Tag Archives: notice

Defaulting Mortgagor Lacked Standing Under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b)

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The court in deciding In re Residential Capital, LLC, 2013 Bankr. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2013) held that the plaintiff Scott was not a party in interest and therefore lacked standing to assert a violation of the automatic stay. The court thus denied his motion.

Before this court was Phillip Scott’s motion to (1) determine that bankruptcy estate owns title to the note, (2) void state court title transfer, and (3) enjoin post petition state court prosecution.

Through his Motion, Scott sought: (1) declaratory relief determining that the bankruptcy estate owns title to the note; (2) injunctive relief enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting the mortgage foreclosure action in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Westchester; and (3) judgment for costs, including attorneys’ fees.

This court held that a mortgagor who defaulted on a note he executed in 2005 did not have standing under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b) to seek a ruling from the bankruptcy court that a business that declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy after it acquired and transferred a mortgage he executed with the note held title to real property that secured the note, and an order enjoining a foreclosure action which a bank filed against the property in a New York court. The court also held that the mortgagor was not a creditor in the debtors’ bankruptcy estate, the note and mortgage were not owned or serviced by any of the debtors, and none of the debtors was a party to the foreclosure action.

Thus this court denied the mortgagor’s motion for an order declaring that the debtors’ bankruptcy estate owned title to the note, voiding a state court title transfer, and enjoining the foreclosure action that was filed in state court.

Texas Court Dismisses Claims Centered Around FDCPA and TDCPA Violations

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The court in deciding Warren v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss all of the claims brought by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that MERS could not assign the note or deed of trust because it was not a party to, and never had a beneficial interest in, the note. Plaintiff further alleged that the note was “securitized”, thus defendant was not the owner of the note or deed of trust and had no right to foreclose on the Property. Plaintiff asserted a claim to quiet title and requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to restrain defendant from foreclosing and evicting him from the Property.

Although the complaint did not formally list any substantive claims, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief contained allegations that may liberally construed as claims for wrongful foreclosure and violations of the Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(B), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA).

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to notify him of the pending foreclosure sale, since the foreclosure notice was “returned as undeliverable” by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). Before filing suit, he sent the defendant a request “for a verification of the debt” pursuant to the federal FDCPA and the TDCPA. Plaintiff believed that pursuant to the FDCPA, the foreclosure could not have been conducted until 30 days had passed after the date he sent his request.

Plaintiff further claimed that the defendant could not foreclose because there were defects in the original loan financing and the original foreclosure order and because defendant failed to “physically post” a copy of the foreclosure sale notice at “the courthouse” where the sale was to take place.

This court considered the plaintiff’s contentions and eventually found them without merit.

Defendants Could Not Show They Were not Debt Collectors as Defined by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692a(6)(F)

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The court in deciding Dias v. Fannie Mae, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181584 (D. Haw., 2013) rejected all but one of the plaintiff’s claims.

The court found that the plaintiff’s Haw. Rev. Stat. § 667-5 defective assignment claims against defendants failed because the mortgage gave the requisite authority.

The court found that a claim that no sale could be held pending a Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) modification failed because the mortgagor lacked standing. The false mortgage assignment claim failed because nothing showed a publicly recorded assignment was false. Likewise, the breach of contract claim for violating HAMP guidelines failed because the mortgagor had no such claim, no HAMP trial payment plan supported it, and she was not an intended beneficiary of any HAMP agreement between defendants and the U.S. Treasury.

However, the plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692, claims survived because a defaulted debt was assigned, so defendants could not show they were not debt collectors, under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692a(6)(F).

Tennessee Court Rejected MERS’ Argument that Sale of Property Should be Invalidated

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The court in deciding Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. v. Ditto, 2014 Tenn. App. (Tenn. Ct. App., 2014) affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal involved the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust.

Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c).

The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that the purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appealed the lower court’s decision, however this court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Since appellant was never given an independent interest in the property, and it did not suffer an injury by the sale of the property at issue, and the only injury suffered by appellant related to the future effect the case could have on its business model, which was not a distinct and palpable injury capable of being redressed by the court, the trial court’s grant of the purchaser’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly granted as appellant did not have standing to file suit to set aside the tax sale of the property for lack of notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(c) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court found that the failure to tender the appropriate funds when filing the petition to set aside the sale under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2504(c) was not a prerequisite for relief.

North Carolina Court Dismisses FDCPA and RESPA Claims

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The court in deciding Champion v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 U.S. Dist. 78 (E.D.N.C., 2014) dismissed the plaintiff’s FDCPA and RESPA claims.

Plaintiff initiated this action asserting claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and North Carolina statutory and common law. In response, the moving defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The court first considered plaintiff’s federal claims. The movants’ primary arguments for dismissal of this claim was that plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege that BANA was a debt collector under the FDCPA. The court agreed with this argument.

Plaintiff’s other federal claim was asserted under RESPA. Plaintiff alleged that defendants collectively violated that act ” through numerous assignments and transfers of the note and deed of trust without having given the proper notice to plaintiff within the proper time frame,” and “by failing to inform Plaintiff of any transfers of the loan servicing of her loan.”

However, the court agreed with the movants that plaintiff had failed to allege any damages flowing from the purported failure to be notified of the change in the entity servicing her mortgage. Accordingly the court dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Washington Court Dismisses Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Washington Deed of Trust Act Violation Claims

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The court in deciding Dietz v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2014) granted Wells Fargo and MERS’ motion to dismiss.

This action involved is a post-sale wrongful foreclosure case. Plaintiff Timothy Dietz alleged causes of action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)(Counts I and IV) and violation of the Washington Deed of Trust Act (DTA)(Counts II and III).

The court in deciding this case noted that Dietz’s first and fourth causes of action were for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b) and 1692e(5) respectively. These causes of action did not mention MERS  and there was no allegation in the complaint that MERS engaged in any activities that could be construed as a “debt collection.” As such, this court dismissed the FDCPA causes of action against MERS.

Similarly, the court found that Dietz had not alleged facts that gave rise to a violation of the debt validation notice requirements. Dietz’s claim that that Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) by failing to notify him within 30 days after it purchased the Loan. Wells Fargo purchased the Loan in 2008 and the assignment was recorded in 2011. The court found that under either date, the claim was barred by FDCPA‘s one year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), as this lawsuit was not filed until 2013.