The Massachusetts Land Court in deciding Suntrust Mortg., Inc. v. Forsberg, 2013 Mass. LCR LEXIS 159 (Mass. Land Ct. 2013) found that defendant (Alfred Forsberg) was not entitled to the protection of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 510 et seq., at the time of foreclosure; and that service and publication of the notice naming SunTrust Mortgage LLC rather than SunTrust Mortgage Inc. did not invalidate the foreclosure sale.
Tag Archives: non-judicial foreclosure
Michigan Court Finds Assignment From MERS to Bank of New York Was Valid
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in Maslowski v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156299 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2013) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The crux of plaintiff’s claim is that the state foreclosure proceedings should be invalidated because MERS lacked the capacity to assign the Mortgage and BONY could not accept the MERS’ Assignment of Mortgage. Defendants successfully sought dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The court reasoned even if the assignment from MERS to BONY was invalid, thereby creating a defect in the foreclosure process under M.C.L. § 600.3204(1)(d), the plaintiff had not alleged that he was prejudiced.
While plaintiff claimed various damages, which arose from the alleged fraudulent assignment, plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any prejudice due to the alleged fraudulent assignment. Plaintiff failed to show that he would be subject to liability from someone other than BONY (i.e., double liability) or that he would have been in any better position to keep the Property absent the assignment Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Finds That Wells Fargo Had Standing to File Foreclosure Action
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Garner, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2648, 2013 WL 5827033 (App.Div. Oct. 31, 2013) affirmed the lower court’s decision and dismissed motions to vacate the judgment of foreclosure.
Defendant argued that plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., lacked standing to file the foreclosure action. The defendant claimed that Wells Fargo did not own the note and mortgage on the date it filed the complaint. For the same reason, the defendant maintained that plaintiff improperly issued the notice of intent to foreclose.
The court found defendant was not entitled to relief under any subsection of Rule 4:50-1, and subsequently dismissed her complaint.
Texas Court of Appeals Finds That Plaintiff’s Claim – That the Note and Deed of Trust Became “Split” – Has No Basis in Law
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District in deciding Townsend v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 13515, 2013 WL 5874607 (Tex. App. Beaumont Oct. 31, 2013) affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 51.0025 permitted the company to administer the foreclosure proceedings.
Plaintiff alleged conspiracy to commit fraud due to the fact that the promissory note was “split” from the deed of trust when the deed of trust was assigned through MERS. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the local clerk’s office did not have a record of an assignment into Bank of America, as successor “by merger” to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP.
However, the court found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the note and deed of trust “split” had no basis in law. The court reasoned that the alleged agreement between the persons conducting the foreclosure accomplished neither an unlawful purpose nor a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Thus, the assignment would be binding on both plaintiff, who had notice of it, and the parties to the assignment.
Eastern District of California Dismisses Plaintiff’s Action, Thus Upholding Decision That Possession of Original Note is Unnecessary
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in Candelo et al v. NDEX West, LLC et al., No. CV F 08-1916 LJO DLB (E.D.Cal. 2008) dismissed the plaintiff’s action.
In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, the court upheld the decision that there was no requirement under the statutory framework for the mandatory production or possession of the original note, by the foreclosing party, to initiate non-judicial foreclosure.
Alabama Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Insufficiently Plead Quiet Title Claim
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Western Division, in deciding Orton v. Matthews, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156870 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2013), granted [defendant] Bank of America’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the FRCP for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff’s complaint represented an attempt to quiet title to the underlying property in the case. The theory behind plaintiff’s quiet title action was that, as a result of the separation of the note and the mortgage at the time of their execution, the defendant’s alleged security interest in the property was invalidated.
Defendant attacked the plaintiff’s complaint on multiple grounds, asserting that 1) it was devoid of the factual allegations necessary to maintain an action to quiet title, and 2) its only cause of action is almost wholly dependent on a theory of law, the so-called “split the note” theory, that contravenes established Alabama law.
Defendant successfully argued that such deficiencies prevented plaintiff’s complaint from meeting Rule 8’s pleading standard, and require dismissal of this action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed.
Central District of California Court Finds Plaintiff Lacks Standing as There Was No “Injury in Fact”
The United States District Court for the Central District of California in deciding Ellis v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157173 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) concluded that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge defendants’ initiating foreclosure proceedings.
Plaintiff brought a complaint with a litany of claims. The claims included (1) dissemination of false advertising pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 52; (2) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA“), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; (3) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA“), [2] 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (4) violation of California Civil Code §§ 2923.5 et seq., 2924 et seq., 2932.5, and 1095; (5) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (6) false advertising pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; and (7) Quiet Title.
On September 12, 2013, MERS filed a motion to dismiss. The court, as an initial matter, noted that plaintiff failed to explain how she had been injured by defendants’ conduct. The court also noted that the previous foreclosures were rescinded, and plaintiff did not allege a pending foreclosure proceeding. Thus, to have standing to bring her claims, the court noted, “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact.'” Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims granting the defendant’s motion.
