Arizona’s “Unholy” Foreclosure Mess

Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary about Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. County of Maricopa, 2014 WL 333575 (Ariz. Court of Appeals, Jan. 30, 2014) on the Dirt listserv:

A defaulting borrower may defend against foreclosure on ground that the chain of assignments of the deed of trust is defective, and also on a variety of other theories.

The residential mortgage loan in this case was originally made in 2005 to Steinberger’s 87-year-old father, who died two years later, leaving her the property. By 2008, she was having difficulty making the payments, and asked IndyMac FSB to consider a loan modification. She was advised that she must first default, and she did so. There followed a period of more than two years during which she was “jerked around” by IndyMac, with successive promises to consider a loan modification, the setting of (and then vacating of) foreclosure dates, and assertions by IndyMac that she had not properly submitted all of the paperwork required for a modification.

In November 2010 she filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that IndyMac had no authority to foreclose on the house, and upon filing a $7,000 bond, she obtained a TRO against foreclosure. The following summarizes the theories on which she obtained a favorable result.

1. Lack of a proper chain of title to the deed of trust. The Court of Appeals seems to have assumed that no foreclosure would be permissible without the foreclosing party having a chain of assignments from the originator of the loan. If one accepts this assumption, IndyMac was in trouble. The first assignment, made in 2009, was from MERS, acting as nominee of IndyMac Bank, to IndyMac Federal FSB, but it was made before IndyMac Federal FSB even existed!

A second assignment was made in 2010 by IndyMac Federal FSB to DBNTC, the trustee of a securitized trust. But Steinberger alleged that by this date, IndyMac Federal FSB no longer existed, so this assignment was void as well. She also made the familiar allegation that this assignment was too late to comply with the 90-day transfer period required by the trust’s Pooling and Servicing Agreement, but the court did not pursue this theory.

The court’s opinion is significant for its treatment of Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Sav. Bank, the 2012 case in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that “Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary [of a deed of trust] to prove its authority.² The Court of Appeals, in Steinberger, read this statement to mean that the beneficiary need not prove its authority unless the borrower alleges a lack of authority in her complaint. There was no such allegation in Hogan, but there was in Steinberger. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that Steinberger could contest IndyMac’s right to foreclose. And it felt that Steinberger’s allegations about the defects in the chain of title to the deed of trust, if proven, could constitute a successful attack on IndyMac’s authority to foreclose.

It’s important to realize what the Court of Appeals did not do. It did not disagree with Hogan’s holding that the beneficiary need not show possession of the promissory note in order to foreclose. Several commentators (including me) have criticized Hogan for this holding, but the Steinberger opinion leaves it intact. Indeed, in Steinberger, the borrower raised no issue as to whether IndyMac had the note, and seems to have conceded that it did. The discussion focuses on the legitimacy of the chain of title to the deed of trust, not on possession of the note.

Is the court correct that a valid chain of title to the deed of trust is necessary to foreclose under Arizona law? As a general proposition, one would think not. Arizona not only has adopted the common law rule that the mortgage follows the note, but even has a statute saying so: Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 33 817:  “The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.” So if the note is transferred, no separate assignment of the deed of trust would be needed at all. And a recent unreported Court of Appeals case, Varbel v. Bank of America Nat. Ass’n, 2013 WL 817290 (Ariz. App. 2013), quotes the Bankruptcy Court as reaching the same conclusion: In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (“Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale.”).

By the way, that’s the rule with respect to mortgages in virtually every state. A chain of assignments, recorded or not, is completely unnecessary to proof of the right to foreclose. The power to foreclose comes from having the right to enforce the note, not from having a chain of assignments of the mortgage or deed of trust.

However, since Hogan has told us that no showing of holding the note is necessary in order to foreclose, what is necessary? It defies common sense to suppose that a party can foreclose a deed of trust in Arizona without at least alleging some connection to the original loan documents. If that allegation is not that one holds the note, perhaps it must be the allegation that one has a chain of assignments of the deed of trust. If this is true, then the opinion in Steinberger, written on the assumption that the assignments must be valid ones, makes sense.

The ultimate problem here is the weakness of the foreclosure statute itself. Ariz. Stat. 33-807 provides, “The beneficiary or trustee shall constitute the proper and complete party plaintiff in any action to foreclose a deed of trust.” Fine, but when the loan has been sold on the secondary market, who is the “beneficiary?” The statute simply doesn’t say. The normal answer would be the party to whom the right to enforce the note has been transferred, but Hogan seems to have deprived us of that answer. An alternative answer (though one that forces us to disregard the theory that the mortgage follows the note) is to say that the “beneficiary” is now the party to whom the deed of trust has been assigned. But the Arizona courts don’t seem to be willing to come out and say that forthrightly, either. Instead, as in the Steinberger opinion, it’s an unstated assumption.

As Wilson Freyermuth put it, after graciously reading an earlier version of this comment, “The Steinberger court couldn’t accept the fact that a lender could literally foreclose with no connection to the loan documents — so if Hogan says the note is irrelevant, well then it has to be the deed of trust (which would presumably then require proof of a chain of assignments).  It’s totally backwards — right through the looking glass.  And totally inconsistent with Ariz. Stat. 33-817.”

To say that this is an unsatisfactory situation is an understatement; it’s an unholy mess. The statute was written with no recognition that any such thing as the secondary mortgage market exists, and the Arizona courts have utterly failed to reinterpret the statute in a way that makes sense. It’s sad, indeed.

There are a number of other theories in the Steinberger opinion on which the borrower prevailed. Some of these are quite striking, and should give a good deal of comfort to foreclosure defense counsel. In quick summary form, they are:

2. The tort of negligent performance of an undertaking (the “Good Samaritan” tort). This applies, apparently, to IndyMac’s incompetent and vacillating administration of its loan modification program.

3. Negligence per se, in IndyMac’s recording of defective assignments of the deed of trust in violation of the Arizona statute criminalizing the recording of a false or forged legal instrument.

4. Breach of contract, in IndyMac’s failure to follow the procedures set out in the deed of trust in pursuing its foreclosure.

5. Procedural unconscionability, in IndyMac’s making the original loan to her elderly father without explaining its unusual and onerous terms, particularly in light of his failing mental health.

6. Substantive unconscionability, based on the terms of the loan itself. It was an ARM with an initial interest rate of 1%, but which could be (and apparently was) adjusted upward in each succeeding month. This resulted in an initial period of negative amortization, and once the amortization cap was reached, a large and rapid increase in monthly payments. At the same time, some of Steinberger’s other theories were rejected, including an argument that, because IndyMac had intentionally destroyed the note, it had cancelled the debt. The court concluded that, in the absence of proof of intent to cancel the debt, it remained collectible.

 

 

Imposing Order on Recording Chaos

Dale Whitman has posted A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right. This is great timing because he will be touching on some of the issues raised in this article in tomorrow’s webinar. His proposal for a national mortgage registry also shares things in common with elements of Adam Levitin‘s recent proposal.

Whitman’s abstract reads:

In this Article, Professor Whitman analyzes the existing legal regime for transfers of notes and mortgages on the secondary market, and concludes that it is highly inconvenient and dysfunctional, with the result that large numbers of market participants simply did not observe its rules during the huge market run-up of the early and mid-2000s. He also considers Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), which was designed to alleviate the inconveniences of repeatedly recording mortgage assignments, but concludes that it was conceptually flawed and has proven to be an inadequate response to the problem. For these reasons the legal system was ill-prepared for the avalanche of foreclosures that followed the collapse of the mortgage market in 2007, and continues to be beset by litigation and uncertainty. This Article then provides a conceptual outline for an alternative National Mortgage Registry, which would supplant the present legal system and would provide convenience, transparency, and efficiency for all market participants. He concludes with a draft of a statute that could be enacted by Congress to create such a registry.

The article concludes:

A national mortgage loan Registry structured along the lines outlined here would resolve all of the major legal problems that beset the secondary mortgage market today. To be specific, the following problems would be put to rest.

1. The lack of clarity in the distinction between negotiable and nonnegotiable notes that exists today would become irrelevant for purposes of loan transfer. Negotiable and nonnegotiable notes would be treated exactly alike and would be transferred in the same manner.

2. The need to physically deliver original notes in order to transfer the right of enforcement – an extremely burdensome and inconvenient requirement for negotiable notes in today’s market – would be eliminated. Transfers would take place electronically with assurance that they would be recognized by local law in all jurisdictions.

3. The necessity of recording mortgage assignments in local recording offices would be eliminated. MERS was designed to remove the need for such assignments (except at the point when foreclosure was necessary), but the national Registry would accomplish this without the artificiality and con-fusion engendered by MERS’ “nominee” status.

4. Borrowers would be protected against competing claims by purported mortgage holders because the Registry’s records of loan holdings would be conclusive. Whether in cases of loan modification, payoff and discharge, approval of a short sale, or foreclosure, a borrower would know with certainty whether a purported holder’s claim to the loan was authentic, and whether its purported servicer was authorized to act.

5. All foreclosures, both judicial and non-judicial, could be conducted with assurance that the correct party was foreclosing. The Registry’s certificate could be recorded under state law and become a part of the chain of title of property passing through foreclosure, thus permitting future title examiners to verify that the foreclosure was conducted by the person authorized to do so. Concerns of title insurers about the validity of titles coming through foreclosure, currently a major worry, would be largely eliminated.

6. The current confusion and litigation about separation of notes from their mortgages, and about what proof is needed to foreclose a mortgage, would be brought to an end. The Registry’s certificate would provide all of the documentary evidence necessary to foreclose.

7. The holder in due course doctrine, with its potential for unfair harm to borrowers, would probably disappear in the context of mortgage loans as secondary market participants abandoned the practice of physical delivery of mortgage notes.

The system for transferring mortgage loans with which we are saddled today is a shambles. The result has been enormous uncertainty and likely huge financial loss for investors, servicers, and title insurers. It is time for Congress to act to create a sensible, simple, and efficient alternative. (68-69)

Many (including Brad Borden and I) have argued that the current recording system is horribly flawed. It is unclear whether there is sufficient political will to engage in a structural reform at this time. If there is not, expect to see another foreclosure mess once the current one has played itself out.

Levitin on the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title

Adam Levitin has posted The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title to SSRN.  This paper adds to a small (here and here, for instance), but important body of literature that seeks to harmonize the application of foreclosure laws with the Uniform Commercial Code. Levitin’s abstract reads

The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too- big-to-fail problem for the courts.

The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through the “public demonstration” regimes of UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages.

To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative “contracting” regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as a whole.

This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by clarifying property rights.

I had to agree with one of his conclusions:  “Reduction of transaction costs is ultimately a second-order move for commercial law. The first-order move, so elemental it is easy to forget, is clarification of the property being transferred.” (723-24) The others are pretty compelling too.

Borden and Reiss on Show Me The Note!

Brad and I were e-interviewed by the Knowledge Effect, a Thomson Reuters blog on our recent article (co-authored with KeAupuni Akina), Show Me The Note!.  The interview is below:

Westlaw Journals: Your commentary is about the success of the “show me the note” defense to stop or delay a foreclosure.  Can you explain what the “show me the note” defense means during foreclosure proceedings? 

Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss:“Show me the note” can mean different things in different jurisdictions.  But the bottom line is that the homeowner is typically telling the court that the foreclosure should not proceed unless and until the foreclosing party can prove that it in fact owns or holds (or is the agent of the owner or holder of) the mortgage note that is secured by the mortgage that is being foreclosed upon.

WJ: What is the difference between a mortgage and a deed of trust, and does this have any bearing on the foreclosure defense?

BTB and DJR:The two documents are very similar in many ways – they both provide a security interest in real property.  The mortgage is the simpler of the two, involving just two parties.  The two parties are the mortgagor (the borrower) and the mortgagee (the lender).  The borrower uses its interest in real property to secure a loan made to it by the lender.  If the borrower fails to repay the loan or otherwise violates the terms of the loan transaction, the mortgagee can foreclose upon the real property.  The mortgagee forecloses through a judicial proceeding.

The deed of trust adds another party to a secured loan transaction.  Here, the borrower delivers a deed of trust to a trustee which states that the borrower’s real property is held as security for the loan made by the lender to the borrower.  The trustee of a deed of trust has the very limited role of following the provisions of the deed of trust.  Most importantly, it can foreclose on the deed of trust on behalf of the beneficiary of the deed of trust, the lender, if the terms of the loan transaction have been violated.  Because of the addition of this third party, foreclosure can (but need not) take place in a non-judicial proceeding.  The thinking is that the trustee will ensure that there will be some basic procedural protections in place for the foreclosure, obviating the need for judicial oversight. The big advantage of the deed of trust is the ability to foreclose quickly and cheaply by means of a non-judicial proceeding.

WJ: How do assignments of mortgages contribute to the confusion about what entity has the right to foreclose?

BTB and DJR: Let us count the ways!  On our blog, REFinblog.com, we track the litigation that arises from the foreclosure epidemic.  The absence of all of the relevant assignments in a transaction can play out one way in a judicial foreclosure (in mortgage-only jurisdictions), another way in a non-judicial foreclosure (in jurisdictions that allow for deeds of trust) and another way in a bankruptcy proceeding.  It plays out differently in different states.  It can play out one way if the mortgagee brings the suit, in another way if the servicer brings the suit and another if MERS (the Mortgage Electronic Recording System) brings the suit.  It can play out differently if the note is negotiable or if it is non-negotiable.  So to answer your question precisely, assignments of mortgages don’t contribute to the confusion – they are the confusion!

WJ: What is the difference between a judicial and non-judicial foreclosure?  Is the “show  me the note” defense more successful in states that use a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding or judicial proceeding?  What contrasts exists between the cases highlighted in your analysis? 

BTB and DJR: Keep in mind that states typically fall into two categories:  those that only allow judicial foreclosures and those that allow either judicial or non-judicial foreclosures.  In a judicial foreclosure, foreclosure actions are brought in court.  A judicial foreclosure can be brought where the security interest is a mortgage or deed of trust.  A non-judicial foreclosure does not – shocker! — involve a court proceeding.  Instead it is conducted using the power of sale contained in the deed of trust.  With the power of sale, the mortgaged property is sold at a public auction.

If we were to generalize, the rule is that state supreme courts do not require the foreclosing party to “show the note” in a non-judicial foreclosure (with Massachusetts one exception).  In addition, the general rule in a judicial foreclosure is that the foreclosing party must “show the note,” although it need not be the actual mortgage note holder, but merely one who has been assigned an interest in the mortgage note by the mortgage note holder.

We think the most interesting contrast is between the more typical Hogan v. Washington Mutual Bank, 277 P.3d 781 (Ariz. 2012), and the more cutting edge Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012).  Hogan strictly construes the state foreclosure law, but leads to some odd results, including the possibility that a borrower can be liable in competing foreclosure proceedings arising from just one deed of trust.  Eaton pushes the language of the statute a bit, but seems to ensure that borrowers are protected from inequitable results in foreclosure proceedings.  For a more in depth analysis, we would recommend a recent law review article by Dale Whitman and Drew Milner in the most recent issue of the Arkansas Law Review, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement to Enforce the Note.

WJ: How does state law influence the success of the defense?   Are there any federal laws applicable to the “show me the note” defense?

BTB and DJR: While “show me the note” does come up in federal cases, federal courts defer to the applicable state law in reaching their results.  As our article demonstrates, the courts’ holdings tend to flow from a careful reading of the relevant state foreclosure statute, so a particular state’s law can have a big effect on the outcome.  We would note that many scholars and leaders of the bar are befuddled by courts’ failure to do a comprehensive analysis under the UCC as part of their reasoning in mortgage enforcement cases, but judges make the law, not scholars and members of the bar.  See Report of The Permanent Editorial Board for The Uniform Commercial Code Application of The Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes at 1 (Nov. 14, 2011).

WJ: What are the main points you want to emphasize for homeowners and their attorneys challenging a foreclosure action?

BTB and DJR: The main point is – the law matters and the jurisdiction matters.  Whether you are a homeowner trying to stave off foreclosure or a real estate finance lawyer structuring a securitization, you should expect that courts will enforce statutes as they are written in an adversarial proceeding.  What works in one jurisdiction may not work in another because the laws of the jurisdictions may vary.  Plan accordingly.