Tag Archives: non-judicial foreclosure

Mass. Appeals Court Applies Eaton Retroactively

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The intermediate appeals court of Massachusetts applied Eaton retroactively in Lyons v. MERS et al., 11-P-560 (June 5, 2013) notwithstanding the Mass. Supreme Court’s holding that Eaton would only apply prospectively. Eaton held that “a mortgagee may foreclose under a power of sale only if it either holds the note or is acting under the direction or as the agent of the note holder.” (1)

The intermediate appeals court found that it would be inequitable to do otherwise:  “Not only was the present case on appeal when Eaton was decided, the Lyonses actually brought their action before Eaton had even been decided in the trial court. Because the Lyonses are in an identical situation to the plaintiffs in Eaton, not a ‘somewhat similar[]’ position,” the court held “that the rule of Eaton is applicable to the Lyonses’ case, and reverse[d] the judgment” of the trial court. (1, citations omitted)

Rhode Island Superior Court: Homeowners Lack Standing to Challenge MERS Assignment

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In Scarcello v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al, C.A. No. KC 2011-0548 (R.I. Super. June 26, 2012), the court granted defendant MERS’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint challenging assignee Aurora’s standing to foreclose and seeking an order to quiet title on the property. Plaintiff homeowners executed a note and mortgage for the property to MERS as nominee for Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., which were later assigned by MERS to Aurora Loan Services, Inc. After plaintiffs defaulted, Aurora foreclosed and subsequently sold the property. Plaintiff homeowners alleged that Aurora, as assignee, lacked standing to foreclose and sell the property. The court found the facts of Scarcello similar to those in Kriegel v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, No. PC 2010-7099, 2011 WL 4947398 (R.I. Super. Oct. 13, 2011) stating “it is well established that ‘homeowners lack standing to challenge the propriety of mortgage assignments and the effect those assignments, if any, could have on the underlying obligation.'” Since plaintiff homeowners are not a party to the assignment, they lack standing to challenge the assignment’s validity. Plaintiffs further alleged that the assignment was unenforceable without a power of attorney for the signing party, but the court held that this was not required as MERS’s power to assign the mortgage stems from its designation as mortgagee and nominee of Homecomings, as clearly stated in the mortgage instrument. Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and as such, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.

Lender Agrees to Permanent Injunction of Non-Judicial Foreclosure in Colorado

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A pro se plaintiff has won at least a procedural victory against her lender in Brumfiel v. U.S. Bank et al. (May 14, 2013) (12-cv-02716-WJM-MEH).  US Bank filed a Notice of Withdrawal of the foreclosure action and then a Motion to Vacate in which it consented “to a permanent injunction preventing it from” proceeding with a non-judicial foreclosure. (3) (quoting Motion to Vacate, emphasis in the original)

Under Colorado law, a party “may foreclose on a property by providing a document by his or her attorney that either ‘certifies’ or simply ‘states’ that ‘holder claims to be a qualified holder’ for the purposes of foreclosure.” (Order granting Plaintiff’s Request for Interim Preliminary Injunction, May 6, 2013, at 2)  The court holds a Rule 120 hearing to confirm the existence of the default.  Brumfiel challenges the constitutionality of this hearing on due process grounds.

In its May 6th order, the Court held that the questions that Brumfiel “raised regarding the serious, substantial, difficult issues apparent in this case” were a sufficient basis for an interim preliminary injunction.  These difficult issues included whether the Colorado process

(1) [] lowers the standard of proof that a creditor must meet in order to proceed to foreclosure from original documentary evidence to an unsworn statement; and

(2) [] creates an additional burden upon a debtor to establish evidence of the creditor’s identity which the creditor, itself, is not required to locate.

Whether these issues create due process concerns within the limited scope of a Rule 120 hearing creates serious constitutional questions. (13-14)

This is only a tactical victory for the homeowner.  By consenting to the permanent injunction, the lender should still be able to proceed with a judicial foreclosure.  But the constitutionality of Colorado’s non-judicial foreclosure process will have to wait to be tested until another day,

 

Careful When Putting Shoe on Other Foot

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Nestor Davidson has posted a very useful article to SSRN, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis.  The article notes that as “borrower advocates have responded to [the] surge in mortgage distress, they have found success raising a series of largely procedural defenses to foreclosure and mortgage-related claims asserted in bankruptcy.” (391)

Davidson points out that this “renewed formalization in the mortgage distress system is a curious turn in the jurisprudence” because from “the earliest history of mortgage law, lenders have had a tendency to invoke the hard edges of law’s formal clarity, while borrowers have often resorted to equity to obtain a measure of substantive fairness in the face of such strictures.” (392)

What I particularly like about this article is that it takes the broad view on downstream (homeowner foreclosure and bankruptcy) litigation.  Instead of painting a pointillistic portrait of all of this “mortgage distress” litigation (a standing case here, a chain-of-assignment case there), Davidson identifies a pattern of formalistic defenses being raised by homeowners and puts it into historical context.

Davidson warns of the potential unintended consequences of this development: “The borrower push to emphasize formalism in mortgage practice, however understandable, may thus give primacy to the set of judicial tools least amenable to claims of individual substantive justice.” (430)

I don’t think that I agree that this new formalism will bite homeowners in the end.  As Davidson himself acknowledges, “formalism need not be equivalent on both sides  . . ..” (430) But I do agree with his conclusion:

For those concerned about the long-term structural balance between procedural regularity and substantive fairness embodied in the traditional realms of law and equity, the brittleness that the new formalism may be ushering in is worth considering and, perhaps, cause for redoubling efforts to find structural solutions to a crisis that even now continues. (440)

 

 

Untrustworthy?

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John Campbell has posted an abstract (and hopefully soon a draft) of Putting the ‘Trust’ in Trustees: An Examination of the Foreclosure Crisis and Suggestions for Reforming the Role of the Trustee. The draft itself proposes legislation for non-judiical foreclosure jurisdictions “that would make trustees real gatekeepers who require essential proofs, ask basic questions, and when factual disputes arise between the foreclosing party and the homeowner, refer those questions to courts.” (53)  It is valuable to set forth some of the things that Campbell’s proposal would require from trustees:

  1. Proof of the transfer of the original note from the original lender to the current party who seeks to foreclose, including any and all intervening assignments. The foreclosing party should be required to produce a copy of the original note and attest in a sworn affidavit that the original note exists in its original form.
  2. Proof that the party who seeks to foreclose is the party who is recorded in the public records as the secured party, along with all the recordings that show how that party came to be secured.
  3. Detailed financial records that show when default occurred and precisely how much money the homeowner currently owes. (56)

Each of these items reflects a major controversy in the world of foreclosures.  The first would ensconce the “Show Me the Note!” claim made by homeowners during foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings in the statutory framework of non-judicial foreclosure regimes.  The second would be a frontal assault on the role of MERS, requiring that the foreclosing party record in its own name its interest in the deed of trust.  And the third would require that servicers provide adequate evidence to homeowners of the default.  The proposal would effectively make non-judicial foreclosure a lot more like judicial foreclosure, an objective that I will not weigh in on today.

New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Holds that Assignee Bank Lacks Standing to Foreclose for Failure to Provide Evidence of Valid Note Assignment

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In Bank of New York v Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274 (2d Dept. 2011), the court stated, “[t]he principal issue ripe for determination by this Court . . . is whether MERS, as nominee and mortgagee for purposes of recording, can assign the right to foreclose upon a mortgage to a [bank] in a foreclosure action absent MERS’s right to, or possession of, the actual underlying promissory note.” In making this determination, the court outlined the following rules regarding standing in foreclosure proceedings: “[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, a [bank] has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced. . . . [A]n assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery.”

The court found that in this case, “as ‘nominee,’ MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the [original mortgagee].  Hence, although . . . MERS [had] the right to assign the mortgages themselves, it did not specifically [have] the right to assign the underlying notes, and the assignment of the notes was thus beyond MERS’s authority.” Based on these findings, the court concluded, “MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the [bank]. Consequently, the [bank] failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”

New York Supreme Court Holds that Assignee Bank Lacks Standing to Foreclose for Failure to Validate MERS’s Authority to Assign and Condemns Frivolous Conduct Relating to “Robosigning”

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In HSBC Bank v Taher, 32 Misc. 3d 1208(A) (Sup. Ct. 2011), the New York Supreme Court of Kings County held that an assignee bank conducting a foreclosure action must submit proof of the assignor’s authority to assign the mortgage, including the underlying note, on behalf of the original mortgagee in order for the assignee to lawfully conduct a foreclosure.

In this case, the court found that the assignee bank, HSBC, did not have standing to foreclose on Taher, the homeowner. The court stated, “the instant action must be dismissed because plaintiff HSBC lacks standing to bring this action. MERS lacked the authority to assign the subject Taher mortgage to HSBC and there is no evidence that MERS physically possessed the Taher notes.”

The court went on to explain that MERS must have authority to assign both the mortgage and the underlying note in order for an assignee to lawfully conduct a foreclosure. The court stated, “even if MERS had authority to transfer the mortgage to HSBC… MERS [was not] the note holder. . . . MERS cannot transfer something it never proved it possessed. . . . [Thus,] MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the . . . assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to [HSBC]. Consequently, [HSBC] failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”

In addition to finding that the assignee bank lacked standing, the court also took the opportunity in this case to highlight its intention to prevent the degradation of the foreclosure process, particularly concerning the practice of “robosigning.” Citing the need to “protect the integrity of the foreclosure process and prevent wrongful foreclosures,” the court announced its institution of a new filing requirement in any foreclosure action. This requirement is that assignees must “file an affirmation certifying that counsel has taken reasonable steps—including inquiry to banks and lenders and careful review of the papers filed in the case—to verify the accuracy of documents filed in support of residential foreclosures.” The court scrutinized HSBC’s foreclosure filing practices, which included instances where the court believed robosigning occurred, and reprimanded the bank and its counsel for its conduct. The court concluded that the conduct bordered on frivolous, and determined that further inquiry, by way of a hearing, was necessary.