These Are A Few of My Favorite Things

Along with raindrops on roses and whiskers on kittens, reforming Government-Sponsored Enterprises and rationalizing rating agency regulation are two of my favorite things. The Federal Housing Finance Agency noticed a proposed rulemaking to remove some of the references to credit ratings from Federal Home Loan Bank regulations. This is part of a broader mandate contained in Dodd Frank (specifically, section 939A) to reduce the regulatory privilege that the rating agencies had accumulated over the years. This regulatory privilege resulted from the rampant reliance of ratings from Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (mostly S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) in regulations concerning financial institutions and financial products.

The proposed new definition of “investment quality” reads as follows:

Investment quality means a determination made by the Bank with respect to a security or obligation that based on documented analysis,including consideration of the sources for repayment on the security or obligation:

(1) There is adequate financial backing so that full and timely payment of principal and interest on such security or obligation is expected; and

(2) There is minimal risk that that timely payment of principal or interest would not occur because of adverse changes in economic and financial conditions during the projected life of the security or obligation. (30790)

The FHFA expects that such a definition will preclude the FHLBs from relying “principally” on an NRSRO “rating or third party analysis.” (30787)

This definition does not blaze a new path for the purposes of Dodd Frank section 939A as it is in line with similar rulemakings by the NCUA, FDIC and OCC. But it does the trick of reducing the unthinking reliance on ratings by NRSROs for FHLBs. Forcing financial institutions to “apply internal analytic standards and criteria to determine the credit quality of a security or obligation” has to be a good thing as it should push them to look at more than just a credit rating to  make their iinvestment decisions. (30784) This is not to say that we will avoid bubbles as a result of this proposed rule, but it will force FHLBs to take more responsibility for their decisions and be able to document their decision-making process, which should be at least a bit helpful when markets become frothy once again.

When the cycle turns, when greed sings
When I’m feeling sad,
I simply remember
my favorite things
and then I don’t feel so bad!

Shaky South Carolina Opinion Finds That Bank Owned Note in Foreclosure Action

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held in Bank of America v. Draper et al., no. 5140 (June 5, 2013) that Bank of America had standing in a foreclosure action and had proved that it owned the mortgage note.  The Court stated that under South Carolina law, a mortgagee who has the note and the mortgage can elect to bring an action on either. The Court also stated that under South Carolina law, the servicer has standing to bring an action on behalf of the beneficial owner. Because Draper admitted that Bank of America was the servicer, the Court held that Bank of America had standing in this foreclosure action.

Draper also argued that Bank of America failed to prove that it was the owner or holder of the mortgage note. Relying on South Carolina UCC section 301, the Court found that the bank was a “person entitled to enforce.” (8) The Court reached this result because Draper did not contest the Bank’s evidence that it owned the note through a series of “transfer and mergers.” (8) The bank considered as relevant evidence of the Bank’s ownership a “ledger of payments” that showed “all transactions on the account.” (8)

One does not have a sense that this case was well briefed because the Court seems to take a lot of shortcuts.  For instance, the Court apparently assumed that the mortgage note was negotiable and thus subject to Article 3 of the UCC. There is a fair amount of controversy relating to this assumption, something that I will blog about soon.

 

(HT April Charney)

Don’t Show Me The Note in Georgia!

The Georgia Supreme Court recently decided You v. JP Morgan Chase, No. S13Q0040 (May 20, 2013) which held that the “law does not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secured a debt [a deed of trust] to hold, in addition to to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt.” (1) The Georgia Supreme Court thus joins the Arizona Supreme Court which reached the same result in Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 277 P.3d 781 (Ariz. 2012). I discuss Hogan and cases reaching the opposite result in Show Me The Note!

The Georgia Supreme Court reached this result after reviewing the history of non-judicial foreclosure in Georgia.  It found nothing in recent statutory enactments that was inconsistent with the longstanding practice of allowing foreclosure on the mortgage alone.  The Court dismissed a number of arguments, including the contention that the UCC “prohibits a party who does not hold the note from exercising the power of sale in the deed securing the note.” (12) The Court notes that Chase is just seeking to enforce the deed of trust, not the note. The Court also acknowledges that it might be more sensible not to split the note from the mortgage, but it also notes that the Georgia legislature did not take that approach.

The court concludes the opinion with something of a cri de coeur, the type of statement one sees from a court that feels that its conscience is being constrained by binding authority:

As members of this State’s judicial branch, it is our duty to interpret the laws as they are written. See Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9(1), 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007). This Court is not blind to the plight of distressed borrowers, many of whom have suffered devastating losses brought on by the burst of the housing bubble and ensuing recession. While we respect our legislature’s effort to assist distressed homeowners by amending the non-judicial foreclosure statute in 2008, the continued ease with which foreclosures may proceed in this State gives us pause, in light of the grave consequences foreclosures pose for individuals, families, neighborhoods, and society in general. Our concerns in this regard, however, do not entitle us to overstep our judicial role, and thus we leave to the members of our legislature, if they are so inclined, the task of undertaking additional reform.

 

 

 

 

(HT William Hart)

Show Me The Note!

KeAupuni Akina, Brad Borden and I have posted Show Me The Note! to  SSRN and BePress.  The abstract reads

News outlets and foreclosure defense blogs have focused attention on the defense commonly referred to as “show me the note.” This defense seeks to forestall or prevent foreclosure by requiring the foreclosing party to produce the mortgage and the associated promissory note as proof of its right to initiate foreclosure.

The defense arose in two recent state supreme-court cases and is also being raised in lower courts throughout the country. It is not only important to individuals facing foreclosure but also for the mortgage industry and investors in mortgage-backed securities. In the aggregate, the body of law that develops as a result of the foreclosure epidemic will probably shape mortgage law for a long time to come. Courts across the country seemingly interpret the validity of the “show me the note” defense incongruously. Indeed, states appear to be divided on its application. However, an analysis of the situations in which this defense is raised provides a framework that can help consumers and the mortgage industry to better predict how individual states will rule on this issue and can help courts as they continue to grapple with this matter.

 

FHA Whitewash

While preparing for my talk tomorrow on The FHA and Housing Affordability, I was reviewing some of the recent literature on the FHA. I came across a recent HUD working paper with some interesting data about recent FHA crises but also with a disturbing spin on the FHA’s history. The FHA Single-Family Insurance Program: Performing a Needed Role in the Housing Finance Market states that in its early years “race was not explicitly regarded as a factor in FHA’s mortgage insurance operations.” (9) This is flat out wrong and has been known to be flat out wrong at least since Kenneth Jackson published Crabgrass Frontier in 1987. Jackson clearly demonstrated that race was “explicitly regarded as a factor in FHA’s mortgage insurance operations.”

care because

Jackson writes that the FHA’s Underwriting Manual from those early years stated that “[i]f a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall be continued to be occupied by the same social and racial classes” and recommended that owners employ restrictive covenants to exclude African Americans (and some other groups). (208) The working paper has other extraordinary statements that minimize the FHA’s central role in promoting segregation during the mid-20th Century. For instance, it states that the FHA’s “early policy may have inadvertently promoted redlining practices.” (18) There was nothing “inadvertent” about it.

I typically find that federal government reports make great efforts to be factually accurate, so this paper is a great exception.  One might think that the authors deserve some leeway in their interpretation, but Jackson’s history has only been confirmed by later research, such as last year’s Do Presidents Control Bureaucracy? The Federal Housing Administration During the Truman-Eisenhower Era which was published in Political Science Quarterly. It makes much the same point as Crabgrass Frontier. I would be curious to hear the authors’ response to my assessment, but I really can’t see how they can deny it.

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” (Santayana)

Mass. Appeals Court Applies Eaton Retroactively

The intermediate appeals court of Massachusetts applied Eaton retroactively in Lyons v. MERS et al., 11-P-560 (June 5, 2013) notwithstanding the Mass. Supreme Court’s holding that Eaton would only apply prospectively. Eaton held that “a mortgagee may foreclose under a power of sale only if it either holds the note or is acting under the direction or as the agent of the note holder.” (1)

The intermediate appeals court found that it would be inequitable to do otherwise:  “Not only was the present case on appeal when Eaton was decided, the Lyonses actually brought their action before Eaton had even been decided in the trial court. Because the Lyonses are in an identical situation to the plaintiffs in Eaton, not a ‘somewhat similar[]’ position,” the court held “that the rule of Eaton is applicable to the Lyonses’ case, and reverse[d] the judgment” of the trial court. (1, citations omitted)

Mass. Trial Court Upholds MERS Foreclosure

Judge Cutler granted MERS and Countrywide’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Lyons challenge to the validity of a foreclosure deed arising from a foreclosure sale conducted by MERS in Lyons v. MERS et al. Misc. 09 416377 (Jan. 4, 2011). The court held that “the Plaintiffs expressly granted the Mortgage to MERS (as nominee for the Lender), with the power of sale. As a result of this grant, MERS needed no assignment” from Countrywide.” (3) The court found that “such an arrangement is entirely consistent with the express terms of the Mortgage, as well as with Massachusetts law.” (3) The court found it intolerable to reach a result where “the logic of a denial of MERS’s foreclosure right as mortgagee would lead to anomalous and perhaps inequitable results, to wit, if MERS cannot foreclose though named as mortgagee, then either [the lender] can foreclose though not named as mortgagee or no one can foreclose, outcomes not reasonably or demonstrably intended by the parties.” (3) Not sure that those are the only possibilities (for instance, MERS could assign the mortgage to its beneficial owner), but there you have it.