Reiss on Fannie and Freddie Buyout

Law360 quoted me in Fairholme Changes The Game For Fannie And Freddie (behind a paywall).  It reads in part,

Fairholme Capital Management LLC’s plan to buy Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s insurance businesses will likely turn out to be more symbolic gesture than successful deal, experts say, but the hedge fund’s bold move could increase interest in privatization of the entities and potentially encourage other bidders to join the fray.

*     *     *

Some experts believe this emphasis on the ownership stakes of Fairholme and other hedge funds will be a major turnoff for the White House, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Treasury.

“It’s a very good idea, but the question is, will it keep the government and taxpayers off the hook? And will it bring in sufficient private capital to provide a vibrant residential mortgage market?” said David Reiss, a real estate finance professor at Brooklyn Law School. “Of course they’re looking to maximize their return, so the question has to be, what’s the angle that they’re playing?”

The angle, experts and analysts say, is likely connected to claims Fairholme and other hedge funds have made recently against the federal government, accusing it of devaluing their shares of Fannie and Freddie in order to reap all the GSEs’ mounting profits.

Fairholme and Perry Capital LLC both sued the government over its management of Fannie and Freddie this summer.

In July, Perry Capital accused the Treasury of wrongfully altering stock purchasing agreements with Fannie and Freddie, which allegedly allowed it to illegally speed up the liquidation of the companies and reap more than $200 billion over the next decade.

Two days later, Fairholme and insurance holding company W.R. Berkley Corp. sued the federal government, alleging it had acted unconstitutionally when it altered its bailout deal for the GSEs to keep the companies’ profits for itself.

Fairholme’s proposal assumes that their shares have the value they claim they have in their lawsuit, Reiss said. If the deal were to move forward, valuation of Fairholme’s stake could be a major sticking point.

*     *     *

“It begins the conversation as to whether you can have effectively a buyout of the federal government from Fannie and Freddie, which is a healthy thing, I think,” Reiss said.

Reiss on Future of Frannie at Urban Land Institute

I will be on an Urban Land Institute panel on November 21st, The Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The panel

will seek to shed some more light on the road ahead for the GSEs and their impact on commercial real estate lending and residential mortgage securitization. Specifically, the panel will address questions such as:

• What will the GSEs’ roles be in the multi-family and single-family markets in the future?

• Will the GSEs remain in conservatorship? If not, what level of government support, if any, will they receive going forward?

The event will feature individuals speaking on behalf of the lending, investment, academic, and GSE communities.

The moderator is Katharine Briggs, a Managing Director at BlackRock. She is a member of BlackRock’s Financial Markets Advisory Group within BlackRock Solutions. Ms. Briggs is a member of the Commercial Real Estate Advisory Team within BlackRock Solutions’ Financial Market Advisory Group. Mrs. Briggs specializes in US and European commercial real estate and related analytics. Ms. Briggs was formerly the Vice President of Corporate Finance with Summit Properties, a multifamily developer and publicly traded REIT owning 60 communities valued at over $2 billion. At Summit, she was responsible for all capital markets activities, investor relations, financial forecasting and tax planning.

The other panelists are:

Robert E. Bostrom, Co-Chair of the Financial Regulatory and Compliance Practice at Greenberg Traurig. His legal career spans more than 30 years, where he has worked and advised at the highest levels of leadership in the banking sector, in private legal practice and inside a government sponsored enterprise (GSE). As general counsel of Freddie Mac, Bob played a pivotal role during the financial crisis and recovery directing Freddie Mac’s legal strategy through the conservatorship, investigations, enforcement actions and litigation. Bob has advised clients on financial institutions regulation, examination, compliance and supervision matters. He is experienced helping clients navigate the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, especially the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

David Brickman, the Senior Vice President, Multifamily,, at Freddie Mac.  He was named senior vice president of Multifamily in June 2011. As head of Multifamily, Mr.
Brickman is responsible for customer relations, product development, marketing, sales, loan purchase, asset management, capital markets, and securitization for the company’s multifamily business, which includes the flow mortgage, structured and affordable mortgage, CMBS and low-income housing tax credit portfolios. The total multifamily portfolio was $180 billion as of March 31, 2013. He is a member of the company’s senior operating committee and reports directly to CEO Don Layton.

Mike McRoberts, a Managing Director at Prudential Mortgage Capital Company.  He is responsible for growing and enhancing Prudential’s leadership position in multifamily lending as head of the company’s market rate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolio teams and agency production team. Prior to joining Prudential, Mike was a vice president and national head of sales and production for Freddie Mac, where he was responsible for the agency’s conventional multifamily business, structured transactions and senior’s housing teams, the national Freddie Mac Program Plus network and Freddie’s four regional production offices. Earlier, he was
national head of underwriting and credit and managing director of Freddie Mac’s southeast region.

Joanne Schehl, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel at Fannie Mae. She is Fannie Mae’s Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for the Multifamily
Mortgage Business. She reports to the Senior Vice President and Deputy General Counsel – Multifamily Mortgage Business. Ms. Schehl leads the team responsible for providing legal support for multifamily infrastructure and operations, lender relationships, operational risk, and regulatory compliance. Ms. Schehl was previously a partner at Arent Fox PLLC, where she was a member of the real estate and finance groups, and served on the firm’s executive committee and as its professional development counsel, founded and led the firm’s strategic technology initiative, and was a leader in the firm’s diversity efforts.

Alan H. Wiener, Group Head, Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital, at Wells Fargo & Company. He is the group head of Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital, based in New York. Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital specializes in government-sponsored enterprise (GSEs) financing through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac programs and Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured financing. Alan’s career has focused on housing and community development in both the public and private
sectors. Prior to joining Wachovia, he was the chairman of American Property Financing Inc., which Wachovia acquired in 2006. Before that, he was executive vice president with Integrated Resources, Inc.

Reiss on Countrywide Verdict

Law360 interviewed me in DOJ’s Countrywide Win Could Force More Bank Settlements (behind a paywall).  The story opens

The U.S. Department of Justice’s victory in a case against Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide subsidiary over a housing-bubble-era mortgage program shows the power of a 1980s fraud statute, and could further encourage banks to settle future financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

A federal jury in New York on Wednesday unanimously found that Countrywide Financial Corp. and one of its former executives defrauded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a program designed to speed up mortgage issuing in 2007 and 2008.

The court victory was significant in part because of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara’s use of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law that grew out of the 1980’s savings-and-loan crisis, to bring a case over the 2007-09 financial crisis. With a fairly low standard of proof and a 10-year statute of limitations, a jury’s verdict based on FIRREA bodes well for future government cases, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“This successful use of FIRREA makes it much more likely that financial institutions are going to settle with the government,” he said.

Mortgage Reform Schooling on 30 Year Term

S&P has posted U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform Efforts and the Potential Credit Implications to school us on the current state of affairs in Congress. It provides a useful lesson on three major mortgage reform bills introduced in Congress this year.  They are the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (Corker-Warner); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners ACT of 2013 (PATH); and the FHA Solvency Act.

Given the current mood in D.C., S&P somewhat optimistically states that there “seems to be a bipartisan commitment to encourage private capital support for the U.S. housing market while winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that hold dominant positions in the mortgage market.” (1) S&P uses this report as an opportunity to “comment on the potential credit implications of these mortgage finance reform efforts on several market sectors.” (1)

In this post, I focus on, and criticize, S&P’s analysis of the appropriate role of the 30 year fixed-rate mortgage. S&P states that

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S. And while some market players have looked at current rates on jumbo mortgages (those that exceed conforming-loan limits) and suggested that the private market could support mortgage interest rates below 5%, we think this view is distorted. Jumbo mortgage rates carrying the lowest interest rates, for the most part, are limited to a narrow set of borrowers who have FICO credit scores above 750 and equity of roughly 30% in their homes. We don’t believe that these same rates would be available to average prime borrowers, such as those with credit scores of 725 and 25% equity in a property. (3)

While I think that S&P is probably right about the limited usefulness of comparing current jumbo loans to a broad swath of conforming loans, I see no support in their analysis for the assertion that the “30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S.” First, a 30-year FRM typically carries a higher interest rate than an ARM of any length. Second, a typical American household only stays in a home for about seven years. Thus, a 30-year FRM provides an expensive insurance policy against increases in interest rates that most Americans do not end up needing.

While we may end up providing governmental support for the 30-year FRM because of its longstanding popularity, S&P’s mortgage reform school should be based on facts, not fancy.

Reiss on Fannie/Freddie Loan Limits

Law360 quoted me in Time May Not Be Right To Limit Fannie, Freddie Loans (behind a paywall).  It reads in part,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has proposed lowering the maximum size of the loans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can purchase as part of an effort to attract more private-sector lending, but some experts warn that other market factors including rising interest rates will keep private lenders from filling the gap.

The FHFA announced earlier this month that it planned to reduce the maximum size of home mortgage loans eligible for backing by the government-sponsored enterprises. The move is part of the agency’s strategic plan of slowly backing away from the mortgage market and encouraging private capital to take its place. But some real estate attorneys and practitioners say private lenders need more than customers to convince them to take the plunge.

Many other environmental factors affect private lenders’ decisions about whether to enter the residential mortgage market, said Bob Bostrom, a shareholder of Greenberg Traurig LLP and former counsel to Freddie Mac.

Reducing the number of loans eligible for Fannie and Freddie backing and raising guarantee fees — another recent tactic — sound good in theory, but they don’t change the fact that the interest rate for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rose a full percentage point over the past several months and the housing market dipped correspondingly, Bostrom said.

“The housing recovery is extraordinarily fragile right now,” he said.

The steps the FHFA is taking to reduce the GSEs’ size and scope will work only when there’s a private sector ready to step in, experts say. Until then, these measures can only push the housing market backward, they warn.

* * *

Not everyone is convinced of this dark forecast, however. David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor and real estate finance scholar, told Law360 on Thursday that he’s not convinced the FHFA’s moves will have a negative effect.

Although the pullback should be gradual, it must be done, because the government can’t continue to hold up the mortgage market indefinitely, he said.

Reiss says current market factors actually favor weaning borrowers off Fannie and Freddie, noting that private capital in the sector has increased — particularly in the market for jumbo loans — and that the overall housing market has stabilized.

“We’re past the immediate crisis,” he said. “There’s nothing going on right now that makes me think a downward adjustment in conforming loan limits won’t be met by an increase in capital from private lenders,” Reiss said.

Reiss on the Future of Fannie and Freddie

I will be speaking at NYU Law next week on

The Future of Fannie and Freddie

Friday, September 20, 2013
9:00 am – 5:00pm
Reception to follow

Greenberg Lounge, NYU School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012

Jointly sponsored by:
The Classical Liberal Institute & NYU Journal of Law & Business

 

This conference will bring together leaders in law, finance, and economics to explore the challenges to investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the future possibilities for these government-sponsored entities (GSEs).  Panels will focus on the reorganization of Fannie and Freddie, as well as the recent litigation surrounding the Treasury’s decision to “wind down” these GSEs.  Panelists will explore the legal issues at stake in the wind down, including the administrative law and Takings Clause arguments raised against the Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency.  Panelists will also look at economic policy and future prospects for Fannie and Freddie in light of legislation proposed in the House and the Senate.

Conference Panels:

  • The Reorganization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
  • Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Administrative Law
  • Conservatorship and the Takings Clause
  • The Future of Fannie and Freddie

Confirmed Participants:

  • Professor Barry Adler (NYU)
  • Professor Adam Badawi (Washington University)
  • Professor Anthony Casey (Chicago)
  • Charles Cooper (Cooper & Kirk PLLC)
  • Professor Richard Epstein (NYU)
  • Randall Guynn (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP)
  • Professor Todd Henderson (Chicago)
  • Professor Troy Paredes (former SEC Commissioner)
  • Professor David Reiss (Brooklyn)
  • Professor Lawrence White (NYU Stern)

Thrilla in Vanilla: Freddie v. Jumbo

Kroll BondRatings issued an RMBS Commentary, Mortgage Credit Trends:  Freddie Mac vs. Prime Jumbo. This commentary is important because it offers some help in evaluating the proposed “risk sharing” securitizations that Fannie and Freddie are considering. It is also important because if compares plain vanilla agency issues with comparable private label jumbos as well as not-so-comparable limited doc jumbos.  The differences are revealing.

Kroll’s key findings are

  • Freddie Mac default and loss rates were much higher for vintages that experienced severe home price declines. The worst vintage was 2007, which experienced an estimated aggregate home price decline in excess of 18% with 12.3% of the original vintage balance liquidated to date.
  • A rapid and significant improvement in credit characteristics sharply curtailed Freddie Mac mortgage liquidation rates, which fell from 8.3% for the 2008 vintage to 0.9% for the 2009 vintage.
  • Current Freddie Mac originations continue to be of very high credit quality, with a weighted average (WA) FICO score of 767 and a WA loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 70% for the 2012 vintage.
  • Credit performance of jumbo prime mortgages and Freddie Mac mortgages is highly comparable when controlling for characteristics such as FICO, LTV, balance, and income and asset documentation. (2)

I am most interested in the last finding. While Kroll controlled for many characteristics, the fact remained that Freddie, as a general rule, allows for fewer high risk characteristics like low doc loans and high CLTV [combined loan to value]. For instance, almost all of Freddie’s loans were full doc while about half of the private label loans were low doc. So, while Kroll appears to be correct in stating “that the credit analysis tools developed for analyzing jumbo prime loans can be productively applied to agency mortgages,” we should not take that to mean that the two products are effectively the same. (7)