Tag Archives: freddie

Investor HERA-sy

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As I have previously noted, Fannie and Freddie investors have filed a complaint, Washington Federal et al. v. U.S.A., No. 1:13-cv-00385-MMS (June 10, 2013), alleging that the federal government “expropriated [Fannie and Freddie’s] common and preferred shareholders’ rights and the value of their equity in the Companies without due process, and without just compensations, thereby constituting an impermissible exaction and/or taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.” (8)

Personally, I think that there is a lot of nonsense in the complaint, both in terms of its factual description of the events that led up to the placement of Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship as well as its interpretation of those events.  But I did find its analysis interesting as to whether the government complied with HERA’s requirements for placing the two companies in conservatorship.  Not compelling, just interesting.

As the complaint notes, the federal government had a number of grounds for appointing a conservator. It takes the position that none of those grounds were met. This seems facially wrong.

One of the grounds is whether Fannie or Freddie “incurred, or became likely to incur, losses that would deplete substantially all of its capital with no reasonable prospect of becoming adequately capitalized.” (31) The complaint alleges that the two companies had not incurred such losses at the time that they were placed in conservatorship. (38-39) But it does not even argue that the two companies never “became likely to incur” such losses prior to their placement in conservatorship. Seems hard, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, to take the position that they were not “likely” to incur such losses. And if the plaintiffs can’t make that case, they lose.

Reform for Whom?

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David Stevens, the head of the Mortgage Bankers Association, gave an important and revealing speech about the direction of housing finance reform.  It contains some good ideas, but also raises an alarm.  Because the Administration and Congress are at an impasse, Stevens is leading the private sector in pushing for reform of Fannie and Freddie.

While Stevens is proposing some good ideas, the federal housing finance system should be designed — big surprise here — by the federal government first and foremost.  Unfortunately, the private sector can take the lead because the federal government has not.  Housing finance policy abhors a vacuum.

Stevens’ prepared remarks provide a “proposal for transition” for Fannie and Freddie. (3)  The proposal has three steps:

First, it is imperative in this state of overlapping regulatory confusion that the White House name a Housing Policy Coordinator.  This is an immediate need with a simple solution.

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Second, we must have absolute transparency.  FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must stop making market shifting decisions without the input of consumers or the industry.

Finally, we must have a clear path to transition out of conservatorship.   To achieve this goal, we must move toward a single security, encourage additional risk sharing by mandating Fannie and Freddie to accept lower guarantee fees for deeper credit enhancements, and redirect the FHFA platform initiative. (3-4)

The first suggestion — some kind of Housing Czar — is both intuitively right and attractive.  Housing cuts across so many arms of the federal government:  the FHFA, HUD, FHA, CFPB and on and on.  Those arms are frequently at cross purposes.  A Housing Czar could seek to rationalize them.  The second is also attractive, but given the focus of the housing finance industry, one would assume that “industry” would get a lot more input than “consumers.”  And the third suggestion may have merit, but is not the type of decision that we want industry to make — we want the government, the people, to make it.

It is no secret that both parties have punted on housing finance reform.  But it will be a tragedy if they do not recover the ball.  Otherwise, industry will write the rules for future homeowners.  Homeowners will then be playing a game designed for industry to win, not them.

Reiss on New Limits on Lending for Fannie and Freddie

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Law360 interviewed me in Fannie, Freddie Will Only Buy Qualified Mortgages, FHFA Says (behind a paywall) about the new limits on lending imposed on Fannie and Freddie:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency on Monday said that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would only be allowed to purchase so-called qualified mortgages when the new standard comes into effect in January.

Under the new standard, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will only be able to purchase and securitize mortgages that qualify to an exemption to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s ability to repay rule, which the federal consumer finance watchdog finalized in January.

* * *

Given the cautious state of mortgage lending, the change is likely to only affect Fannie, Freddie and the mortgage market along the margins, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“It will be interesting to see, however, whether the private-label market will step into the void and offer more of these products — and it will be interesting to see how the market prices them,” he said in an email.

Principled Forgiveness

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The Congressional Budget Office issued a report, Modifying Mortgages Involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Options for Principal Forgiveness, that reviews where we are with principal-forgiveness loan modifications. It notes that “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been allowed to implement principal forgiveness out of concerns about fairness, implementation costs, and the incentive that the approach could provide for people to become delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (1)

The report examines how the GSEs could employ principal forgiveness. A key issue that the report addresses is how to deal with the moral hazard of homeowners “becoming delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (3) This could result in large costs for the federal government and would be inequitable to those who are similarly situated who choose not to become delinquent.

The CBO analyzes three principal forgiveness options.  Each option would allow a GSE to choose between a standard HAMP modification or one that involved principal forgiveness, “depending on which one lowered the government’s expected costs more.” (3) CBO estimates that 1.2 million borrowers might be eligible for such a program, which would be about 40 percent of all underwater borrowers. CBO estimates that the federal government would save a modest amount of money with these options.

The CBO’s cost-benefit principle seems like a reasonable basis upon which to expand principal forgiveness loan modifications.  The FHFA should pursue these options even before its new leadership is in place.

Judiciary’s Take on the Subprime Zeitgeist

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The 2nd Circuit’s opinion in FHFA v. UBS Americas Inc. et al. (April 5, 2013, No. 12-3207-cv) offers an interesting window into how at least some members of the judiciary understand the Subprime Crisis. On its face, the case was about some technical issues of procedure — whether the case was untimely and whether the FHFA lacked standing.  The Court’s reasoning, however, delved into some deep issues.

In discussing the timeliness issue, the Court concluded that given the statute’s plain language and the particular provision as a whole, “a reasonable reader could only understand” it to resolve the issue in favor of the FHFA. (17) Then, seemingly gratuitously, the Court delved into the legislative history of the statute.  But this legislative history seemed to be drawn as much from the Court’s understanding of recent events as from the record.  It wrote

Congress obviously realized that it would take time for this new agency to mobilize and to consider whether it wished to bring any claims and, if so, where and how to do so. Congress enacted HERA’s extender statute to give FHFA the time to investigate and develop potential claims on behalf of the GSEs — and thus it provided for a period of at least three years from the commencement of a conservatorship to bring suit.

Of course, the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market was a major cause of the GSEs’ financial predicament, and it must have been evident to Congress when it was enacting HERA that FHFA would have to consider potential claims under the federal securities and state Blue Sky laws. It would have made no sense for Congress to have carved out securities claims from the ambit of the extender statute, as doing so would have undermined Congress’s intent to restore Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to financial stability. (17-18)

I agree with the Court on the substance, but I found it interesting that certain things about the legislative history were “obvious,” certain facts “must have been evident” and alternative interpretations would make “no sense.”  I am not sure if I could go that far.

This version of legislative history does, however, reflect a view that Congress intended the Executive Branch to take extraordinary measures to hold financial institutions accountable for their role in the financial crisis.

Are Baby Steps Enough for Fannie and Freddie?

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S&P issued a research report, The Implementation Of The FHFA’s Plan For Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Still Has A Long Way To Go. The report addresses a number of recent events that will impact any reform program for the two Government-Sponsored Enterprises.  S&P strike an optimistic note in the opening lines:  “The U.S. government continues to gradually make progress on the reform of the” two Enterprises.” (1)  It is unclear to me that we are actually making any progress at all. S&P seem to acknowledge as much a few paragraphs later: “Fannie and Freddie are perhaps more entrenched in the housing market today than ever before. Including Ginnie Mae, the government-related housing entities have combined to purchase or guarantee more than 90% of mortgages underwritten in the U.S. since the housing crisis, up from about 50% before the crisis.” (1)

S&P notes that Fannie and Freddie’s financial health is improving as they “are now generating earnings, which reduces the urgency to try to minimize taxpayer costs.” (1)  Their underlying loans are also performing much better:  “At Freddie, loans originated after 2008 account for 63% of its single-family guarantee portfolio and have a seriously delinquent rate of 0.39%, versus 9.56% for loans originated from 2005–2008. At Fannie, loans originated after 2008 account for 66% of its single-family guarantee portfolio and have a seriously delinquent rate of 0.35%, versus 9.92% for loans originated from 2005–2008.” (2)

S&P takes heart that change is afoot because of “the new key aspect of the FHFA’s plan to build a secondary market infrastructure is the proposed creation of a joint venture (JV) between Fannie and Freddie. This JV would have a CEO and chairman that are independent from Fannie and Freddie, and its physical location would also be separate. The GSEs would initially own, operate, and fund this unit, but the JV also would be able to eventually act as a common securitization platform for the entire market, instead of a proprietary platform. Furthermore, the ownership structure would be one that is easily sold or that policymakers can use in housing finance reform once Fannie and Freddie have less of a role in the market.” (2-3)

S&P characterizes the federal government’s approach as “taking baby steps.” (4) I would characterize it as just so much muddling about.

Wrapping up America’s Housing Future

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This is my last post (see here and here for the first two) on the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Housing America’s Future report.  I have one last thought to share — a radical one at that.

The report takes for granted that the federal government should provide a guarantee that wraps mortgage-backed securities and completely covers investors for credit losses. (51-52) Is it too Un-American to contemplate a world where investors bear some (I’m not even saying all!) of the credit risk?  Why is that not on the table at all?  Investors obviously bear credit risk in all sorts of credit markets.

But housing, we are told, is special.  The 30 year fixed rate mortgage would disappear without it.  That is patently not true because the private-label market has issued 30 fixed rate jumbos in the past.  It may be true that the number of 30 year fixed rate mortgages would shrink to an unacceptable level if there was no government wrap, but that leads to a modest proposal.

What if the government offered a range of wraps at different price points?  a 100% wrap.  But also a 75% wrap and a 50% wrap and a 25% wrap.  What if those limited wraps covered either first loss or last loss on different MBS?  What if this menu of options allowed us to better determine a socially optimal level of government guarantee instead of assuming that it has to be total to keep the housing market from melting, melting away?