Author Archives: David Reiss

Calling All RE Law Profs!

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I have been asked to post this announcement by Rutgers Professor Jay Soled.  He indicated that they were very interested in hearing from law professors who do research in this area.

Paul V. Profeta Chair in Real Estate

The Finance and Economics Department of the Rutgers Business School at Newark and New Brunswick, Rutgers University invites nominations and applications for the inaugural holder of the Paul V. Profeta Chair in Real Estate. The School and University are strongly committed to recruiting an accomplished scholar necessary to lead the school’s ambition to be a leader in research and teaching in Real Estate. The successful candidate will become the Founding Executive Director of the Rutgers Center for Real Estate Studies.  The center is envisioned to facilitate scholarship activities and promote the education of real-estate issues in its various degree granting and continuing education programs.  The Finance and Economics Department has 35 full-time faculty members.  The Rutgers Business School offers BS, MBA, Masters of Quantitative Finance, and Ph.D. programs that include finance and applied economics concentrations.  Please submit your application (cover letter, three names of your letter writers, research paper[s], and CV) electronically at https://www.business.rutgers.edu/faculty-research/teaching-opportunities. The search will continue until the position is filled.

Reiss in Bloomberg on CS Lawsuit

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Bloomberg quoted me in Credit Suisse Waits for $11 Billion Answer in N.Y. Fraud Suit.  It reads in part,

As Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) sees it, time has run out on New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s pursuit of Wall Street banks for mortgage fraud that helped trigger the financial crisis.

Schneiderman sued Credit Suisse in 2012 as part of a wide-ranging probe into mortgage bonds. He claimed Switzerland’s second-largest bank misrepresented the risks associated with $93.8 billion in mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006 and 2007.

Credit Suisse asked a Manhattan judge in December to dismiss Schneiderman’s case, as well as his demand for as much as $11.2 billion in damages. The bank argued that New York, by waiting so long to file the lawsuit, missed a three-year legal deadline for suing. The state countered that it had six years to file its complaint.

If the bank wins, Schneiderman will face a new roadblock as he considers similar multibillion-dollar claims against a dozen other Wall Street firms. The judge in New York State Supreme Court could rule at any time.

“It would obviously tilt everything in the favor of Credit Suisse and similarly situated financial institutions,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, hindering New York’s remaining efforts to hold banks accountable for mistakes that spurred a recession.

*     *     *

Since the latest bonds cited in Schneiderman’s suit originated in 2006 and 2007, if the judge chooses the bank’s argument, the lawsuit may be dismissed. If the judge takes Schneiderman’s more expansive view, most or all of the suspect bonds may still be covered by the litigation.

“The entire case is time-barred,” Richard Clary, a lawyer for the bank, told Friedman at the December hearing. Lawyers for the state argued that such limits weren’t intended to apply to the attorney general.

“We’ve successfully resolved cases filed within six years,” Deputy Attorney General Virginia Chavez Romano said, citing last year’s JPMorgan accord. “It has been our decades-long practice.”

So far, New York’s courts have broadly interpreted the statute in finding a six-year period, Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said. That may be changing as legal scholars and financial industry lawyers question its propriety.

“Having these incredibly long and ambiguous statutes of limitations is not particularly fair,” he said.

*     *     *

Friedman’s ruling in the Credit Suisse case may be crucial to Schneiderman’s probe of close to a dozen other banks, and whether he can sue them successfully.

New York agreed with the firms in October 2012 that any legal deadline for bringing fraud claims against them would be suspended while he continues his investigation, a person familiar with the matter said.

Such tolling agreements stopped the clock on any statute of limitations and ensured Schneiderman can bring fraud claims against banks for conduct going as far back as 2006, said the person.

Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said the banks may have agreed to the delay to avoid forcing Schneiderman to file a “kitchen sink complaint with every possible allegation in it” just to beat the clock. Doing so also builds good will with regulators and may also facilitate a favorable settlement.

The agreements don’t necessarily mean that suits will be filed, the person said. If Schneiderman sues any of the banks, they may then assert the statute of limitations is three years, and not six, just as Credit Suisse has done.

*     *     *

This may be a more potent argument if Friedman rules for the Swiss bank in the pending case.

A three-year statute-of-limitations would mean they can’t be held responsible for transactions before 2009, while a six-year deadline would allow Schneiderman to reach back to 2006.

There’s “great uncertainty” about whether Schneiderman can move forward with the Credit Suisse case in light of the statute of limitations arguments, said James Cox, a corporate law professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

Reiss said that any ruling would probably be challenged all the way to the Court of Appeals in Albany, the state’s highest court.

The State of the Foreclosure Crisis

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Rob Pitingolo of the Urban Institute issued State of the Foreclosure Crisis: Past the Peak but Not Recovered. It opens,

Much attention has been given to statistics that show new foreclosure activity nationally has slowed over the past few years. When it comes to metropolitan area markets, however, some have gotten worse, while others have stagnated. It is not simple enough to declare an end to the foreclosure and delinquency crisis when there are as many as a quarter (25%) of metro areas that have not yet begun their recovery. (1)

It continues,

the rate of 90 day or more delinquency steadily fell in 2010 and 2011, ending at 3.1% in September 2013. In contrast, the foreclosure inventory only turned the corner in mid -2012, and is still higher than the March 2009 level at 4.5%, around seven times the pre-crisis level. Historically, a foreclosure inventory under 1% is what we would expect in “normal” market conditions.” (1, footnote omitted)

It concludes, “attention must be paid to individual metropolitan housing markets. Some are in much better shape than others; and some have made great strides since the peak of serious delinquency in December 2009. However, it may be premature to declare the problem is “ending” until all metro area markets show signs of recovery.” (2) The report identifies the starkest differences in metro areas:

Three geographic regions were hard hit at the beginning of the foreclosure crisis: California metros, Florida metros, and “Rust Belt” metros (those in Midwest states like Ohio, Michigan and Indiana). All three of those regions have seen solid improvements since December 2009.

On the other hand, the Northeast has generally performed poorly in the past several years. Serious delinquency rates in major metropolitan markets like New York City, Philadelphia and Baltimore have all worsened since December 2009. Other metro areas in New York like Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse have similarly struggled, as have metro areas surrounding New York like New Jersey and Connecticut. (5)

The report concludes with a call for a nuanced response to the current state of the foreclosure crisis:  “communities need strong examples to build upon, rigorous data and analysis, and a commitment to evidence-based policymaking that strives toward the best fit between policy solutions and policy problems.” (6) This seems like the right call and the appropriate response to headlines that report the national trend without mentioning the variations among metro areas.

Federalizing Monoline Mortgage Insurance

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The Federal Insurance Office of the Department of Treasury issued a report required pursuant to Dodd-Frank, How To Modernize And Improve The System Of Insurance Regulation In The United States, which addresses among other things the state of the monoline mortgage insurance industry:

Recommendation: Federal standards and oversight for mortgage insurers should be developed and implemented.

Like financial guarantors, private mortgage insurers are monoline companies that experienced devastating losses during the financial crisis. A business predominantly focused on providing credit enhancement to mortgages guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, mortgage insurers migrated from the core business of insuring conventional, well-underwritten mortgage loans to providing insurance on pools of Alt-A and subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis. The dramatic decline in housing prices and the impact of the change in underwriting practices required mortgage insurers to draw down capital and reserves to pay claims resulting in the failure of three out of the eight mortgage insurers in the United States. Historically high levels of claim denials, including policy rescissions, helped put taxpayers at risk.

Regulatory oversight of mortgage insurance varies state by state. Though mortgage insurance coverage is provided nationally, only 16 states impose specific requirements on private mortgage insurers. Of these requirements, two govern the solvency regime and, therefore, are of particular significance: (1) a limit on total liability, net of reinsurance, for all policies of 25 times the sum of capital, surplus, and contingency reserves, (known as a 25:1 risk-to-capital ratio); and (2) a requirement of annual contributions to a contingency reserve equal to 50 percent of the mortgage insurer’s earned premium. In addition to the states, the GSEs (and through conservatorship, the Federal Housing Finance Agency) establish uniform standards and eligibility requirements that in some cases are more stringent than those required by state regulators. As the financial crisis unfolded, mortgage insurers no longer met state or contractual capital requirements. State regulators granted waivers in order to allow mortgage insurers to continue to write new business while the GSEs loosened other standards that were applicable to mortgage insurers.

The private mortgage insurance sector is interconnected with other aspects of the federal housing finance system and, therefore, is an issue of significant national interest. As the United States continues to recover from the financial crisis and works to reform aspects of the housing finance system, private mortgage insurance may be an important component of any reform package as an alternative way to place private capital in front of any government or taxpayer risk. Robust national solvency and business practice standards, with uniform implementation, for mortgage insurers would help foster greater confidence in the solvency and performance of housing finance. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to establish federal oversight of federally developed standards applicable to mortgage insurance. (31-32)

This critique of the monoline insurance industry seems accurate to me. The industry has a tendency to fail when it is needed most — during major financial crises. Having multiple states regulate monoline insurers allows this nationally (and globally) significant industry to engage in regulatory arbitrage — that is, finding the most pliable regulatory environment in which to operate. National regulation would solve that problem. As always, a single federal regulator is more prone to capture by the industry it regulates than a bunch of state regulators. We have, however, tried the alternative and it has not worked so well. I think a federal approach is worth a try.

Reiss on BK Live!

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The BK Live segment on Mortgage Inequities in Brooklyn has been posted to the web. Mark Winston Griffith (Brooklyn Movement Center Executive Director), Alexis Iwaniszie (New Economy Project) and I discuss mortgage inequities and how they effect Brooklyn (and beyond). REFinblog.com gets a nice shout out from BK Live.

Reiss on Mortgage Inequities

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I will be appearing on a segment on BK Live on BRIC , the Brooklyn Public Network, about “Mortgage Inequities/Fair Housing in Brooklyn” on Thursday, February 13th at noon (running again at 2pm, 8pm, 9pm and 10pm (Cablevision Ch 69, Time Warner 56, RCN Ch 84, Verizon Ch 44 or online at: www.bkindiemedia.bricartsmedia.org).

I will be appearing with Mark Winston Griffith, Executive Director of the Brooklyn Movement Center, a community organizing group based in Bed-Stuy and Crown Heights, and Alexis Iwanisziw of the New Economy Project.

We will be discussing The New Economy Project’s recent study about inequities in mortgage lending based on race in NYC:

Mortgage lenders made markedly fewer conventional home mortgage loans in communities of color than in predominately white neighborhoods in New York City, according to a series of GIS maps published today.

The maps show unequal lending patterns based on the racial composition of communities in New York City, controlling for the number of owner-occupied units in each neighborhood. New Yorkers who live in predominantly white neighborhoods on average receive twice as many conventional home purchase loans as New Yorkers who live in predominantly black or Latino neighborhoods, for every 100 owner-occupied housing units in the neighborhood.

“The maps show that banks continue to redline communities of color across New York City,” said Monica M. Garcia, Community Education Coordinator at New Economy Project, which produced the maps. “For decades, banks have excluded neighborhoods of color from fair access to mortgage financing, allowing predatory lenders to flourish right up to the financial crisis. Now it’s déjà vu all over again, with banks failing adequately to provide conventional mortgages to people in predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods.”

“The maps highlight the profound and continued need for strong government action against banks that violate fair housing and fair lending laws,” said Sarah Ludwig, Co-Director of New Economy Project.

The series includes a map of New York City and borough-level maps of Brooklyn, Queens and Bronx.

To produce the maps, New Economy Project analyzed home mortgage lending data for 2012, the most recent year for which the data are publicly available. New Economy Project received partial funding to produce the maps from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Fair Housing Initiatives Program.

Gimme (Mortgage) Data

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The CFPB announced that it is seeking feedback on potential changes to mortgage information reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Data collection seems like a pretty obscure issue, but some Republicans and financial industry interests have been attacking the CFPB for collecting so much data. Given the rapid changes in the consumer financial services sector, it seems to me that collecting more data about the types of products being offered to different types of consumers is essential to regulating that sector. For those unfamiliar with HMDA, it

was enacted in 1975 to provide information that the public and financial regulators could use to monitor whether financial institutions were serving the housing needs of their communities and providing access to residential mortgage credit. The law requires lenders to disclose information about the home mortgage loans they sell to consumers. HMDA was later expanded to capture information useful for identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns.

In the wake of the recent mortgage market crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) transferred HMDA rulemaking authority to the CFPB. The law directs the Bureau to expand the HMDA dataset to include additional loan information that would be helpful in spotting troublesome trends. (1)

 The CFPB is considering requiring the following information pursuant to HMDA:

  • total points and fees, and rate spreads for all loans
  • riskier loan features including teaser rates, prepayment penalties, and non-amortizing features
  • lender information, including unique identifier for the loan officer and the loan
  • property value and improved property location information
  • age and credit score (1-2)

There are additional data points under consideration, but these five alone would go a long way to identifyingpredatory trends as they are developing in the mortgage market. Lay people are probably unaware of the rate of change in the industry, but during boom times the kinds of products that are popular can change dramatically in a few months. It is hard enough for regulators to keep on top of such rapid changes, but it is even harder when they only have access to some of the relevant information. The CFPB’s proposal is a step in the right direction as it seeks to get a handle on the market that it regulates.