Reiss on Ocwen Settlement

Law360 quoted me in New York’s Ocwen Deal Sets Tough Precedent For Regulators (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

New York regulators ordered Ocwen Financial Corp. to pay $150 million in hard cash and barred the company from claiming a tax deduction on the restitution payments in a mortgage servicing settlement that could set a new standard for regulators accused of being soft on the companies they penalize.

The New York Department of Financial Services’ penalty against Ocwen, which also saw the company’s executive chairman lose his job, comes amid criticism that major penalties against Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks have been too lax. In a move aimed at addressing concerns over companies’ abilities to game the penalties, New York’s settlement specifically says Ocwen will not be able to use some of the techniques banks have used to lessen the blow of earlier settlements.

“They’ve tried to make a very tight settlement that demonstrates that Ocwen is suffering measurable costs for their behavior,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The New York Department of Financial Services announced Monday that Ocwen, the country’s fourth-largest mortgage servicer, with some $430 billion in unpaid servicing balances, would pay out $150 million in “hard money” to New York homeowners who were victim to the company’s problematic servicing operations. A third of that $150 million would go directly to people who were foreclosed upon, and the remaining $100 million would go to housing-related projects chosen by the state.

But, unlike in previous mortgage-related settlements, Ocwen will not be able to count what are known as “soft dollar” modifications of mortgages they do not own and other techniques toward its settlement total, the DFS said. Banks and other servicers have been able to count such modifications in their total settlement amounts in previous deals, including the $25 billion national mortgage settlement from 2012.

Critics say such soft-dollar remediation has allowed law enforcement agencies, regulators and banks to inflate the amount of money banks and servicers are said to be paying out while limiting the amount of money they actually pay.

“It seems like a transparent settlement,” Reiss said.

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“A lot of the problems that people have had with these financial settlements are specifically identified,” Reiss said.

Reiss on Lawsky’s Departure from DFS

Bloomberg interviewed me for Lawsky Leaving After $3 Billion in Fines Makes a Mark. The article reads in part,

When Ocwen Financial Corp. (OCN) shares soared on the news that regulator Benjamin Lawsky, who’s probing the company, will step down, Bill Miller shrugged.

The next head of New York’s Department of Financial Services will probably be as aggressive as Lawsky, continuing the uncertainty for Ocwen, said Miller, who runs the $2.2 billion Legg Mason Opportunity Trust. (LMOPX) Lawsky’s investigations of nonbank mortgage servicers such as Ocwen have caused their shares to plunge.

“Ocwen has been rallying on the view that with him gone that will lift the burden, but I would be surprised if the next person didn’t at least follow through in the way Lawsky was going to,” said Miller, whose fund, which invests in Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc., has gained an annual 38 percent since 2011.

In three years as New York’s financial watchdog, Lawsky extracted more than $3 billion in fines from global banks, called for the firing of executives and questioned whether the lightly regulated nonbank servicers are properly handling modifications and defaults. As the department’s first superintendent, Lawsky hired experienced lawyers from the New York Attorney General’s office, creating a strong enforcement culture that will continue after he’s gone, said Kathryn Judge, an associate professor focusing on financial institutions at Columbia University Law School.

“Similar to what we saw Eliot Spitzer doing as attorney general, being in New York allowed Lawsky to step in where federal regulators hadn’t,” Judge said. “By stepping into this role at a formative stage for the regulator, he created a footprint. That legacy will survive.”

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The superintendent’s work has reflected favorably on the governor, said David Reiss, a professor who specializes in real estate and consumer protection at Brooklyn Law School. That will encourage Cuomo to select a successor who’s equally dynamic, Reiss said.

Cuomo will want to build on Lawsky’s record of protecting homeowners from improper foreclosures and holding mortgage servicers accountable, said Reiss.

Chief of staff Anthony Albanese, general counsel Daniel Alter, and capital markets division head Maria Filipakis are among the top people that Lawsky brought to the department. One of them may be in a position to replace him, according to a lawyer who has had extensive dealings with the superintendent. The lawyer asked not to be named because he’s not authorized to speak publicly about the matter.

The successor will have to focus more on regulation and finding answers to the issues the department uncovered with nonbank servicers and insurers, said Eric Dinallo, who served as New York’s superintendent of insurance from 2007 to 2009.

“Each superintendent or commissioner wants to put their unique stamp on the agency,” he said.

Lending to Keep Housing Affordable

New York State Comptroller DiNapoli issued a critical audit of a loan program of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development. HPD disagreed with many of the audits key findings. For the purposes of this blog post, however, I am more interested in the Article 8A loan program itself. The program derives its name from its enabling statute, Article 8A of the New York State Private Housing Finance Law.

According to the audit, the program is intended

to improve living conditions and to preserve safe and affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households. The Program attempts to achieve this goal by providing low interest rate loans, of up to $35,000 per unit, to owners of rent-regulated, multiple dwelling buildings in New York City (City). The loans are to be used to correct substandard or unsanitary conditions, to replace and rehabilitate building systems (i.e., heating, plumbing, and electrical work), or for other necessary improvements. (4)

To become eligible for this program, building owners “applying for Article 8-A loans must submit an application demonstrating that the physical condition of the property in question, and the owner’s property-related finances, warrant Program funding; and the applicant was unable to obtain a loan from at least two traditional lenders.” (5)

This is an interesting program design because it makes low-cost City funds available to owners who are already required to provide affordable housing pursuant to applicable rent regulation statutes. Given that many other owners of rent regulated buildings are able to operate their buildings without subsidized loans, one wonders why the relatively small number of buildings in this program should receive special treatment.

Legitimate policy rationales could include (i) preventing rent-regulated units from being left vacant due to their poor condition or (ii) preventing units from exiting rent regulation because they are eligible for the “substantial rehabilitation” exception to further rent restrictions. But better than assuming that a particular subsidized loan was made consistent with a legitimate policy rationale, would be for the City to make a specific finding of what it was getting in return for this subsidy. If subsidized loans were just going to (i) owners who had made bad choices in the past that led them to be rejected by private lenders or (ii) to owners in the “know” about this program, that would be a poor use of public funds.