Rent Freezes in NYC

Zohran Mamdani, Democratic Nominee for Mayor of NYC

The New York Times quoted me in Free Buses and Billions in New Taxes. Can Mamdani Achieve His Plans? It reads, in part,

A major pillar of Mr. Mamdani’s economic plan is housing: He wants to build 200,000 units of affordable housing and freeze rent on the city’s nearly one million rent-stabilized apartments.

But to build, he has said the city will have to borrow $70 billion, exceeding its debt limit by some $30 billion. Going over the limit would require state approval.

Freezing rent, on the other hand, is relatively straightforward and has precedent. But there are consequences.

Mayors cannot freeze rent on their own, but they do appoint the nine members on the Rent Guidelines Board, which sets rents on the city’s rent-stabilized units.

David Reiss, who served on the board under Mr. de Blasio, said that before it voted, members generally considered the overall state of housing in the city, including affordability, landlord expenses and economic conditions.

He said that members could decide that affordability was the most important factor and vote to freeze rents, as they did in 2015, 2016 and 2020.

“A rent freeze would meet the needs of a lot of people who are having a hard time keeping up with their rent,” Mr. Reiss said, “but it’s an unsustainable operation.”

Landlords, including those whose buildings have a large majority of rent-stabilized units, are increasingly saying that they are not collecting enough rent to maintain units.

“Are we going to be pushing a distinct portion of the housing market into great distress because their expenses are outstripping their income?” Mr. Reiss said.

The Importance of Mentorship for New Lawyers

I interviewed Connor Blancato, an up-and-coming real estate lawyer, for the New York Real Property Law Journal. The interview emphasizes the importance of mentorship  for new lawyers.

Click on the picture to read the interview.

Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market

Bill Pulte, FHFA Director and Chair of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac

I was quoted in the American Prospect’s story, Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market. It reads, in part,

This week, the Donald Trump–appointed chief regulator for the two quasi-governmental companies that own or control about half of the residential housing market anointed himself the board chair of both those companies. This maneuver could signal a host of shenanigans: the culmination of a 17-year hedge fund get-rich-quick scheme, a balance-sheet fiction to justify tax cuts, a new favor factory for apartment developers with ties to the president, a data transfer so Elon Musk’s everything app can learn how to sell mortgages, or something equally problematic.

But what gives former board members, market observers, and officials at the regulator greater concern is the distinct possibility that mucking around with the $7.7 trillion secondary mortgage market could lead to breaking it.

If that happens, homebuyers may not be able to get mortgages, homebuilders may be reluctant to break ground, and uncertainty would abound in a market that has brought down the economy on more than one occasion in U.S. history, most recently in 2008. “It could freeze sales, freeze refinances, stop people from forming households, cause people to be afraid of moving, freeze up developers of housing and the secondary market,” said David Reiss, a professor at Cornell Law School.

* * *

Multifamily Glad-Handing

The GSEs have a pretty sober business on the single-family side, and since the housing collapse really originated there, a lot of work was done to clean up that part of the business. But Fannie and Freddie also make loans in the multifamily market to support building of apartments and condos. A former official with one of the GSEs told me that business is a little looser, with ways to enhance those loans.

This president, of course, is a multifamily real estate developer himself, who has friends in multifamily real estate development. Hamara, one of the new board members, is a vice president at Tri Pointe Homes, a major homebuilder. You could imagine these relationships leading to the GSEs pushing risk limits, loosening credit standards, or raising loan-to-value ratios for favored borrowers. There is a secret mortgage blacklist at Fannie Mae for condos without enough property insurance or in need of repairs; controlling the board could make that blacklist go away, at least for certain developers.

This kind of setup resembles the opportunity zones that were a feature of the 2017 Trump tax cuts. They gave significant tax breaks to investors in certain communities deemed in need of development. Trump administration officials credit opportunity zones with increasing housing construction, but critics argue that the investments were rife with corruption and favor-trading.

That could also be the case here: New criteria guiding the new boards might lead to more multifamily housing, but with uneven results, favors to friends, and idiosyncratic deals that would be more about boosting allies than building housing. And as Calabria has pointed out, Fannie and Freddie are likely under Trump to cancel affordable-housing initiatives, meaning that sweetheart deals might only extend to the developers, rather than the public. Plus, there is the potential for dramatic losses if lending standards erode.

Reiss, of Cornell, agreed that this was all a possibility. “If someone gets to one of the directors, and they are there not acting as a fiduciary for the company, it opens the door to political favoritism,” he said.

* * *

What If It Breaks

Pulte is expected to force job cuts at the GSEs, which employ roughly 15,000 people. He has already been making familiar noises about DEI and remote work. One possibility on the table at the GSEs is merging Fannie and Freddie; you don’t usually have the same person chair the boards of two direct competitors. The regulatory agency is also likely to see cuts; already at FHFA, according to one source, fair lending and consumer protection groups have been put on administrative leave, along with employees at the Division of Research and Statistics.

Controlling the boards would limit dissent about these actions. But cuts in the name of efficiency could strain or even rupture the numerous functions the GSEs carry out, with consequences for the entire housing market.

Due to the conservatorship, the GSEs are limited in what they can pay their employees, which has led to a talent drain. Some systems have not been integrated, and others are not up to industry standards. Fannie and Freddie have a cautious internal culture that doesn’t move quickly. Hacking away at their already weakened structure could easily create operational harm.

But Reiss explained that nothing has to overtly break to lose the confidence of the markets; even a lack of workforce to move the paper around could create that impression, and disrupt the flow of credit. “If there is any kind of uncertainty, the spread between Fannie and Freddie securities and Treasury bonds will increase,” he said. “Investors will ask if the government will make good on Fannie and Freddie bonds. This uncertainty and direction could increase costs over time for all borrowers.”

Rethinking The Federal Home Loan Bank System

photo by Tony Webster

Law360 published my column, Time To Rethink The Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency is commencing a comprehensive review of an esoteric but important part of our financial infrastructure this month. The review is called “Federal Home Loan Bank System at 100: Focusing on the Future.”

It is a bit of misnomer, as the system is only 90 years old. Congress brought it into existence in 1932 as one of the first major legislative responses to the Great Depression. But the name of the review also signals that the next 10 years should be a period of reflection regarding the proper role of the system in our broader financial infrastructure.

Just as the name of the review process is a bit misleading, so is the name of the Federal Home Loan Bank system itself. While it was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions.

Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the system, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the system so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. But we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs. 

Does Historic Preservation Limit Affordable Housing?

By Stefan Kühn - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9413214

I answer that it can in CQ Researcher’s Historic Preservation:  Can The Past Escape The Wrecking Ball?

Many people fail to realize that land use policies like historic preservation involve big trade-offs. The most important one is that if you want to protect existing structures from demolition and modification, you can’t replace them with bigger ones that could house more people. Consider:

  • Historic preservation equals height and density restrictions. New building technologies (think steel girders and elevators) allow buildings to be built higher as time goes by. If a city landmarks a large percentage of its inner core, it restricts the ability of that core to go higher. This can lead to sprawl, as a growing population is pushed farther and farther from the city center.
  • Historic preservation favors the wealthy. Limited supply drives up housing prices and apartment rents, benefiting owners. And low-income and younger households are likely to suffer, as they are least able to bear the cost of the increases compared to other households. Future residents — think Midwesterners, Southerners and immigrants seeking to relocate to a city like New York for job opportunities — will also suffer.
  • It isn’t easy for historic preservation to be green. It feels environmentally responsible to protect older, low-density buildings in city centers because you have no dusty demolition, no noisy construction. But it actually comes at a big environmental cost. Denser construction reduces reliance on cars and thereby lowers carbon emissions. People living in a dense city have a much smaller carbon footprint than those in a car-oriented suburb.

Just because preservation comes at a cost does not mean it is bad. Much of our past is worth protecting. Some places benefit from maintaining their identities — think of the European cities that draw the most tourists year in and year out. But it is bad to deploy historic preservation indiscriminately, without evaluating the costs it imposes on current residents and potential future ones.

Cities that want to encourage entrepreneurship and affordable housing should deploy historic preservation and other restrictive land use tools thoughtfully. Otherwise, those cities will be inhabited by comparatively rich folks who complain about the sterility of their current lives and who are nostalgic for “the good old days” when cities were diverse and hotbeds of creativity.

If they fail to understand the trade-offs inherent in historic preservation, they won’t even understand that a part of the problem is the very policy they support to “protect” their vision of their community.

Amazonian Rage in NYC

photo by Theeditor93

Vice quoted me in Amazon Is Bringing in Elite Lobbyists Amid Seething Rage Over HQ2. It opens,

Amazon might be too big to tax, but it’s not too big to freak out.

As the company tries to erect a massive headquarters in America’s largest city, it has come up against staunch opposition from residents, politicians and unions—all concerned the powerful monopoly will serve to inflate rent and strain local infrastructure, especially the housing supply and subway system. And while it might seem like a trillion-dollar company could easily quash protesting naysayers, turns out CEO Jeff Bezos might actually have good reason to try and win the haters over.

On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal reported Amazon hired high-powered Democratic consulting firm SKD Knickerbocker, and a lobbying shop called Greenberg Traurig, to help smooth the way forward for its new HQ. While Amazon remained relatively tight-lipped, the company has sought to make inroads into affected communities—planning meetings with public-housing residents and reaching out to members of the city council. But some elected officials, including Senator Mike Gianaris and NYC Councilman Jimmy Van Bramer, whose districts include the HQ’s proposed turf in Long Island City, have refused to serve on its advisory board, indicating instead a desire to kill the project entirely. Meanwhile, a Quinnipiac poll that dropped this week showed the majority of NYC residents backed the HQ2 plan, but activists groups and community board members have continued to organize, spurred on by Congresswoman-elect Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—or at least her Twitter account.

In fact, the new Amazon influence operation, which emerged a few weeks after HQ2 plan was made official, suggested there were still concrete ways locals could thwart or at least put a dent in the company’s expansion scheme. If nothing else, an extremely-powerful company that has experience in the DC lobbying game is finding out it won’t get a new home in NYC without a fight that cuts at the core of the Democratic Party’s identity.

According to Richard Brodsky, a lawyer and veteran Democratic politician who served in the state assembly, if city officials or other activists took Amazon or the politicians who supported the plan to court, they could employ legislative subpoenas to demand more documentation of the project, and investigate compliance issues. Brodsky argued Amazon’s bid might provide the jobs promised, but that the company still had a long way to go in informing the public about how it would impact communities.

“Because the governor and the mayor have given this project to a set of soviet-style bureaucracies, there’s no one to ask the questions and no one to answer,” he told me, referring to the special fast-track process Mayor Bill de Blasio and Governor Andrew Cuomo, both Democrats, have tapped to push through the Amazon deal. “Who the hell do you ask?”

Litigation is a fairly common way of handling disputes over projects like this in the city, according to David Reiss, a law professor and expert on community development at Brooklyn Law School. “Not being a shy bunch, New Yorkers often file lawsuits that try to set up procedural roadblocks to the project,” he told me via email. “These suits can slow down or even stop projects—and can give community members leverage with the City, State and project developers.” Even if it isn’t stopped altogether, legal action could help modify the project and fund parks, schools or transit.

Under the current approach from on high, however, the Amazon HQ also had to be approved by the Public Authorities Control Board (PACB), comprised of gubernatorial appointees mostly made in consultation with the state legislature. This may prove to be among the only serious points of leverage Amazon opponents have to stall, or, in an extreme case, block the whole project. Even then, Brodsky said, the PACB was only technically supposed to oversee financial concerns, and not necessarily gauge a project’s social impact.

The city, for its part, appeared to largely be standing behind its original plan as it geared up for public hearings beginning next week. A spokesperson from the NYC Economic Development Corporation, the nonprofit development agency contracted by the city that helped broker the deal, told me Amazon was working to broker partnerships with affordable-housing developments and other community organizations, as well as provide concrete details about the 25,000 jobs promised in the company’s initial memo about the project.

The spokesperson also dismissed the idea that the new HQ would strain the city’s mess of a public transportation system. They argued the current flow of traffic on the subway routes amounted to Queens residents commuting to Manhattan for work, and that the “reverse commute” of Amazon employees coming to Long Island City would balance things in the other direction, not jam up trains in some new way. (It’s worth noting that Amazon employees were already reportedly looking for rental properties in Long Island City proper.)

Those resisting the headquarters, however, were unlikely to be swayed by more details, logistical help, or civic engagement on part of a brand many despised for what it represented in the annals of modern capitalism. Ocasio-Cortez, who has become a national spokesperson for anti-Bezos sentiment and a leading light of a left-wing insurgency in the Democratic Party, took to Twitter again on Tuesday: “Now what I DON’T want is for our public funds to be funding freebie helipads for Amazon + robber baron billionaires, all while NYCHA and public schools go underfunded & mom+pops get nowhere near that kind of a break,” she said, capturing criticism of some of the most comical parts of the Amazon deal as brokered by de Blasio and Cuomo.

Ocasio-Cortez’s Democratic Socialist bent may still be a nascent one, and her job in DC means local activist groups will have to lead the fight on the ground. (Some unions actually supported the deal, further exposing the internal Democratic Party divide at issue here.) At the same time, it’s important to look back to previous massive corporate deals for context on what’s going on. While Amazon, as a company, doesn’t have many contemporaries in the city trying to launch a new home at this scale, the way stadiums, universities and other hubs have been constructed in NYC in the past will help inform what does—and doesn’t—happen in Long Island City.

The EDC spokesperson, for example, pointed out that other big projects—such as Columbia University’s expansion and Atlantic Yards—were also achieved via a General Project Plan pushed through by the state instead of undergoing to the more public land review process at the city level. Using that fast-track in Amazon’s case has been a key flashpoint in the dispute over its origin, garnering frustration from Van Bramer and his colleagues. (Announcing a project before knowing the specific details, the EDC spokesperson insisted, was par for the course in cases like this one.)

This fast-tracking does happen often with larger projects, Reiss agreed, noting that land procedures can be bypassed when the state government is involved, leaving some feeling like their voices were ignored. “This can cut deeply because they are often the ones who are most affected by the negatives of the construction process and the changes that the project bring about in their communities,” he told me.

The Hunger Games: Amazon Edition

photo by SounderBruce

The New York Law Journal published commentary of mine, The Hunger Games: Amazon Edition. It opens,

Last week Amazon finally announced that New York and Northern Virginia would be the sites of its planned major expansion. While many are caught up in the excitement of Amazon bringing 25,000 high-paid jobs to both metropolitan areas, it is worth thinking through the costs that beauty contests like this one impose on state and local governments. Amazon extracted billions of dollars in concessions from the winners and could have extracted even more from some of the other cities courting them.

It is economically rational for companies to create such Hunger Games-type competitions among communities. These competitions reduce their costs and improve their bottom lines. But is it economically rational for the cities? As long as governments are acting independently, yes, it is rational for them to race to the bottom to secure a win. So long as they are a bit better off by snagging the prize than they would have been otherwise, they come out ahead. But the metrics that politicians use are unlikely to be limited to a hard-nosed accounting of costs and increased tax revenues. Positive buzz may be enough to satisfy them.

Consider Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s deal with Foxconn. Just over a year ago, he was touting the $3 billion state subsidy for FoxConn’s manufacturing plant. This was the year leading up to his hard fought election fight, a fight he ultimately lost. His public statements focused on Foxconn’s promise to create 13,000 jobs. While that was a lot of jobs, it was a hell of a lot of subsidy—more than $230,000 per job, more than six times the largest amount Wisconsin had ever paid to subsidize a promised job. Walker got his campaign issue, FoxConn got its $3 billion and Wisconsin residents got … had. The $3 billion dollar subsidy has grown to over $4 billion at the same time that Foxconn is slowing down its investment in Wisconsin. So now taxpayers are subsidizing each job by well over $300,000 each. Nonpartisan analysts have determined that it will take decades, at the earliest, for Wisconsin to recoup its “investment.”

Likewise, hundreds of millions of dollars are thrown at stadiums and arenas even though economists have clearly demonstrated that those investments do not generate a positive financial return for the governments that provide these subsidies. Fancy consultants set forth all of the supposed benefits: job creation, direct spending by all of the people drawn to the facility, indirect spending by those who service the direct spenders. This last metric is meant to capture the increase in restaurant staff, Uber drivers and others who will cater to the new employees, residents and visitors to the facility. But as has been shown time and time again, these metrics are vastly overstated and willingly accepted at face value by politicians eager to generate some good headlines. They also ignore the opportunity cost of the direct subsidies—monies spent on attracting a company is money that can’t be spent on anything else. While we don’t know what it would have been spent on, it is likely to have been public schools, mass transit, roads or affordable housing in many communities.