Tag Archives: Countrywide

Reiss on Countrywide Verdict

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Law360 interviewed me in DOJ’s Countrywide Win Could Force More Bank Settlements (behind a paywall).  The story opens

The U.S. Department of Justice’s victory in a case against Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide subsidiary over a housing-bubble-era mortgage program shows the power of a 1980s fraud statute, and could further encourage banks to settle future financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

A federal jury in New York on Wednesday unanimously found that Countrywide Financial Corp. and one of its former executives defrauded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a program designed to speed up mortgage issuing in 2007 and 2008.

The court victory was significant in part because of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara’s use of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law that grew out of the 1980’s savings-and-loan crisis, to bring a case over the 2007-09 financial crisis. With a fairly low standard of proof and a 10-year statute of limitations, a jury’s verdict based on FIRREA bodes well for future government cases, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“This successful use of FIRREA makes it much more likely that financial institutions are going to settle with the government,” he said.

BoA Claws Back Clawback

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New York County Supreme Court Justice Bransten held, in U.S. Bank National v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., no. 652388-2011 (May 29, 2013), that a trustee cannot succeed in getting the defendants (Countrywide entities among others) to repurchase all of the mortgages in a securities pool based on a theory of “pervasive breach.” Rather, she holds that the repurchase obligations are determined by the terms of the agreements governing this MBS transaction.

The trustee asserted that the loans breached the reps and warranties.  The deal documents, however, limited the trustee’s remedy for such a breach to repurchase. The Court writes that

Plaintiff invites this Court to look past the absence of contractual language supporting its claim, asserting that it is entitled to the  benefit of every inference on a motion to dismiss.  While the Trustee is entitled to all favorable inferences with regard to its factual claims on a motion to dismiss, its bare legal conclusion that the Servicing Agreement accommodates its pervasive breach theory is not entitled to deference. (8)

Justice Bransten has ruled on a number of MBS cases involving alleged breaches of reps and warranties and is developing a coherent body of law on this topic. In the Bransten Trio of cases, she rejects the idea that vague disclosures are sufficient to immunize securitizers from liability for endemic misrepresentation. And here, she rejects the idea that vague theories of liability can replace the clear language agreed to by the parties.  In good judicial fashion, she is letting parties know that they should pay attention to the text of their agreements and be ready to face the consequences of those agreements.

Mass. Trial Court Upholds MERS Foreclosure

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Judge Cutler granted MERS and Countrywide’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Lyons challenge to the validity of a foreclosure deed arising from a foreclosure sale conducted by MERS in Lyons v. MERS et al. Misc. 09 416377 (Jan. 4, 2011). The court held that “the Plaintiffs expressly granted the Mortgage to MERS (as nominee for the Lender), with the power of sale. As a result of this grant, MERS needed no assignment” from Countrywide.” (3) The court found that “such an arrangement is entirely consistent with the express terms of the Mortgage, as well as with Massachusetts law.” (3) The court found it intolerable to reach a result where “the logic of a denial of MERS’s foreclosure right as mortgagee would lead to anomalous and perhaps inequitable results, to wit, if MERS cannot foreclose though named as mortgagee, then either [the lender] can foreclose though not named as mortgagee or no one can foreclose, outcomes not reasonably or demonstrably intended by the parties.” (3) Not sure that those are the only possibilities (for instance, MERS could assign the mortgage to its beneficial owner), but there you have it.