Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

Reiss on Government’s Role in Housing Finance

The Urban Land Institute New York Blog posted Housing Finance Leaders Gather to Discuss the Future of Freddie and Fannie about a recent panel on the housing finance market. It begins,

Housing finance industry leaders came together last week to debate the future role of government-sponsored lending giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both entities were placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) during the financial crisis from which they have yet to emerge.

Panelists included David Brickman, Head of Multifamily for Freddie Mac, Robert Bostrom, Co-Chair of the Financial Compliance and Regulatory Practice at Greenberg Traurig, Mike McRoberts, Managing Director at Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, David Reiss, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, and Alan H. Weiner, Group Head at Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital.

The debate centered around the proper role for the mortgage giants and to what extent government-backed entities should intervene in capital markets.

A market failure or liquidity crisis is the only reasonable basis for government intervention in the housing market, according to Reiss. “However, it is not possible for the government to create liquidity only in moments of crisis, so there is a need to have a permanent platform that is capable of originating liquidity at all times,” said Brickman. Fannie Mae, which was created during the Great Depression and Freddie Mac, which was created during the Savings and Loan crisis, were both responses to past market failures.