President Trump’s Two Residential Mortgages

Dan Abrams

I was interviewed in Trump’s Mortgage Fraud Hypocrisy on The Dan Abrams Show (SiriusXM POTUS 124) (behind paywall). A recording is available on YouTube (no paywall). The auto-generated (cleaned up a bit) transcript of the relevant part reads,

Dan Abrams: This effort to get rid of Lisa Cook as one of the governors at the Fed has heated up. Remember, the Supreme Court basically said Trump couldn’t do it without due process, and it seems now he’s beginning the process of quote-unquote doing the due process, telling her that they want to get rid of her. It made me remember an article that came out in December, which I think is very important in this context — it’s from ProPublica, and the headline is “Trump’s Own Mortgages Match His Description of Mortgage Fraud, Records Reveal.” It talks about how in 1993, Trump signed a mortgage for a home in Palm Beach, pledging it would be his principal residence. Seven weeks later, he got another mortgage for a seven-bedroom, marble-floored neighboring property, saying it too would be his principal residence. And in reality, ProPublica reports, Trump — then a New Yorker — does not appear to have lived in either home, let alone used them as a principal residence. That seems to me precisely the issue the administration is focusing on with regard to Lisa Cook. And if you’re interested in the article, it’s got all the documents Trump signed, with images of them.

Remember, in October federal prosecutors charged Letitia James, and a central claim in that case was that she purchased a house in Virginia pledging to her lender that it would serve as her second home, and then used it as an investment property and rented it out. [The source transcript is garbled here — something to the effect that Trump’s mortgage agreements were arguably a more significant misrepresentation, since his said the properties would be his primary residence, not merely a second home as in the James case; recommend checking the audio for the exact wording before publishing.] But Trump, when he was declaring that he was going to fire Lisa Cook, specifically noted that she had signed two primary-residence mortgages within weeks of each other — exactly as the records show he did in Florida. Here’s the quote they sent her: “You signed one document attesting that a property in Michigan would be your primary residence for the next year. Two weeks later, you signed another document for a property in Georgia stating it would be your primary residence for the next year. It is inconceivable that you were not aware of your first commitment when making the second. At a minimum, the conduct at issue exhibits the sort of gross negligence in financial transactions that calls into question your competence and trustworthiness.” The Trump administration has made similar claims regarding Adam Schiff and Eric Swalwell as well.

So when Trump administration officials are confronted about this, they do the usual, which is talk about it from a law enforcement perspective, talk about how important this is. This is Bill Pulte — remember, this guy’s the worst person in this administration, as far as I’m concerned, the most politicized. He’s the one who was acting director of National Intelligence; he couldn’t get confirmed, I don’t think, for any position, and yet they keep bouncing him around — but he’s been overseeing housing, and that’s given him access to all these mortgage records. So here is Bill Pulte, speaking in June:

“This is not political from my perspective. I’m in charge of making sure that we have a mortgage market that is safe and sound. It doesn’t matter whether you’re Republican or Democrat or a Fed governor — if you commit mortgage fraud, we’re going to refer it. And that’s what we did in the Lisa Cook case. I do believe that eventually she’ll be indicted. And let’s say the Supreme Court rules against the people who are saying there’s cause, or there’s ability, to fire her — I do expect her to eventually be indicted. That’s just my own opinion; I’d refer you to the DOJ for specifics. But if she is indicted, obviously that would give the ability to fire her for cause, even more so than we believe — I’ll just speak for myself — already exists.”

Let me bring in David Reiss. He’s a clinical professor of law at Cornell Tech and Cornell Law School, an expert in the real estate sector. Professor, thanks very much for coming on — appreciate it.

David Reiss: My pleasure.

ABRAMS: From a legal perspective, these are the kinds of cases that are almost never prosecuted — is that right?

REISS: That’s correct. There was a lot of this kind of behavior before the Great Financial Crisis in the early 2000s, but it was very rarely prosecuted.

ABRAMS: So is there a difference between what ProPublica seems to have been able to show that Donald Trump did and what Lisa Cook is accused of?

REISS: I don’t think so. I think it’s the same, or in some ways an even worse set of facts. There’s the statement by the broker who said these were going to be rentals from the beginning. This is exactly the kind of behavior that Pulte says is unacceptable — the kind he’s identified with opponents of the Trump administration.

ABRAMS: So could she use that — meaning, let’s assume for a moment that she is indicted — is that really just something for the court of public opinion, or is that something she could potentially introduce as a defense?

REISS: That’s an interesting question. On a straight legal answer, I’d say selective enforcement — arguing that I’m being prosecuted but somebody else isn’t — is a very high standard to meet, especially for a political case like we’re seeing with Cook and some of the others. But I do think judges have been choosing not to give a [presumption of regularity] to the Trump DOJ, so judges may use their discretion to look at this with some sense that it’s just a political hit job.

ABRAMS: Right — because the Trump allegations, the Trump information, is outside the statute of limitations. So there’s no way that could be prosecuted. Correct?

REISS: That is correct. Even if it violated the law, it’s past the statute of limitations. There’s no way to bring it back.

ABRAMS: Right. Now, in response to questions, a White House spokesperson told ProPublica: “President Trump’s two mortgages you’re referencing are from the same lender. There was no defraud[ing]. It is illogical to believe that the same lender would agree to defraud itself.” [As transcribed — worth checking this quote against the ProPublica article’s exact wording before publishing.] What do you make of that?

REISS: Well, it’s interesting, because that’s not the standard that applies. It’s a federal standard — a section of federal law, 1014. It’s really about whether, at the time you signed it, you knew it was false. It’s not a fraud standard — it doesn’t have all the elements of fraud, such as materiality. So that’s a bit of a misdirection, suggesting that the lender knew about this or went along with it. That’s not the standard for the criminal law here.

ABRAMS: Putting aside the criminal law for a minute — does what they’re saying make sense? I’m trying to figure out what their point even is. “President Trump’s two mortgages you’re referencing are from the same lender … it’s illogical to believe that the same lender would agree to defraud itself.” It seems to be suggesting the lender wouldn’t have done it a second time — but if there was fraud in the first case, maybe they just didn’t realize it. I don’t know — this isn’t my area of expertise, but as I think about it, maybe they didn’t realize, when they made the first mortgage, that the information was false, and so they just used the same information for the second one.

REISS: Interpreting the statement from the administration in the best possible light, they’re saying perhaps he intended the first property as his primary residence, and that was true at the time — and the lender knew about the first one and knew about the second one. If you think about the statute requiring knowledge of falsehood at the time of signing, you can construct a story where that’s the case. That would be the argument they’d make at trial, if this weren’t past the statute of limitations and if Pulte had referred it to DOJ and DOJ chose to pursue it.

ABRAMS: It is amazing to me — and again, I don’t know if you’re going to want to answer this, you don’t have to — but it feels like the double standard the president often applies to others versus himself is astonishing. This is such an apples-to-apples comparison. We often say, well, it’s not really apples to apples — but this really is apples to apples, isn’t it?

REISS: It is. I’m going to say a few things in response to that. One: this is genuine hypocrisy, but unless it enrages his base — unless they say, “yes, our leader is applying two standards, and that’s unfair, and we want to punish him for that and not vote for him or for his slate” — it doesn’t really matter. Second — and this doesn’t excuse his behavior in the slightest, or Pulte’s behavior in the slightest — hypocrisy is a real bipartisan issue. You have Spitzer prosecuting johns, you have Hastert and Gingrich bringing the impeachment against President Clinton. There’s a lot of hypocrisy by politicians, and this, I think, is just part of something massive—

ABRAMS: I guess what makes this different to me is that with these cases, you can make the argument that none of them should be brought, or you can make the argument that they’re really important to be brought. I don’t think Eliot Spitzer — who suffered, who lost his job, there were real consequences for him — was out there in public saying, “these johns, they’re a real problem.” And that’s what Trump is doing. He’s going out there criticizing Lisa Cook as if she’s a criminal. I think that’s what makes this different.

REISS: I agree. It’s more extreme, but it’s really part and parcel of his approach to politics, which is attack, attack, attack, and deny, deny, deny, if anything comes close to touching your behavior or your team’s behavior. And it’s not just Trump — there are members of the administration who have similar mortgage issues, and allegedly Letitia James, Cook, and Schiff have that issue too. It’s part and parcel of behavior on the left and on the right, but he’s only going after Democrats. And that’s obviously true.

ABRAMS: Yep — and again, [the source transcript is garbled here: “only going after Democrats is sort of part and parcel of this administration going after Democrats for doing exactly what he did to me, is a step further” — recommend checking against the audio for the exact wording before publishing]. David Reiss, thank you so much for coming on the program. Really appreciate it.

More on the 50-Year Mortgage

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Marketplace interviewed me in Trump Floated a 50-Year Mortgage to Address Housing Affordability. How Would That Work? The transcript reads,

President Donald Trump proposed a 50-year mortgage over the weekend, in a social media post. The idea came from Bill Pulte, the Federal Housing Finance Agency director.

“The average age of a first-time home buyer is now 40 years old. The notion that you’d finish paying off your mortgage at 90 is probably not something that most people contemplate when they want to buy a home,” said David Reiss, a professor at Cornell Law School.

Still, in the short term, a 50-year mortgage would appear cheaper — slightly. Robert Bridges did the math; he’s associate professor emeritus at the University of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business.

“The payment on a 50-year mortgage, for instance, for a $200,000 loan at 6% would be about $1,052, where a 30-year loan would have a payment of $1,199,” Bridges said.

So that’s a difference of $147 in that example. But it comes with costs to the borrower as well, for starters the interest rate would be higher.

“You pay more for a 30-year mortgage than you do for a 15-year mortgage,” Reiss said. “So you will probably pay more for a 50-year mortgage than you would for a 30-year mortgage.”

According to the American Enterprise Institute, a 50-year mortgage would, initially, increase a homeowner’s buying power by 8%.

“Over time, maybe months, maybe years, that would fade,” said Edward Pinto, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Basically, if everyone’s buying power goes up, so does the price of housing. And a longer mortgage also means it takes longer to build up equity.

“And then you’re really left with not much advantage, and you become really a renter with a mortgage,” Pinto said.

A longer loan where it takes longer to build equity also leaves homeowners more vulnerable to risks in the market if home prices stagnate, which Pinto predicts they will in the coming years.

“This has been tried with 40-year loans before, and every time it’s been tried in the United States, it’s failed,” Pinto said.

Failed because they’re too risky, he said. That’s one reason we don’t already have 50-year mortgages.

“It doesn’t seem like this is really the remedy for the housing problem that we all know we have in this country,” Bridges said.

Which is first and foremost, he said, that we don’t have enough of it.

Trump & Pulte’s 50-Year Mortgage

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Politico quoted me in ‘Band-Aid,’ ‘Distraction’: Experts Slam Pulte, Trump 50-Year Mortgage Idea. It opens,

The Trump administration is entertaining a potential plan for the government to back 50-year mortgages to address a housing affordability crisis.

But, in a housing market defined by low supply, industry experts warn that changes in financing are likely to be little more than a “band-aid” and a “gimmick,” while posing bigger risks to homebuyers.

“As a country, the mortgage term is not what we should be worried about. We should be focused on building more supply,” said Troy Ludtka, senior U.S. economist at SMBC Nikko Securities America.

Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Bill Pulte posted on X Saturday that the Trump administration is working on directing government-owned housing finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to support 50-year home mortgages, calling the move ”a complete game changer.” President Donald Trump also posted on his social media platform, Truth Social, supporting the idea.

The proposal comes after Trump directed Pulte to leverage Fannie and Freddie to ramp up the country’s stalled housing production to bring down costs and address the estimated shortage of 4.7 million homes. But the new proposal is raising concerns about whether such a major change to the two giant mortgage financiers’ buying rules could destabilize a central strength of homeownership — the opportunity to build wealth over time.

In a series of follow-up posts over the weekend, Pulte wrote that “a 50 Year Mortgage is simply a potential weapon in a WIDE arsenal of solutions that we are developing right now. STAY TUNED!” He sounded off about other possible ideas like supporting portable mortgages, which can transfer to a new property, and assumable mortgages, which can be transferred to a property’s new buyer.

An FHFA spokesperson told POLITICO, “We continue to evaluate all options to address housing affordability, including studying how to make mortgages assumable or portable.”

And a White House spokesperson said in a statement, “President Trump is always exploring new ways to improve housing affordability for everyday Americans. Any official policy changes will be announced by the White House.”

Experts expect that extending the potential length of Fannie- and Freddie-supported home loans would require congressional support.

Fannie and Freddie don’t offer loans directly to potential homebuyers; instead, they purchase mortgages from lenders to package and sell on the secondary market. This frees up resources for lenders to issue new mortgages.

By purchasing 50-year mortgages, Fannie and Freddie could make the longer-term loans more appealing for lenders to offer. With a longer loan, monthly payments could come down, but it also comes at a cost to homebuyers.

“It would lead to buyers building equity in their homes more slowly. At the beginning of the mortgage, more of those payments tend to be interest… This is more of a stopgap band-aid to address affordability,” said Gennadiy Goldberg, head of US rates strategy at TD Securities.

Sharon Cornelissen, director of housing at the Consumer Federation of America, called the proposal “a distraction” and warned that although expanding the accessibility of 50-year mortgages could lower monthly payments, “the cost of that is that people won’t be able to build wealth through homeownership.”

And as first-time homebuyers get older, the 50-year mortgage appears less manageable, Cornelissen said. Last week, the National Association of Realtors shared findings that the median age of first-time homebuyers had risen to an all-time high of 40.

“So you’ll be 90,” Cornelissen said, adding that finishing payment on a 30-year mortgage is a “stabilizing force” for people going into retirement.

David Reiss, a Cornell Law School professor and real estate finance researcher, said a move toward 50-year mortgages would require homebuyers to rethink how they save for retirement.

“We often hear financial advice that you want to try to pay off your mortgage before the time that you retire,” Reiss said. “So that’s a problem.”

The FHFA’s @Pulte Acts on X Alone

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Business Insider quoted me in Mortgage Regulator Bill Pulte Has Posted at Least 13 Agency Orders on His Personal X Account (behind a paywall). The story reads, in part,

Until he became the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and a warrior in President Trump’s fight with the Federal Reserve, Bill Pulte was mostly known for posting on X. Under the handle @pulte, the businessman frequently sent groceries and gas money to people in need.

In his governmental role, which he assumed in March, Pulte has continued to use X as a megaphone. Over the last six months, he has posted at least 13 official orders on his personal account — and they don’t appear to be posted publicly anywhere else.

The practice is unusual for the head of an agency that regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two housing-finance companies under federal conservatorship central to the $21 trillion residential mortgage market.

*    *     *

“This is very abnormal,” said David Reiss, a law professor at Cornell University who focuses on housing policy and real-estate finance. “I don’t know what a court would do if someone sued based on an order that he only posted on X.” He added by email that impacted parties might argue that carrying out official acts by an X post doesn’t comply with the Administrative Procedure Act.

The FHFA did not respond to questions about Pulte’s posts. Pulte didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Fannie, Freddie and Trump

Profile picture for William J. Pulte

FHFA Director Bill Pulte

Central Banking quoted me in Fannie, Freddie . . . and Donald. It reads, in part,

IIn a client note on May 13, investment management firm Pimco said any privatisation of Fannie and Freddie would be a solution in search of a problem.

“If the GSEs are released but the government remains accountable to come to their rescue, wouldn’t taxpayers ultimately be the biggest loser, once again, by seeing GSE gains privatised but losses socialised?” it said, adding: “Don’t fix what’s not broken.”

David Reiss, professor at Cornell Law School, says Pimco’s view reflects the fact that the mortgage market has been functioning “pretty smoothly” since Fannie and Freddie were nationalised. According to this viewpoint, there is “no need to release them from conservatorship”.

However, Reiss says he does not like to see so much power and influence concentrated in the GSEs, and he believes the private sector would do a better job of evaluating credit risk.

“Some people – mostly investors in Fannie and Freddie securities – think [privatisation] is the right thing to do because the conservatorships were supposed to be temporary and the companies should be returned to private control and investors should be able to get some kind of return on their investments,” he says.

Reiss adds that some members of the Trump administration think privatisation would generate hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue that could be used to help pay down the national debt, offset tax cuts and seed a sovereign wealth fund.

Joe Tracy, senior fellow with think-tank the American Enterprise Institute and a former official with the Federal Reserve banks of New York and Dallas, agrees with Reiss. “The problem is that they are in conservatorship limbo, so the government has effectively nationalised a large segment of mortgage finance,” he says. “This should be carried out by the private sector.”

    *     *     *

Lawrence White, professor at New York University and co-author of Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, says the GSEs are unlikely to become boring unless they are broken down. He believes that if Fannie and Freddie are privatised in their current form, each enterprise will be likely to pose a systemic risk from a financial stability perspective.

“The implication is that their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency [FHFAI, will need to have strong powers of examination and supervision and will need to impose substantial, risk-adjusted capital requirements,” he says.

“It is unclear whether there will be implications for the Fed as lender of last resort, since the Fed’s lending function is currently limited to banks.”

Reiss agrees that the two lenders are systemically important. If they “had to significantly scale back their lending, it would likely cause a crisis in the financial markets”, he says. “If that crisis were not quickly addressed it would cause a crisis in the real economy as well, freezing up credit for new construction and resales.”

Given that the two GSEs issue more than 70% of the outstanding $9 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in the US and, if privatised, would be two of the country’s largest publicly traded companies, the financial stability risks are clear, he says.

Reiss adds that if the privatisations were poorly planned, and if this were priced in by the markets, it would lead to “higher mortgage rates, with all of the knock-on effects that would have”. This, he says, would “increase the magnitude of a financial crisis if the two companies were to report poor financial results down the line”

Reiss’s interpretation of the Fed’s role is different to that of White, and he believes history may end up repeating itself. He says that although the FHFA is Fannie and Freddie’s primary regulator, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires the Fed to be consulted about any federal government processes related to the companies.

“The Fed may also co-ordinate with other parts of the federal government in responding to a financial crisis, such as purchasing Fannie and Freddie securities, as they did during the financial crisis of 2007-08,” he says. “One could well imagine the Fed playing a similar role in future crises involving Fannie and Freddie.

What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private?

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I was quoted in Fintech Nexus’ Home Invasion: What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private. It reads, in part,

The Trump Administration has telegraphed significant changes to GSE mortgage lenders — with massive implications for the industry

Since his swearing in on March 14 as the fifth Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), construction mogul William J. Pulte has executed major policy and personnel changes. Among other moves, Pulte has named himself board chair of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, removed 14 of the GSEs’ 25 sitting board members, fired most of the companies’ audit boards, generally slashed headcount, and rescinded several Biden-era oversight-related advisory bulletins.

According to Professor David Reiss of Cornell Law School, a scholar of real estate finance and housing policy, Pulte’s simultaneous leadership of the FHFA in addition to roles at the GSEs, which have been under federal conservatorship since the 2008 financial crisis, is not normal.

“The whole point of regulation is you have somebody who’s overseeing an industry,” he told Fintech Nexus. “This is like the left hand [knowing] what the right hand is doing: You’re overseeing yourself, so it’s … kind of inconsistent with the notion of a supervisory regulator.”

Fintech Nexus contacted the FHFA, requesting that it comment on the impetus behind Pulte’s simultaneous self-appointments to Fannie and Freddie. The FHFA did not respond.

*     *    *

CAPITAL IDEAS

One idea percolating is for the Trump Administration to use Fannie and Freddie as a pool of capital to inject into a sovereign wealth fund. An op-ed in the Financial Times by Stifel CEO Ronald Kruszewski suggested this reconfiguration could provide “continued government backing,” “stabilize investor confidence,” and “pave the way for a $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund by 2040.”

However, in a letter to the editor in the Financial Times, Dini Ajmani, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury, suggested the idea would fail, as any privatization of the GSEs would require proper capitalization, taxpayer compensation, and adequate confidence of securities investors.

“I believe the difficulty in meeting all three conditions is why [the] status quo has persisted,” Ajmani told Fintech Nexus. “To build capital, Fannie/Freddie must retain earnings, which means the taxpayer is not compensated. If the taxpayer is compensated through dividend payments, private capital will be uninterested because the agencies will be undercapitalized.”

To this end, FHFA Director Pulte may continue to atrophy many forms of GSE oversight as a way to prime the pump: Pre-empting congressional activity by deregulating Fannie and Freddie can accelerate their transition toward open-market frameworks.

The Trump Administration may see it as its only viable short-term  avenue, as many members of Congress are uninterested in bringing Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship; Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, called the move “Great for billionaires, terrible for hardworking people.”

Should the Trump Administration succeed in its quest, we may see states attempting to fill in the gaps on regulatory accountability, rhyming with blue-state attorneys-general’s litigiousness in the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s de-clawing, though this is unlikely.

“State regulators do not generally play a role similar to the two companies (except to some small extent state Housing Finance Agencies),” Reiss of Cornell Law School said. “I could imagine state agencies trying to increase consumer protection for mortgage borrowers, if the federal regulatory environment changes, but we would have to see how that plays out to understand how the states would respond.”

Trump’s Plans to Privatize Fannie and Freddie

from Cato Institute website, https://www.cato.org/people/mark-calabria

Mark Calabria, OMB Associate Director for Treasury, Housing, and Commerce

I was interviewed on  WBUR-FM’s On Point (distributed by American Public Radio), hosted by Meghna Chakrabarti for an episode on How Trump Plans To Get Government out of the Mortgage Business. The link has the recording of the show as well as a transcript.

The transcript of the interview starts,

CHAKRABARTI: Now that President Trump is back in the White House, it seems that he intends to get the job done this time around. Mark Calabria has returned to Trump’s administration, this time working on housing policy at the Office of Management and Budget. Bill Pulte is now director of FHFA, and he just made the highly unusual move of appointing himself chair of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, making the regulator and the regulated basically the same.

Pulte also fired 14 of the 25 sitting board members at Fannie and Freddie. A shakeup many are suspecting is a first step in leading these two companies out of government control and into privatization. We’re talking about a huge part of the U.S. economy that underpins the housing market. So this hour, we want to explore what privatization of Fannie and Freddie actually means, what it should look like, and how it might have an impact on homeowners and the housing market.

So to do that, David Reiss joins us. He’s a clinical professor of law at Cornell Law School and Cornell Tech, an expert in housing finance and policy. Professor Reiss, welcome to On Point.

DAVID REISS: Meghna, thank you so much.

CHAKRABARTI: I have to tell you that I actually can’t believe that it’s been 17 years since the financial crisis of 2008.

Let’s dust off the memory banks professor and go back to before 2008 and start there. Can you just remind us like what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were, what their purpose was, who owned them, et cetera?

REISS: I’m gonna go even a little bit further back than Fannie and Freddie’s creation, because I think it’s really gonna help people visualize what’s at stake here.

And if you think back to the 19th century and somebody was trying to buy a house, they didn’t have that many options. A house has always been a very expensive thing to buy, so they need to borrow some money to buy a house. And how could you do that?

Maybe if you’re rich, you could do it, or had a rich uncle, but otherwise you need to go to somebody who has capital and that you could borrow it and give them some interest in return. And pay them back over time, and be able to live in that house while you’re paying back the amount of money that you borrowed. And so if people think of It’s a Wonderful Life where there’s the Bailey Brothers building in loans and where they, people deposit their small savings into the buildings and loan.

And then some people are then able to borrow some money from the buildings and loan for mortgages. And there’s the famous scene where there’s a panic at the bank. And Jimmy Stewart says, Mrs. Kennedy, your money is in Mrs. Smith’s house. And Mrs. Smith, your money is in Ms. Macklin’s house.

And that’s the way it was done in the 19th century and the early 20th century. But there were real limitations to that. Sometimes communities didn’t have a lot of capital to lend people, so maybe in out west or in the Midwest there wasn’t a lot of capital, like there might’ve been back east in Boston or New York.

And so people who could have handled the mortgage just didn’t have access to it. It was like they were living in a dry area, and the fresh flowing credit didn’t reach their dry community. So during the Great Depression and the New Deal the government started to intervene, to spread credit out across the country in a way that kind of provided liquidity to all the communities where people wanted to borrow.

And Fannie Mae was a creature of the New Deal, but really took off in the ’70s along with its sibling Freddie Mac. And effectively, what those two companies were designed by Congress to do was to ensure that capital could go across state borders in a way that banks were typically not allowed to do. And they effectively created at first a national market for mortgage credit, and effectively when they access the global credit markets over time, an international global market for credit. So they’re really intermediaries.