Unsexy but Essential: NYC’s Infrastructure Needs

The Center for an Urban Future has released a much-needed report, Caution Ahead: Overdue Investment for New York’s Aging Infrastructure. The report finds that

too much of the city’s essential infrastructure remains stuck in the 20th Century—a problem for a city positioning itself to compete with other global cities in today’s 21st Century economy.

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This report finds that city agencies and authorities will have to invest approximately $47.3 billion to maintain the safety and functioning of New York’s infrastructure—leaving a $34.2 billion capital funding gap at the city, Port Authority, New York City Transit, Housing Authority and CUNY over the next five years. This funding gap includes only the replacement and repair of existing infrastructure—not new structures or increased capacity. (3)

Good government reports like this are often heeded for a day or two in the press and then filed away with other examples of wishful thinking. The fact is that it is hard for politicians to fix the old when it is so much more noteworthy to do ribbon cuttings for the new. But given that Mayor de Blasio has placed housing construction at the top of his agenda, a report like this might gain more traction than usual.

The report highlights work that is needed to be in the following areas, among others:

  • Roads
  • Subways
  • Natural Gas
  • Electricity Distribution
  • Water Mains
  • Sewage Pipes
  • Stormwater Management
  • Parks

All of these infrastructure needs are integral to large scale housing construction. Large, new buildings need to be supported with investments across these areas. This is a cost. But large scale housing construction also provides the opportunity to upgrade infrastructure more broadly. Concentrated development makes it more cost-effective to upgrade and modernize the infrastructure that supports new developments as well as their surrounding areas. There is no question that the de Blasio Administration should integrate infrastructure improvement with its ambitious affordable housing agenda. It may not be able to get two for the price of one. But with proper planning, it certainly could get two for less than the price of two.

Long-Term Homeownership Affordability

Amnon Lehavi has posted Can the Resale Housing Market Be Split to Facilitate Long-Term Affordability? to SSRN.  The paper argues that

a comprehensive affordable housing policy requires the formal splitting of the homeownership market into (at least) two distinct segments: one designated for the general public and following a conventional pricing mechanism through free market supply and demand, and the other designated for eligible households and controlling both initial supply and subsequent resale of housing units through regulated affordability-oriented pricing mechanisms.

While regulation of the pricing of affordable housing units during their initial allocation is a standard feature of housing policy–whether such affordable units are produced by a public authority or a private developer–regulation of pricing upon resale to subsequent buyers has received less attention as a matter of both theory and practice, thus leaving a substantial gap in

design mechanisms aimed at promoting a sustainable affordable housing policy.(1)

This is not really a new argument, but the paper takes the position that existing efforts to regulate resales of affordable housing in the homeownership market can be scaled up significantly. The paper does not take on some of the bigger questions that this position implicates — for instance, should scarce homeownership dollars be spent on rental housing instead — but it does develop a concrete proposal:

This paper seeks to enrich policy design options by introducing two alternative cap-on-resale mechanisms for the affordable housing segment: “Mixed Indexed Cap” (MIC) and “Pure Indexed Cap” (PIC). It explains how such models could be utilized to attain a policy goal of promoting long-term social mobility, allowing multiple low- and modest-income households to engage in capital building by sequentially enjoying increments of appreciation of properties in the affordable housing segment.

In so doing, the paper addresses a series of challenges posed by the design of a cap-on-resale mechanism: Could such a mechanism ensure that the homeowner is granted a fair return upon resale, providing the owner with proper incentives to invest efficiently in the property during the tenure, while setting up a resale rate that would make the unit truly affordable for future homebuyers? (1)

New York Ciy has experimented with affordable homeownership and has not come up with an ideal solution to the problem of affordability upon resale. Given the renewed focus on affordable housing policy in NYC, this attention to affordable homeownership policy is most welcome.

Preserving Low-Income Housing

NYC Mayor De Blasio announced an aggressive goal of producing and preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing over the next ten years. New York City will need to be as creative as possible to achieve this goal and will need to look to all of the resources that it has at its disposal to achieve it. Enterprise Community Partners released Preserving Housing Credit Investment: The State of Housing Credit Properties and Lessons Learned for the Extended Use Period. This report looks at important component of a preservation agenda: Low-Income Housing Tax Credit buildings that “reach the end of their initial 15-year compliance period.” (4) The report presents data about LIHTC buildings during the 15-year “extended use period” that follow the compliance period

and shares how some state and local housing agencies around the country are addressing the post-Year 15 Housing Credit properties. While the condition of the Housing Credit portfolio at Year 15 is strong, as properties age into a second 15-year period of rent restrictions and beyond, the ability for some of those properties to be able to afford to make improvements while maintaining affordability is clearly a challenge. Some of these local best practices point to solutions demonstrating programmatic and regulatory flexibility, new resources as well as resyndication where appropriate. (4)

Across the nation, roughly 100,000 units of housing age out of the initial compliance period each year, so we are talking about a lot of housing.  New York has a significant portion of that housing stock. While these properties are in pretty good condition overall, the report found that

very limited financing choices exist throughout the extended use period for properties with modest recapitalization or capital improvement needs. Currently, the best choice seems to be a resyndication with a new Housing Credit allocation. However, the use of Housing Credits to preserve and extend the affordability of existing affordable housing competes with other Housing Credit properties, including public housing revitalization and new projects (both as adaptive reuse of existing buildings and new construction). The Housing Credit was created to address affordable housing needs that the private market could not effectively serve. It incentivized a public-private partnership that includes affordability for 30 years. In order to preserve this inventory, more investment will be required. Ensuring the physical and economic stability of these assets through their extended use periods will require innovative uses of limited public subsidy by states and municipalities. (5)

New York City will certainly want to plan for the modest recapitalization of its LIHTC properties as part of its affordable housing strategy. And it will be better to plan for it now than pay too much for deferred maintenance down the line.

State of the Union’s Rental Housing

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The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University released its report, America’s Rental Housing: Evolving Markets and Needs. The report notes that

Rental housing has always provided a broad choice of homes for people at all phases of life. The recent economic turmoil underscored the many advantages of renting and raised the barriers to homeownership, sparking a surge in demand that has buoyed rental markets across the country. But significant erosion in renter incomes over the past decade has pushed the number of households paying excessive shares of income for housing to record levels. Assistance efforts have failed to keep pace with this escalating need, undermining the nation’s longstanding goal of ensuring decent and affordable housing for all. (1)

The report provides an excellent overview of the current state of the rental housing stock and households. Of particular interest to readers of this blog is how the report addresses the federal government’s role in the housing finance system. The report notes that

During the downturn, most credit sources dried up as property performance deteriorated and the risk of delinquencies mounted. Much as in the owner-occupied market, though, lending activity continued through government-backed channels, with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) playing an important countercyclical role.

But as the health of the multifamily market improved, private lending revived. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, banks and thrifts greatly expanded their multifamily lending in 2012, nearly matching the volume for Fannie and Freddie. Given fundamentally sound market conditions, multifamily lending activity should continue to increase. The experience of the last several years, however, clearly testifies to the importance of a government presence in a market that provides homes for millions of Americans, particularly during periods of economic stress. (5)

 The report, to my mind, reflects a complacence about the federal role in housing finance:

Although some have called for winding down Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily activities and putting an end to federal backstops beyond FHA, most propose replacing the implicit guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with explicit guarantees for which the federal government would charge a fee. Proposals for a federal backstop differ, however, in whether they require a cap on the average per unit loan size or include an affordability requirement to ensure that credit is available to multifamily properties with lower rents or subsidies. While the details are clearly significant, what is most important is that reform efforts do not lose sight of the critical federal role in ensuring the availability of multifamily financing to help maintain rental affordability, as well as in supporting the market more broadly during economic downturns. (8)

The report gives very little attention to what the federal housing finance system should look like going forward, other than implying that change should be incremental:

To foster further increases in private participation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA—the regulator and conservator of the GSEs) has signaled its intent to set a ceiling on the amount of multifamily lending that the GSEs can back in 2013. While the caps are fairly high—$30 billion for Fannie Mae and $26 billion for Freddie Mac—FHFA intends to further reduce GSE lending volumes over the next several years either by lowering these limits or by such actions as restricting loan products, requiring stricter underwriting, or increasing loan pricing. With lending by depository institutions and life insurance companies increasing, the market may well be able to adjust to these restrictions. The bigger question, however, is how the financial reforms now under debate will redefine the government’s role in backstopping the multifamily market. Recent experience clearly demonstrates the importance of federal support for multifamily lending when financial crises drive private lenders out of the market. (27)

I would have preferred to see a positive vision from the Center for how the federal government should go about ensuring liquidity in the market during future crises and how it should support an increase in the affordable housing stock. Perhaps that is asking too much of such a broad report, although the fact that Fannie and Freddie are members of the Center’s Policy Advisory Board which provided funding for the report may have played a role as well. [I might add that I found it odd that the members of the Policy Advisory Board were not listed in the report.]

I do not want to end on a negative note about such a helpful report. I would note that it takes seriously some controversial ideas about increasing the supply of affordable housing.  The report advocates for the reduction of regulatory constraints on affordable rental housing construction. I interpret this as a version of the Glaeser and Gyourko critique of the impact of restrictive local land use regimes on housing affordability. As progressives like NYC’s new Mayor know, restrictive zoning and affordable housing construction are at cross purposes from each other.

Reducing The Cost of Affordable Housing Development: Lessons for NYC?

Enterprise and the Urban Land Institute have issued a report, Bending the Cost Curve on Affordable Rental Development: Understanding the Drivers of Cost, that identifies affordable housing development’s “most commonly cited cost drivers, provides a brief overview of their impact and applicability, and includes high-level recommendations to promote a more efficient delivery system.” (4). As the report notes,

Affordable housing delivery is shaped by a number of procedures, regulations, and policies instituted at all levels of the system—each with associated costs. Development costs may be dictated by site constraints, design elements, local land use and zoning restrictions, building codes, delays in the development process, efforts to reduce long-term operating costs, and the affordable housing finance system. Most affordable developments rely on multiple funding streams, both equity and debt, each of which carries its own set of requirements and compliance costs. While there may be some alignment of affordable housing land use regulations, financing tools, or programs, far too often developers must seek a complex series of approvals or obtain waivers to bring a project to fruition. This process alone can introduce costs through delays to the development timeline as well as introduce additional uncertainty and risk, which, in addition to regulatory barriers, can also increase costs. (3)

While the report offers no shocking insights into affordable housing’s cost drivers, it does provide a good overview. It also brings to mind research that NYU’s Furman Center did some years ago about the drivers of the high cost of housing construction in New York City.

Given that Mayor-Elect de Blasio has put affordable housing at the center of his campaign, his team should focus on reducing these costs as part of his overall affordable housing strategy. Mayors Bloomberg and Giuliani were not able to make any significant progress on this issue, even though doing so would be quite consistent with their approach to governance. Perhaps that makes it even more of a compelling goal for the de Blasio Administration.

3 Housing Riddles For De Blasio

I wrote an op ed for Law360,com that was posted today. While it is behind a paywall on Law360, it reads in full as follows:

3 Housing Riddles For De Blasio

As Mayor-Elect Bill de Blasio is making the transition from campaigning to governing New York City, it is worth contemplating some of the fundamental riddles that perplex those who spend their time thinking about the city’s housing policy. I address three of the most perplexing below.

The Riddle of Mandatory But Not Sufficient

The housing policy centerpiece of the de Blasio campaign is to require developers to build some affordable housing units when they build on lots that have been upzoned, a policy known as mandatory inclusionary zoning. The campaign website states that this policy will create 50,000 new units of housing.

Let’s put aside the fact that this number appears to be very aggressive given the lack of significant upzonings on the horizon (see second riddle below). Just because the city mandates that affordable housing be part of any new construction, it cannot mandate that developers build any housing at all if the deal does not make economic sense for them.

The de Blasio administration will need to carefully calibrate the mandatory inclusionary zoning rules to ensure that builders are sufficiently incentivized to build in the first place. This may limit the amount of affordable housing that can be mandated as part of that new construction.

One key aspect of this policy is whether the mandatory affordable housing will be required to be on-site or if the developer can build it off-site. If it is the former, it will help achieve the progressive goal of increasing socio-economic diversity in a city that is rapidly losing it.

But each unit of on-site housing would likely be more expensive to construct than off-site affordable units. And the opposite is true if the mandatory affordable units are allowed to be off-site; they will be likely cheaper to construct and thus more housing could be built. But it would not work toward increasing socio-economic diversity in the city.

And thus, the riddle of mandatory but not sufficient poses two challenges to the administration. Can it incentivize the creation of a meaningful number of units? And should it favor socio-economic diversity or the maximum production of affordable units? No easy answers here.

The Riddle of Now Versus Later

Can you increase the supply of housing to address the needs of a growing population while also downzoning large swaths of the city to respond to the preferences of the city’s current residents?

The Michael Bloomberg administration wanted to have this both ways, but that can’t work. The Bloomberg administration had planned on an increase in population of roughly another million people by 2030 while at the same time downzoning a large swath of the city (and, to be fair, upzoning some other portions).

This downzoning made current residents happy as it kept big, modern, out-of-context buildings from popping up near their homes. But it also limited the opportunities for increasing the housing stock, particularly near transit hubs. This is the basis of the second riddle — what is seen as bad by current residents may be good for future residents.

It is a fundamental economic truth that if more and more people are flocking to New York City, housing costs will rise unless supply increases. But for city residents, there is a paradox. New Yorkers see gleaming towers rise in their neighborhoods along with the rents for their nearby apartments. There are two explanations for this paradox.

First, the supply of new housing may be increasing without keeping pace with rising demand. Historically, New York City has not had many new units of housing built each year, maybe 20,000 units or so in a good year. This modest increase in supply has been overwhelmed by the increase in population of a million people in the last 20 or so years. This disparity goes a long way to explain the high rents and the miniscule vacancy rates that are seen throughout the city.

Second, new housing in one community (Williamsburg, for example) may be causing or be part of a wave of local gentrification in the existing housing stock. So, even if the new housing is having a tendency to decrease housing costs in the city overall because it increases the supply, it can also be pushing rents higher in the communities in which it is situated.

Increasing the supply of housing has to be a key component of providing “safe affordable homes for all New Yorkers,” as de Blasio calls for on his campaign website. This has to mean zoning significantly more land for high-rise residential construction as well as incentivizing the construction of affordable housing units in that new construction.

At the same time, de Blasio must attend to the concerns of those negatively impacted by the new construction. Hence, the riddle of now versus later.

The Riddle of the Few Versus the Many

The de Blasio campaign website calls for “tighter standards that ensure subsidies meet the needs of lower-income families and are distributed equitably throughout the five boroughs.” Distributing affordable housing subsidies equitably throughout the city is important, but there is another equity issue — should the city heavily subsidize affordable housing for a small portion of those who are eligible or should it distribute resources more broadly and thinly among everyone who is eligible?

Fewer than 8 percent of low- and middle-income households receive a direct or indirect subsidy for an apartment (excluding public housing) while more than 20 percent live below the poverty line of $23,283 annually for a family of four.

Should the city’s limited resources be used to create a relatively small number of new affordable units or should some of them be used in ways that benefit a broader swath of low- and moderate-income New Yorkers, albeit more modestly?

Certain policies can address the needs of many, many more low- and moderate-income households than does heavily subsidized new construction that houses perhaps a few thousand low- and moderate-income households each year.

Examples of such policies include tax credits for low- and moderate-income households that put money in their pockets and increased enforcement directed against landlords who try to illegally drive their tenants out of rent-regulated units. On the other hand, without an affordable apartment, staying in NYC can just be untenable no matter what additional benefits the government may be able to provide through more broadly available programs.

Thus, the third riddle is — do you give a lot of help to a few or do you give a little help to the many? It’s like choosing between the rock and the hard place for policymakers and New Yorkers alike.

Mayor-Elect de Blasio and his team will have to struggle with these riddles, and more. The only thing that is clear is that there are no right answers and no easy answers when it comes to housing policy in New York City.

—By David Reiss, Brooklyn Law School

David Reiss is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. He concentrates on real estate finance and community development and writes about housing policy.

Reiss on Mayor De Blasio’s Plans for Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning

Law360.com interviewed me about Mayor-Elect de Blasio’s plans for mandatory inclusionary zoning in NYC Real Estate Faces Less Friendly Market Under De Blasio (behind a paywall). It reads in part:

One of the biggest and most controversial pieces of de Blasio’s affordable housing platform is a plan to mandate inclusionary zoning — requiring developers to build affordable housing as part of their market-rate multifamily projects — when developments are being constructed in areas rezoned by the city.

Mandatory inclusionary zoning is meant to be a “hard-and-fast rule” to replace the incentives de Blasio plans to end for big developers, and he predicted on his campaign website that the strategy would create up to 50,000 new affordable housing units during the next 10 years.

But “mandatory” anything is considered an added cost when developers are weighing their options in deciding where to build, and requiring that residential developments include affordable housing could push some developers elsewhere, experts say.

“The devil is in the details,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss, noting that the way the de Blasio administration writes and implements the rule will make a big difference, either encouraging more development of affordable housing or shutting down the market to new developers.

And while de Blasio has emphasized that inclusionary zoning would only be mandatory for projects taking place in areas specifically rezoned for new development, Learner points out that the Bloomberg administration rezoned more than 30 percent of the city, so the new rule could likely affect many developers.

“When the program is designed, a lot of thought needs to go into what impact mandatory inclusionary zoning will have on the bottom line of developers,” Reiss said. “If it’s too significant of an impact, a less than optimal amount of housing will be built.”