Tax Incentives for Sustainable Homeownership

Harris, Steuerle and Eng have published New Perspectives on Homeownership Tax Incentives in Tax Notes. The report presents

three tax reforms designed to promote homeownership that are fundamentally different from earlier proposals. Many of those earlier proposals would convert existing deductions into credits but would mistakenly, in our view, perpetuate flaws in the current system — namely, the failure to adequately promote the accumulation of home equity. The reforms examined here instead share the common characteristic of subsidizing homeownership through a channel other than the deductibility of mortgage interest, which is the largest tax expenditure for housing. These reforms include a first-time home buyer tax credit, a refundable tax credit for property taxes paid, and an annual flat amount tax credit for homeowners — all largely paid for by restricting the home mortgage interest deduction to a rate of 15 percent. Although far from perfect, these reforms would provide a better and more efficient allocation of housing subsidies and ultimately provide a somewhat larger incentive for wealth accumulation than current policy does. Our simulations show that relative to existing incentives, each policy would raise home prices and make the tax code more progressive. (1315)

This report has some drawbacks, such as overstating the case that empirical studies reinforce “the notion that homeownership improves American communities.” (1315) In fact, the empirical literature is decidedly ambiguous about the spillover and wealth accumulation effects of homeownership, particularly when the last few years are taken into account (I discuss these ambiguities here).

But the report also presents some creative ways to change the incentives that are found in the tax code. They argue, for instance, that it is better to incentivize the accumulation of home equity than unfettered mortgage borrowing. And they make proposals that would do just that.  Worth a read.

Round One to California in Suit Against S&P

California Superior Court Judge Karnow issued a Memorandum Order Overruling Defendants’ Demurrers in California v. The McGraw-Hill Cos. et al., CGC-13-528491 (Aug. 14, 2013 San Francisco County).   California Attorney General Harris alleged “that S&P intentionally inflated its ratings for the investments and that these knowingly false ratings were material to the investment decisions of [California Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (STRS)], in violation of the False Claims Act and other statutes.” (2)

S&P demurred to the False Claims Act causes of action [asked for the causes of action to be dismissed], because, among other reasons,

(l) the complaint does not plead that any ‘claims’ were ever “presented” to the state;

(2) if claims were presented, they did not involve ‘state funds’ . . .. (4)

S&P asserts, among other things, that because it “was not the seller, it did not “present” any claims for payment.” (4) The Court stated, however, that the False Claims Act “imposes liability on any person who ’causes’ a false or fraudulent claim to be presented or ’causes to be made or used a false . . . statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.’ C. 12651(a)(1)-(a}(2).” (4, citation omitted) The Court inferred “from the complaint that S&P ’caused’ PERS and STRS to purchase the securities. This is good enough for present purposes.” (4, citation omitted)

I am a longstanding critic of the rating agencies, but I have to say that I am struck by how broadly courts have interpreted statutes relied upon by the federal government and the states as they pursue alleged wrongdoing by financial institutions involved in financial crisis. In the courts’ defense, they typically rely on the plain language of the statutes, but, boy, do they interpret them broadly.

In this case, giving a rating can “cause” someone to purchase a security — is there any limit on what is a sufficient “cause” to trigger the statute? In DoJ’s case against Bank of America, a financial institution may be liable under FIRREA for a fraud it perpetrates even if the only entity affected by the fraud is — Bank of America! Similar broad interpretations of NY’s Martin Act make it relatively easy for NY government to bring a securities fraud case against a financial institution because our normal intuitions about intent are not relevant under that act.

Pursuing alleged wrongdoers: good.

Pursuing alleged wrongdoers with broad, ambiguous and powerful tools:  worrisome.