Tag Archives: mortgage

Arizona Court Holds That MERS is the Beneficiary With the Authority to Foreclose

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The court in Ciardi v. The Lending Company, Inc. et al., 2010 WL 2079735 (D. Ariz. 2010) held that that MERS is the beneficiary with the authority to foreclose. In doing so the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion to vacate temporary restraining order.

In December 2005, plaintiff [Bianca Ciardi] borrowed $270,500 from ‘The Lending Company’ for the purpose of purchasing real property. Plaintiff also executed a promissory note and a deed of trust. Soon after, the plaintiff’s note was sold.

Plaintiff eventually defaulted on their note and their home was nearing auction in a non-judicial trustee’s sale. A lower court granted the plaintiff’s temporary restraining order (“TRO”) without notice. Defendants removed to this court, and sought to have the TRO dissolved and Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint dismissed pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).

In their analysis, the court noted, that the Plaintiff’s amended complaint was not the model of clarity and that the plaintiff did not allege any specific causes of action, rather much of their amended complaint was simply a narrative concerning the mortgage securitization industry.

In reaching their conclusion, the court, reviewed the plaintiff’s amended complaint. And concluded that even considering the plaintiff’s pro se status and, in so doing, construing plaintiff’s amended complaint liberally, the court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be based. Plaintiff also sought a preliminary injunction to halt the planned foreclosure of their home. However, the court reasoned, in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show a likelihood of success on the merits.

Accordingly, because the court found the plaintiff’s amended complaint failed for a failure to state a claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed in showing a likelihood of success on the merits. As such, the Court denied the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.

MERS’ Assignments are Recognized as Valid as New York Appellate Court Overturns ‘N.Y. v. Alderazi’ & ‘LaSalle v. Lamy’

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In the case of Bank of New York v. Eddie Sachar, et al., 95 A.D.3d 695 (2012), the court found the Bank of New York Mellon had standing to foreclose based on a MERS assignment and the delivery of the note.

The court’s ruling granted the plaintiff’s [Bank of New York Mellon] motion for summary judgment on its complaint against defendant [Sachar]. The plaintiff-bank proved its standing to commence the foreclosure action by demonstrating that it was both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action was commenced.

Although the defendant correctly alleged that, although Mortgage Electronic Registration System [MERS] validly assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, and the assignment was properly recorded in the public records, MERS had not been given any interest in the underlying note by the lender (see Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 283 [2011]).

However, the complaint and the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion establish that an assignment of the note had been effectuated by physical delivery of the note before the current action was commenced.

Bankruptcy Court Rules MERS Has Standing and the Customary Rights of a Mortgagee Under a Mass. Mortgage and May Act Under the Mortgage

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The Massachusetts bankruptcy court hearing In re Sonya D. Huggins f/k/a SONYA D. HICKS, Debtor Chapter 13, Case No. 05-18826-RS overruled the Huggins’ objection to the standing of the nominee to seek relief from the automatic stay and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the motion for stay relief.

After Huggins commenced her Chapter 13 case, the court denied a motion by a nominee mortgagee for relief from stay to foreclose a mortgage on the debtor’s residence but ordered monthly adequate protection payments. The nominee filed a second stay relief motion under 11 U.S.C.S. § 362(d), and the debtor objected.

Huggins maintained that the nominee could not stay relief in bankruptcy because it had no rights to enforce the mortgage outside bankruptcy. The court disagreed, finding that the nominee was acting for a lender that held the note, thus there was no disconnection between the note and the mortgage. The nominee was the record mortgagee under the terms of the mortgage with its powers expressly set forth, and Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 244, § 14 expressly authorized the exercise of sale powers by a mortgagee or a person authorized to sell, which was precisely the position of the nominee.

The court concluded that the denial of the nominee’s foreclosure right as mortgagee could lead to anomalous and perhaps inequitable results, such as the lender being able to foreclose despite the fact that it was not named as mortgagee or that no one could foreclose. Thus, as the court concluded, the nominee had standing to foreclose on the lender’s behalf. As to relief from stay, the court concluded that there was no irrefutable presumption that the property was necessary for an effective reorganization under 11 U.S.C.S. § 362(d)(2)(b). The debtor was required to proffer evidence on those issues.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Rules in Favor of MERS in Foreclosure Proceeding, Upholding its Power of Sale Over the Plaintiff’s Property

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In Richardson v. Citimortgage, No. 6:10cv119, 2010 WL 4818556, at 1-6 (E.D. Tex. November 22, 2010) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, granted the Defendants’, Citimortgage and MERS, motion for summary judgment against the Plaintiff, Richardson, in a foreclosure proceeding. The Court reiterated MERS’s power of sale and its role as an “electronic registration system and clearinghouse that tracks beneficial ownerships in mortgage loans.”

Plaintiff purchased his home from Southside Bank with a Note. As the Lender, Southside Bank could transfer the Note and it, or any transferee, could collect payments as the Note Holder. In the agreement, Plaintiff acknowledged that Citimortgage, the loan servicer, could also receive payments. A Deed of Trust secured the Note by a lien payable to the Lender.

Under a provision in the deed, Southside Bank secured repayment of the Loan and Plaintiff irrevocably granted and conveyed the power of sale over the property. The Deed of Trust also explained MERS’s role as its beneficiary, acting as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s and MERS’s successors and assigns. MERS “[held] only legal title to the interests granted by the Borrower but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, [had] the right to exercise any and all of the interests [of the Lender and its successors and assigns], including the right to foreclose and sell the property.”

Plaintiff signed the Deed of Trust but eventually stopped making mortgage payments to CitiMortgage and filed for bankruptcy protection. As a result, “MERS assigned the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Citimortgage.” Citimortgage posted the property for foreclosure after receiving authorization from the United States Bankruptcy Court. Plaintiff brought suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging Citimortgage’s authority to foreclose on the property.

In granting Citimortgage and MERS’s motion for summary judgment, the court explained that Citimortgage could enforce the loan agreements, including the power of foreclosure, after it received the Note from Southside Bank. Furthermore, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Plaintiff could not challenge Citimortgage’s right to enforce the Note after he “represented that it was [his] intention to surrender [the] property to Citimortgage,” in bankruptcy court. Citimortgage subsequently acquired a “valid, undisputed lien on the property for the remaining balance of the Note.”

Plaintiff also challenged MERS’s role with “respect to the enforcement of the Note and Deed of Trust.” In response, the court explained that “[u]nder Texas law, where a deed of trust expressly provides for MERS to have the power of sale, as here, MERS has the power of sale,” and that the Plaintiff’s argument lacked merit.

The court described MERS as a “[book entry system] designed to track transfers and avoid recording and other transfer fees that are otherwise associated with,” property sales. It concluded that MERS’s role in the instant foreclosure “was consistent with the Note and the Deed of Trust,” and that Citimortgage had the right to sell the Plaintiff’s property and schedule another foreclosure.

Borden and Reiss on Show Me The Note!

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Brad and I were e-interviewed by the Knowledge Effect, a Thomson Reuters blog on our recent article (co-authored with KeAupuni Akina), Show Me The Note!.  The interview is below:

Westlaw Journals: Your commentary is about the success of the “show me the note” defense to stop or delay a foreclosure.  Can you explain what the “show me the note” defense means during foreclosure proceedings? 

Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss:“Show me the note” can mean different things in different jurisdictions.  But the bottom line is that the homeowner is typically telling the court that the foreclosure should not proceed unless and until the foreclosing party can prove that it in fact owns or holds (or is the agent of the owner or holder of) the mortgage note that is secured by the mortgage that is being foreclosed upon.

WJ: What is the difference between a mortgage and a deed of trust, and does this have any bearing on the foreclosure defense?

BTB and DJR:The two documents are very similar in many ways – they both provide a security interest in real property.  The mortgage is the simpler of the two, involving just two parties.  The two parties are the mortgagor (the borrower) and the mortgagee (the lender).  The borrower uses its interest in real property to secure a loan made to it by the lender.  If the borrower fails to repay the loan or otherwise violates the terms of the loan transaction, the mortgagee can foreclose upon the real property.  The mortgagee forecloses through a judicial proceeding.

The deed of trust adds another party to a secured loan transaction.  Here, the borrower delivers a deed of trust to a trustee which states that the borrower’s real property is held as security for the loan made by the lender to the borrower.  The trustee of a deed of trust has the very limited role of following the provisions of the deed of trust.  Most importantly, it can foreclose on the deed of trust on behalf of the beneficiary of the deed of trust, the lender, if the terms of the loan transaction have been violated.  Because of the addition of this third party, foreclosure can (but need not) take place in a non-judicial proceeding.  The thinking is that the trustee will ensure that there will be some basic procedural protections in place for the foreclosure, obviating the need for judicial oversight. The big advantage of the deed of trust is the ability to foreclose quickly and cheaply by means of a non-judicial proceeding.

WJ: How do assignments of mortgages contribute to the confusion about what entity has the right to foreclose?

BTB and DJR: Let us count the ways!  On our blog, REFinblog.com, we track the litigation that arises from the foreclosure epidemic.  The absence of all of the relevant assignments in a transaction can play out one way in a judicial foreclosure (in mortgage-only jurisdictions), another way in a non-judicial foreclosure (in jurisdictions that allow for deeds of trust) and another way in a bankruptcy proceeding.  It plays out differently in different states.  It can play out one way if the mortgagee brings the suit, in another way if the servicer brings the suit and another if MERS (the Mortgage Electronic Recording System) brings the suit.  It can play out differently if the note is negotiable or if it is non-negotiable.  So to answer your question precisely, assignments of mortgages don’t contribute to the confusion – they are the confusion!

WJ: What is the difference between a judicial and non-judicial foreclosure?  Is the “show  me the note” defense more successful in states that use a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding or judicial proceeding?  What contrasts exists between the cases highlighted in your analysis? 

BTB and DJR: Keep in mind that states typically fall into two categories:  those that only allow judicial foreclosures and those that allow either judicial or non-judicial foreclosures.  In a judicial foreclosure, foreclosure actions are brought in court.  A judicial foreclosure can be brought where the security interest is a mortgage or deed of trust.  A non-judicial foreclosure does not – shocker! — involve a court proceeding.  Instead it is conducted using the power of sale contained in the deed of trust.  With the power of sale, the mortgaged property is sold at a public auction.

If we were to generalize, the rule is that state supreme courts do not require the foreclosing party to “show the note” in a non-judicial foreclosure (with Massachusetts one exception).  In addition, the general rule in a judicial foreclosure is that the foreclosing party must “show the note,” although it need not be the actual mortgage note holder, but merely one who has been assigned an interest in the mortgage note by the mortgage note holder.

We think the most interesting contrast is between the more typical Hogan v. Washington Mutual Bank, 277 P.3d 781 (Ariz. 2012), and the more cutting edge Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012).  Hogan strictly construes the state foreclosure law, but leads to some odd results, including the possibility that a borrower can be liable in competing foreclosure proceedings arising from just one deed of trust.  Eaton pushes the language of the statute a bit, but seems to ensure that borrowers are protected from inequitable results in foreclosure proceedings.  For a more in depth analysis, we would recommend a recent law review article by Dale Whitman and Drew Milner in the most recent issue of the Arkansas Law Review, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement to Enforce the Note.

WJ: How does state law influence the success of the defense?   Are there any federal laws applicable to the “show me the note” defense?

BTB and DJR: While “show me the note” does come up in federal cases, federal courts defer to the applicable state law in reaching their results.  As our article demonstrates, the courts’ holdings tend to flow from a careful reading of the relevant state foreclosure statute, so a particular state’s law can have a big effect on the outcome.  We would note that many scholars and leaders of the bar are befuddled by courts’ failure to do a comprehensive analysis under the UCC as part of their reasoning in mortgage enforcement cases, but judges make the law, not scholars and members of the bar.  See Report of The Permanent Editorial Board for The Uniform Commercial Code Application of The Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes at 1 (Nov. 14, 2011).

WJ: What are the main points you want to emphasize for homeowners and their attorneys challenging a foreclosure action?

BTB and DJR: The main point is – the law matters and the jurisdiction matters.  Whether you are a homeowner trying to stave off foreclosure or a real estate finance lawyer structuring a securitization, you should expect that courts will enforce statutes as they are written in an adversarial proceeding.  What works in one jurisdiction may not work in another because the laws of the jurisdictions may vary.  Plan accordingly.

 

Court Holds That MERS Assignment, in Isolation, Could Not Prove Ownership

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The court deciding In Re Wilhelm (Case No. 06-51747) was faced with the issue of when actual notes prove that the note’s chain of ownership is unclear. In reaching their decision the court found that in such a situation, the MERS assignment could not, on its own, prove ownership of the note.

The court in this case stated that the MERS assignment was legitimate when taken as a whole, along with proper transfer of the note. The court further went on to note “in hundreds of stay relief motions, including many post-Sheridan, creditors are providing adequate documentation and explanation to meet the requisite standing requirements.”

MERS Has Standing to Bring Foreclosure Action as Court Ruled There Was No Question That the Defendant-Homeowner Was the Correctly Named Party

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In the case of Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, No. CV 054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 20, 2006) the plaintiff-lender moved for summary judgment against defendants, a husband and wife, as to liability only. After review of the lender’s complaint and allegation that the husband was indebted to the lender, the court found that because the husband and quit claimed his interest in the property to the wife, she was the owner of the equity of redemption. Consequently, the wife was properly named as a party to the litigation as a defendant.

Moreover, there was no question that the named lender was the correct party to bring the action. Consequently, the lender was entitled to summary judgment as to the husband’s and the wife’s liability only.

The defendants first claimed there was a question of fact as to whether the defendant Tina Galka-Ventura was liable to MERS. However, the court determined this was not a question of fact as the plaintiff properly alleged that the defendant Joseph Ventura quitclaimed his interest to Gina. Thus, the court determined she was the owner of the equity of redemption.

Second, the defendants claimed that there was a genuine issue of material fact as whether a debt was owed to the plaintiff. The court determined that this was not a material fact. Thirdly, the defendants claimed there was material fact as to what entity is the holder of the note securing the property. The court also determined that this was not a material question.