Tag Archives: Mortgage Electronic Recording System

Court Holds That MERS Assignment, in Isolation, Could Not Prove Ownership

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The court deciding In Re Wilhelm (Case No. 06-51747) was faced with the issue of when actual notes prove that the note’s chain of ownership is unclear. In reaching their decision the court found that in such a situation, the MERS assignment could not, on its own, prove ownership of the note.

The court in this case stated that the MERS assignment was legitimate when taken as a whole, along with proper transfer of the note. The court further went on to note “in hundreds of stay relief motions, including many post-Sheridan, creditors are providing adequate documentation and explanation to meet the requisite standing requirements.”

Nevada Court Finds MERS Lacked Standing to Bring Foreclosure Action as it Failed to Establish Itself as a Real Party in Interest and Failed to Provide Sufficient Evidence of it Authority

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In MERS v. Chong, No. 09-661 (D. Nev. 2011) the court affirmed the order from the bankruptcy court holding that MERS lacked standing to bring an action. In the underlying bankruptcy action, MERS filed its motion for relief from stay, seeking to have the automatic stay lifted so that MERS could conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale.

The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination that MERS was not a beneficiary as MERS failed to present sufficient evidence showing it was a real party in interest. The court found that MERS might have had standing to prosecute the motion in the name of its members as a nominee.

However, in this case there was no evidence that the named nominee was entitled to enforce the note or that MERS was the agent of the note’s holder. As such the court found that MERS lacked standing.

Michigan District Court Holds That MERS Cannot Foreclose by Advertisement But Can Assign its Security Interest

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In Knox v. Trott & Trott, No. 10-13175, Dist. Court, (Michigan 2011) the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(3) and (4). Knox maintained that the court erred in rejecting his argument that the defendants lacked standing under Mich. Comp. Laws 600.3204(1)(d) to foreclose on his property.

Plaintiff based his request on a previous Michigan court of appeals case, Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merchandising, Inc. 538 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Circ. 2008). However, the court distinguished that case from the present case, as the former dealt with the narrow issue of whether MERS could foreclose by advertisement or whether it must use judicial foreclosure. In the present case, the court stressed that absent a showing by MERS that it owned “an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage,” it lacked authority under the Michigan statute to foreclose.

In the present case, however the court found that MERS was not the foreclosing entity. As such, its status as defendant in the litigation fell outside the parameters of the issue resolved in Residential Funding.

MERS Has Standing to Bring Foreclosure Action as Court Ruled There Was No Question That the Defendant-Homeowner Was the Correctly Named Party

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In the case of Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, No. CV 054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 20, 2006) the plaintiff-lender moved for summary judgment against defendants, a husband and wife, as to liability only. After review of the lender’s complaint and allegation that the husband was indebted to the lender, the court found that because the husband and quit claimed his interest in the property to the wife, she was the owner of the equity of redemption. Consequently, the wife was properly named as a party to the litigation as a defendant.

Moreover, there was no question that the named lender was the correct party to bring the action. Consequently, the lender was entitled to summary judgment as to the husband’s and the wife’s liability only.

The defendants first claimed there was a question of fact as to whether the defendant Tina Galka-Ventura was liable to MERS. However, the court determined this was not a question of fact as the plaintiff properly alleged that the defendant Joseph Ventura quitclaimed his interest to Gina. Thus, the court determined she was the owner of the equity of redemption.

Second, the defendants claimed that there was a genuine issue of material fact as whether a debt was owed to the plaintiff. The court determined that this was not a material fact. Thirdly, the defendants claimed there was material fact as to what entity is the holder of the note securing the property. The court also determined that this was not a material question.

U.S. District Court for Hawaii Rules in Favor of MERS in Non-Judicial Foreclosure Proceeding, Validating its Right to Transfer, Foreclose, and Sell Property as the Lender’s Nominee

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In Pascual v. Aurora Loan Services, No. 10–00759 JMS–KSC, 2012 WL 2355531, at 1-18 (D. Haw. June 18, 2012), the court explained the role of MERS in mortgage transfers and granted Defendant Aurora Loan Services’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff Pascual’s claim that the non-judicial foreclosure executed by Defendant was void as a result of MERS’s invalid assignment of the mortgage.

Under the language of the mortgage, MERS held the power of sale of the subject property and “the right to foreclose and sell the property and to take action required of the Lender.” The mortgage also notified the Plaintiffs that the “Note [could] be sold without prior notice.” MERS, acting as a nominee for the lender, Lehman Brothers, assigned the mortgage to the Defendant after Lehman Brothers filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Shortly after the assignment, the Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan. Defendants subsequently filed a Notice of Mortgagee’s Intention to Foreclosure Under Power of Sale. It held a public auction, and as the highest bidder, recorded a Mortgagee’s Affidavit of Foreclosure Sale under Power of Sale.

Under HRS §677-5, the “mortgagee, mortgagee’s successor in interest, or any person authorized by the power to act,” can foreclose under power of sale upon breach of a condition in the mortgage. Plaintiffs argued that because MERS did not match the description of one these parties, it did not have authority to assign the mortgage to the Defendant, thereby making the transfer invalid. In response, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s assertions and explained the role of MERS, citing Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F. 3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). It described MERS as a “private electronic database that tracks the transfer of the beneficial interest in home loans as well as any changes in loan servicers.” It further stated that “at the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the deed of trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender’s ‘successor’s and assigns,’ and as the deed’s ‘beneficiary’ which holds legal title to the security interest conveyed.” The court elaborated that under Cervantes, “claims attacking the MERS recording system as fraud fail, given that mortgages generally disclose MERS’[s] role as acting ‘solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns,’” and that “MERS has the right to foreclose and sell the property.”

Applying the holding to the present case, the court concluded that the mortgage expressly notified the Plaintiffs of MERS’s role as the “nominee for the ‘Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns,’” which had the power of sale of the subject property without giving notice to the Borrower. For these reasons, the court concluded that the transfer from MERS to the Defendant was valid. As a result, it dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of HRS § 667-5.

The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s motion to amend their claim. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, it concluded that there was not a statutory requirement for the Defendants to provide affirmative evidence that its assignment of the subject property was valid. It also denied Plaintiff’s claim that Lehman Brothers’ entrance into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings precluded it from validly transferring the mortgage to the Defendant.

Washington Court Holds That the Language of the Security Instrument Gave MERS Both the Authority to Foreclose and Assign the Deed of Trust

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The court Salmon v. Bank of America, MERS et al., No. 10-446 (D. Wash. May 25, 2011) dismissed claims against Bank of America and MERS. The plaintiffs argued that MERS was a “ghost-beneficiary” and as such could not be the beneficiary of a deed of trust under Washington law, as it did not have an interest in the note. The court rejected this argument, and noted that the beneficiary of a deed of trust is not required to be the note holder

The court, in their holding, noted that MERS had both the authority to foreclose and the authority to assign the deed of trust, based on the language of the security instrument.

Utah Court Holds That Under Utah Law, MERS Was Not Required to Identify the Note-Holder in Order to Permit the Trustee to Proceed With Foreclosure

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The plaintiff in Nielsen v. Aegis Wholesale Corporation, MERS et al., No. 10-606 (D. Utah May 4, 2011) argued that MERS divided the deed of trust as well as the promissory note. The court, in reaching their decision and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, noted that “the court adopted the defendant’s argument that plaintiff had latched onto a failed theory—that a note and trust deed can be ‘split’ and rendered null and void.” The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against MERS with prejudice.

The court further went on to state that, “by law, each successor to the note also received the benefit of the security, and by contract, MERS was appointed as the nominee beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust. Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, MERS had established its rights with respect to foreclosure on the security and MERS had, at all relevant times been, entitled to act as beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust.”

The court further noted that under Utah law, MERS was not required to identify the note holder in order to permit the trustee to proceed with foreclosure.