Tag Archives: MERS

Oregon Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Argument That the Trust Deed Can Only be Foreclosed if a Single Entity Holds Both the Note and Deed

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After receiving a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, the plaintiff in Spencer v. Guaranty Bank et al., No. 10CV0515ST, Deschutes Co. Circuit (May 5, 2011) sought an injunction barring MERS, as well as the other defendants, from bringing a foreclosure action. The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

In addition to the court granting the motion to dismiss, the court also noted that the plaintiff “made no claim that she was not in default nor that any requirement of ORS 86.735 were not satisfied,” the court held that MERS satisfied the statutory definition of “beneficiary” under ORS 86.705. Specifically, the court identified that it was “not persuaded that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems couldn’t act in that capacity, even if it is not the holder of the note.”

Moreover, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the trust deed can only be foreclosed if a single person or entity holds both the note and deed, noting that ORS 86.770(2) protects the plaintiff from a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the note after the non-judicial sale. “The bottom line is that plaintiff sought to retain ownership, apparently forever, of a property for which she has not paid nor even alleges that she intends to pay for. She has not stated a claim.”

Mortgage Bankers Ask Permission to Hijack GSE Reform

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The Mortgage Bankers Association issued a concept paper that calls for a board of mortgage industry representatives to “have the authority to direct the scope and immediate priorities of the [Central Securitization] Platform’s development, and the capability to redirect resources from the GSEs’ back offices to aid the project.” (3) So, to be clear, the mortgage industry wants not only to (a) define the scope and activities of the Platform but also (B) tell Fannie and Freddie how to spend their money to do so.  As Christmas is still a ways away, let’s spend some time working through this industry wishlist in the concept paper, The Central Securitization Platform: Direction, Scope, and Governance.

To start, what is the purpose of this mysterious “Platform?” According to the FHFA, it is supposed to “streamline and simplify those functions that are commoditized and routinely repeated across the secondary mortgage market.”(Building a New Infrastructure for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 5-6)

The MBA is calling for the establishment of “a strong panel of industry representatives to guide the development of the Platform.” (1)

But here is where I become nervous: “this Platform is just one piece of a much larger puzzle that impacts borrowers, lenders and the market as a whole. For these reasons, it is critical to appoint an industry advisory panel with real authority over the Platform’s early development. FHFA should establish and convene this panel before any further development is undertaken.” (2, emphasis added) Moreover, the MBA “believes the Platform should ultimately be owned by the industry as a cooperative.” (2)

So we have an acknowledgement that the Platform impacts “borrowers” and “the market as a whole.” But we have a call for a board with real powers that is only made up of “industry representatives.” Where have I heard a similar story like this before?  Oh, the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS), a system designed by the mortgage industry that has been consistently attacked by local government officials and borrowers.

For now, I am agnostic as to whether the Platform is a good idea or not. But I certainly do not believe that only the industry should have the power to define its “scope and activities” and I certainly don’t believe that the industry should have the power to spend Fannie and Freddie’s money to pursue its vision. There are a lot more interests at stake than just the special interests represented by the MBA.

 

 

Minnesota Court Holds MERS Foreclosure Valid, Although Signatories on the Assignment Were Officers of More Than One Entity

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The court in deciding Ostigaard v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al., No. 0:10cv1557, (May 2, 2011) granted MERS as well as its codefendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The court heavily relied on the holding from an earlier case [Jackson v. MERS].

The plaintiff made the allegation that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the signatories on the assignment were officers of more than one entity. The court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s notion, found that “In [Jackson v. MERS], the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the operation of MERS and noted ‘legislative approval of MERS practices’ by the Minnesota Legislature. The Jackson court also recognized that MERS shares officers with some of the lenders with which it works. Consequently, the plaintiff’s argument failed.” Likewise, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that his inability to contact the MERS signing officer who executed the assignment was a denial of due process.

Minnesota District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims and Holds That MERS Had Legal Title and Authority to Foreclose

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The Minnesota District Court in Allen v. Wilford & Geske et al.,No. 70-CV-10-29502 (D. Minn. May 9, 2011), after hearing the plaintiff’s contentions, dismissed his complaint for foreclosure fraud. The court held that MERS had legal title and authority to foreclose.

By granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that, “MERS was not required to register every assignment of the loan or to track that history in its foreclosure documents…” and “…it was not a misrepresentation for  MERS to identify itself as the mortgagee in the foreclosure documents and not to identify all past and present lenders.”

California Court Affirms MERS’ Authority to Assign its Interest Under a Deed of Trust

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The court in Hollins v. ReconTrust et al., Civil No. 2:11-cv-00945-PSG –PLA (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) affirmed MERS’ authority to assign its interest under a deed of trust and granted MERS’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs claimed that the foreclosure proceedings initiated by the U.S. Bank as well as ReconTrust were not valid. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust.

The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but rejected the argument. In rejecting the palintiff’s argument, the court found that “federal and state courts in California have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to MERS in cases where the plaintiff expressly authorized MERS to act as a beneficiary.” Regarding the plaintiffs’ allegation that U.S. Bank was not authorized to foreclose due to lack of “documentation evidencing the proper status of U.S. Bank as a party in interest,” the court found the allegation “negated by a judicially noticeable record of assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank.” Last but not least, the plaintiffs’ failure to tender was fatal to their claims.

Oregon Court Holds That Oregon’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statute Does Not Require Presentment of the Note

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The court in Buckland v. Aurora Loan Services, Josephine County No. 10 CV 1023 (March 18, 2011) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for wrongful foreclosure with prejudice.

MERS, although not being a party to the case, the plaintiff’s complaint contained claims that MERS lacked the power to appoint a trustee as it was not the beneficiary of the plaintiff’s deed of trust. The plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that Aurora was required to prove it was the note holder before directing the trustee to non-judicially foreclose. The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.

The court relied on the cases cited in Aurora’s motion to dismiss, including Stewart v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (holding that presentment of note not required and MERS is a valid deed of trust beneficiary). The court ultimately held that Oregon’s non-judicial foreclosure statute does not require presentment of the note.

Indiana Supreme Court Allows Citimortgage to Intervene in ReCasa’s Foreclosure Proceeding

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In Citi v. Barnabas, 975 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2012), the Indiana Supreme Court held that Citimortgage had a right to intervene in ReCasa’s foreclosure proceeding and sale since Citi held a first mortgage on the property, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court.

The homeowner, Barnabas, granted a first mortgage on the property in 2005 to Irwin Mortgage Corp. (Irwin) with MERS designated as nominee and mortgagee, which later assigned the mortgage to Citimortgage (Citi). In 2007, Barnabas granted a second mortgage to ReCasa. Barnabas defaulted on the second mortgage and ReCasa commenced foreclosure proceedings in 2009. In response to the foreclosure proceedings, Irwin filed a disclaimer of interest in the property. When Citi learned the property was already sold through ReCasa’s foreclosure sale, Citi filed a motion to intervene, which was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision.

The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying Citi’s motion, as ReCasa didn’t dispute the validity of the assignment from MERS to Citi, but rather argued that MERS lacked a property interest, and therefore so did Citi. However, the court stated that “the assignee of rights under a contract stands in the shoes of the assignor and can assert any rights that the assignor could have asserted,” citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Household Merch., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) giving MERS the same property interest as the original lender.

When examining the mortgage language, the court found MERS’s designation as both “nominee” and “mortgagee” to be conflicting based on standard definitions for both terms, rendering the mortgage ambiguous. To determine MERS’s interest, the court looked to the parties’ intent and found that the legal title held by MERS was sufficient to give MERS foreclosure rights, acting as agent for the lender, Irwin.

ReCasa further argued that Irwin’s disclaimer of interest extinguished MERS’s property rights. The court notes that MERS has an agency relationship not only to Irwin, but also to all its member banks, and therefore does not disclaim the interests of another member bank in the property, such as Citi.

Although Citi’s motion to intervene was untimely, the court held that if Citi were not permitted to intervene, its interest would be destroyed in its entirety, prejudicing Citi. The court further noted that although intervention is typically “disfavored,” it is appropriate in certain “extraordinary and unusual circumstances,” particularly when “the petitioner’s rights cannot otherwise be protected.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Benton Cnty. v. Whistler, 455 N.E.2d 1149, 1153–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Furthermore, Citi’s delay in filing was a direct result of ReCasa’s failure to notice either Citi or MERS of the foreclosure proceedings. ReCasa argued that notice to an attorney representing Citi in the Barnabas bankruptcy proceeding provided Citi with actual knowledge of the foreclosure. But the court held that “actual knowledge of the suit does not satisfy due process or give the court in personam jurisdiction.” Overhouser v. Fowler, 549 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Glennar Mercury Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind. App. 144, 152, 338 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1975)).

The court was hesitant to outline MERS’s rights as a mortgagee under Indiana statute, though it noted the original statute might soon require modernization to account for changes in the mortgage industry.