosure proceedings. After considering the plaintiff’s arguments, the court first concluded that the plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the court found that the federal claims in the operative complaint failed as a matter of law.