In Meehan v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 1:11CV363, 2011 WL 3360193 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2011), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that MERS had a beneficial interest in the property based on the language of the mortgage agreement. In this case, the homeowners filed an action to quiet title, claiming, “MERS has no beneficial interest in the mortgage. . . [further,] MERS’s interest is adverse and constitutes a cloud on the title to [the] property.” MERS claimed it had a beneficial interest in the property because the mortgage named MERS as nominee for the lender as well as the mortgagee. The court found that the contract language was clear and an action to quiet title, which is an equitable remedy, was not available to the homeowners in this case. Thus, the court held that the homeowners claim was without merit and granted MERS’s motion to dismiss.
Author Archives: Michael Liptrot
Southern District of Ohio Unable to Determine Lenders’ Standing, Orders Lenders to Submit More Evidence or Have Case Dismissed
In In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed 27 private foreclosure actions based on federal diversity jurisdiction. In this case, the court was concerned with the issues of standing and subject matter jurisdiction, and was dissatisfied with the evidence submitted by the lenders. The court concluded by ordering the lenders to “submit evidence [within 30 days] showing that they had standing in the above-captioned cases when the complaint was filed and that this Court had diversity jurisdiction when the complaint was filed. Failure to do so will result in dismissal without prejudice to refiling if and when the plaintiff acquires standing and the diversity jurisdiction requirements are met.”
Ohio Appellate Court Holds that Lender, as the Real Party in Interest, has Standing to Foreclose
In Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Shifflet, 2010-Ohio-1266, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District held that the lender had standing to bring a foreclosure action against the homeowners. The homeowners argued that “MERS, rather than [lender], was the holder of the mortgage, rendering [MERS] the real party in interest.” The court rejected this argument, and based their determination on the evidence submitted by the lender. The evidence submitted was (1) an affidavit from the lender’s assistant vice president stating that the lender is the holder of the mortgage deed and note, and (2) an assignment executed by MERS that assigned all of its right, title, and interest in the subject mortgage deed and note to the lender. The court found this evidence dispositive, stating, “[g]iven the affidavit of [the lender’s assistant vice president] and, more importantly, the documentary evidence of the assignment of the mortgage and note to [the lender], the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the lender.”
Ohio State Court of Appeals Holds that Bank has Standing to Foreclose
In Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Traxler, 2010-Ohio-3940, the Court of Appeals, Ninth District of the State of Ohio held that the bank had standing to commence a foreclosure action against the homeowners. The homeowners argued that the bank lacked standing because the bank did not possess the mortgage and note at the time it commenced its action. The court rejected this argument, holding, “a bank need not possess a valid assignment at the time of filing suit so long as the bank procures the assignment in sufficient time to apprise the litigants and the court that the bank is the real party in interest.” The court looked at the assignments of the mortgage and note, and found that both were valid. Specifically, the court rejected the homeowner’s argument that MERS lacked authority to assign the mortgage. The court found that where MERS is designated as both the nominee and mortgagee of the mortgage, it has authority to assign the mortgage. However, the court went even further and stated, “assuming that MERS did not have the authority to assign the mortgage, however, we. . . conclude that the proper transfer of the promissory note, which the mortgage secured, amounted to an equitable assignment of the mortgage.” Thus, the court concluded that the homeowner’s arguments be rejected and the bank had standing to foreclose.
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Holds that Bank Has Standing to Foreclose
In Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Delphonse, 64 A.D.3d 624 (2d Dept. 2009) the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department found that the lender, Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide), had standing to foreclose on the Delphonses, the homeowners in the case, because the court found that the Delphonses waived the issue at the pre-trial stage, and furthermore that Countrywide met its burden of proof. The court held, “[the Delphonses] waived the defense of lack of standing (see CPLR 3211[a][3]) by failing to either make a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground or by asserting that defense in their answer. . . . On its motion for summary judgment, [Countrywide] established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the mortgage, the underlying note, and evidence of a default.”
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department Holds that MERS has Standing to Foreclose
In Mtge. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674 (2d Dept. 2007), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department found that MERS had standing to foreclose on the homeowner. The court held, “[t]he record shows that the promissory note was. . . ultimately transferred and tendered to MERS. Therefore, at the time of the commencement of this action, MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note and of the mortgage, which passed as an incident to the promissory note. . . . Moreover, further support for MERS’s standing to commence the action may be found on the face of the mortgage instrument itself. Pursuant to the clear and unequivocal terms of the mortgage instrument, Coakley expressly agreed without qualification that MERS had the right to foreclose upon the premises in the event of a default.” Thus, in this case MERS was able to prove that it held both the mortgage and the underlying note, which was enough for the court to determine that MERS had standing to foreclose.
United States Bankruptcy Court Bound by Precedent to Recognize Bank’s Standing in Foreclosure Action, but Opines on MERS’s Flawed Assignment Process and Status as Agent
In In re Agard, 444 BR 231, 235 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated in part sub nom. Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., BR 8-10-77338 REG (E.D.N.Y. 2012), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York held that U.S. Bank, the assignee bank in this case, had standing to foreclose because the state court had already determined that the assignment of the mortgage by MERS to U.S. Bank was a valid assignment. The court stated the issue as follows: “[homeowner] argues that the only interest U.S. Bank holds in the underlying mortgage was received by way of an assignment from. . . MERS, as a ‘nominee’ for the original lender. [Homeowner]’s argument raises a fundamental question as to whether MERS had the legal authority to assign a valid and enforceable interest in the subject mortgage.”
In holding for U.S. Bank, the court stated the homeowner’s argument had to be rejected because of the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court stated, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which together stand for the proposition that lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct appellate review of state court judgments.” Also, the court found that res judicata precludes the homeowner from prevailing here: “The state court already has determined that U.S. Bank is a secured creditor with standing to foreclose and this Court cannot alter that determination in order to deny U.S. Bank standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.”
However, the court in this case found it necessary to expound upon whether it believed that U.S. Bank had standing to foreclose, despite the state court’s binding opinion. “[T]he Court believes that it is appropriate to set forth its analysis on the issue of whether [U.S. Bank], absent the Judgment of Foreclosure, would have standing to bring the instant motion.” The court began its analysis by stating, “in order to have standing to seek relief from stay, [U.S. Bank]. . . must show that [it] holds both the Mortgage and the Note. . . [U.S. Bank] can prove that [it] is the holder of the Note by providing the Court with proof of a written assignment of the Note, or by demonstrating that [it] has physical possession of the Note endorsed over to it. . . the Assignment of Mortgage is not sufficient to establish an effective assignment of the Note.” Therefore, U.S. Bank would have to show that MERS both assigned the note and that it had authority to assign the note. Regarding MERS’s authority to assign the note, the court held, “[w]hat remains undisputed is that MERS did not have any rights with respect to the Note and other than as described above, MERS played no role in the transfer of the Note… [U.S. Bank]’s failure to show that [it] holds the Note should be fatal to the Movant’s standing.”
Furthermore, the court took issue with MERS’s status as agent of the original mortgagee. The court stated, “the record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency relationship exists under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members. According to MERS, the principal/agent relationship among itself and its members is created by the MERS rules of membership and terms and conditions, as well as the Mortgage itself. However, none of the documents expressly creates an agency relationship or even mentions the word “agency.” MERS would have this Court cobble together the documents and draw inferences from the words contained in those documents.” The court went even further in its criticism, saying, “Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon the statutory definition of ‘mortgagee,’ MERS’s position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best. . . . even if MERS had assigned the Mortgage acting on behalf of the entity which held the Note at the time of the assignment, this Court finds that MERS did not have authority, as ‘nominee’ or agent, to assign the Mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific written directions by its principal. This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a ‘common agent’ for undisclosed principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its distortion of its alleged ‘nominee’ status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: ‘The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on which part they were touching at any given time.’ ”
Absent the state court precedent that the court was bound to follow, the court likely would have emphatically refused to recognize MERS’s authority to assign the note as well as the mortgage, and in turn would have prevented U.S. Bank from proceeding with the foreclosure. Thus, in future cases before the court with similar facts that are not bound by state law precedent, MERS and any assignee bank will not have standing to foreclose.
