Tag Archives: foreclosure

Tennessee Court Finds Allegation of Fraud Was Pled With Sufficient Particularity Pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03

Posted on by

The court in deciding Zhong v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145916 (W.D. Wash. 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling dismissing the mortgagor’s intentional misrepresentation claim on the pleadings pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03.

Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and defendants advised plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff subsequently sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

This court ruled that the lower court erred in dismissing the mortgagor’s intentional misrepresentation claim on the pleadings pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 because her allegation of fraud stemming from an intentional misrepresentation were pleaded with sufficient particularity.

Moreover, because the amended complaint alleged particular intentional misrepresentations of a material fact, that signatories possessed authority to execute the deed of trust, as well as the mortgagor’s detrimental reliance upon such, the claim satisfied the heightened requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Further, this court found that the mortgagor’s claim was not correctly dismissed based upon the statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105, because it was at least plausible that the mortgagor was unable to discover the alleged intentional misrepresentation until the mortgagees commenced foreclosure against her.

Washington Court Rejects Split-the-Note Theory

Posted on by

The court in Zhong v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145916 (W.D. Wash. 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged ten causes of action in connection with the initiation of the non-judicial foreclosure of her property.

Specifically, she brought claims for (1) wrongful foreclosure under the Washington Deed of Trust Act (“DTA”), RCW 61.24, (2) violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), (3) negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (4) a request for injunctive relief, (5) a request for declaratory judgment, (6) cloud of title, (7) quiet title, (8) predatory lending, (9) emotional distress, and (10) unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to federal court, and now move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, this motion was granted. The court found that the plaintiff’s arguments failed as the court found that the plaintiff simply rehashed well-worn arguments that courts have repeatedly rejected.

 

Georgia Court Finds Chase Had Authority to Foreclose

Posted on by

The court in deciding Ball v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146503 (M.D. Ga. 2013) granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiffs Johnny Frank Ball Jr. and Tempie Ball filed a suit in the Superior Court of Sumter County, Georgia, seeking to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of their home. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages against Chase and the Freddie Mac for wrongful foreclosure and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.

The legal theory underlying the plaintiff’s causes of action was premised on the definition of a “secured creditor” in the Georgia Code. Plaintiffs maintained that Chase lacked authority to foreclose its property because only a “secured creditor” [a creditor who holds the promissory note] may initiate a non-judicial foreclosure, and only Chase held the security deed.

The court in assessing the validity of this argument rejected it as the Georgia Supreme Court recently rejected this very theory. Therefore, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Nevada Court Found Plaintiff’s Claim for Quiet Title Failed as a Matter of Law Based on Statute’s Express Language

Posted on by

The court in dealing with Beverly v. Weaver-Farley, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146150 (D. Nev. 2013) ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that pursuant to NRS 116.3116(2)(b), Wells Fargo’s first deed of trust was extinguished by the HOA’s foreclosure and sale of the underlying property.

The court found that, the first deed of trust was recorded in October 2004; also defendant Wells Fargo was assigned all rights under the first deed of trust in April 2009, a full month before the delinquent HOA assessment was recorded on the subject property. Thus, Wells Fargo’s lien meets the statutory requirements of NRS 116.3116(2)(b) as such survived the HOA sale. Therefore, the plaintiff took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust.

As an alternative argument, plaintiff contended that Section 3116(2)(c) carved out a limited exception to Section 3116(2)(b) that is applicable in this matter.

Plaintiff further contended that this section provided that the foreclosure of a delinquent HOA assessment lien extinguished the first security interest on the property if it related to charges incurred during the nine months prior to the foreclosure.

However, once again the court found that the plaintiff misconstrued the statute. The court found that the plain language of NRS 116.3116(2)(c) simply created a limited super priority lien for nine months of HOA assessments leading up to the foreclosure of the first mortgage, but it did not eliminate the first security interest. Based on the express language of the statutes, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim for quiet title failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss.

 

California Court Dismisses All Seven Causes of Action Arising Out of the Alleged Wrongful Foreclosure of Plaintiff’s Home

Posted on by

The court in deciding Dorn v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7356 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2013) concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action; the court thus affirmed the lower courts decision.

Plaintiff Jason Dorn appealed from a judgment dismissing his action against defendants America’s Wholesale Lender, Countrywide Bank, Bank of America Home Loan Services, MERS, and ReconTrust.

Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief: fraud in the execution, (2) declaratory relief: failure of consideration, (3) declaratory relief: existence of an obligation — no creation of rights, (4) declaratory relief: existence of an obligation — no creation of rights,(5) injunctive relief, (6) accounting.

After considering arguments the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss.

Wisconsin Court Grants Summary Judgment in Favor of GMAC

Posted on by

The court in deciding GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Poley, 2013 Wisc. App. LEXIS 872 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) affirmed the lower court’s decision in granting summary judgment in favor of GMAC.

In this foreclosure action, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee, GMAC Mortgage LLC. On appeal, mortgagor James Poley argued that the court should have stayed this foreclosure action as a result of a federal bankruptcy proceeding initiated by GMAC during the pendency of this action and, in any case, erred in granting summary judgment in favor of GMAC.

After considering the arguments the court concluded that the lower court did not err in determining that the bankruptcy proceeding did not prevent Poley from opposing summary judgment. The court also concluded that the lower court properly granted summary judgment. Therefore the court affirmed the decision of the lower court in all respects.

Michigan Court Grants Summary Judgement in Favor of Bank

Posted on by

The court in deciding Wargelin v. Bank of Am., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146326 ( E.D. Mich. 2013) ultimately granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff brought an action arising out of a foreclosure and subsequent sheriff’s sale of his residential property. Count I of plaintiff’s action was violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Count II, was for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Count III involved defamation of title. Count IV was discharge of lien and claim to quiet title. Count V of the plaintiff’s complaint was for a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws §600.3205a.

Count VI of the plaintiff’s complaint was intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count VII was request for equitable, declaratory & injunctive relief; count VIII, Fraudulent Misrepresentation; count IX, quiet title; count XI, silent fraud and bad faith promises. Count XII of the claim was for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. Lastly, count XIII arose out of a violation of Michigan Foreclosure Law and Count XVI, violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).

The defendants maintained that all of the plaintiff’s claims challenging the foreclosure sale were subject to dismissal because these claims were based on a purported breach of an oral modification agreement, therefore these claims were barred by the statute of frauds. Defendants also argued that plaintiff’s failure to redeem the property within the redemption period precluded plaintiff from raising any claims associated with the foreclosure.