Tag Archives: property tax

NYC’s 421-Abyss

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New York City’s 421-a tax exemption has lapsed as of yesterday because of disagreements at the state level (NYS has a lot of control over NYC’s laws and policies, for those of you who don’t follow the topic closely). 421-a subsidizes a range of residential development from affordable to luxury. In the main, though, it subsidizes market-rate units.

This subsidy for residential development is heavily supported by the real estate industry. Many others think that the program provides an inefficient tax subsidy for residential development, particularly affordable housing development.

I fall into the latter camp. I would note, however, that NYC’s dysfunctional property tax system is highly inequitable because it taxes different types of housing units (single family, coop and condo, rental) so very differently.

With that in mind, let me turn to a policy brief from the Community Service Society, Why We Need to End New York City’s Most Expensive Housing Program. The reports key conclusions are,

At $1.07 billion a year, 421-a is the largest single housing expenditure that the city undertakes, larger than the city’s annual contribution of funds for Mayor de Blasio’s Housing New York plan.

The annual cost of 421-a to the city exploded during the recent housing boom as a result of market changes, not because of any intentional policy decision to increase the amount of tax incentives for housing construction.

Half of the total 421-a expenditure is devoted to Manhattan.

The 421-a tax exemption is a general investment subsidy that has been only superficially modified to contribute to affordability goals.

The 421-a tax exemption is extremely inefficient as an affordable housing program, costing the city well over a million dollars per affordable housing unit created.

The reforms made to 421-a in 2006 and 2007 have not resulted in a significant improvement of 421-a’s efficiency as an affordable housing program.

A large share of buildings that receive 421-a and include affordable housing also receive other subsidies, such as tax-exempt bond financing. Affordable units in these buildings cannot be credited entirely to the 421-a program.

The great majority of the tax revenue forgone through 421-a is subsidizing buildings that would have been developed without the tax exemption. (3-4)

The brief argues that 421-a should be allowed to expire and be replaced “with a targeted tax credit or other new incentive that is structured to provide benefits only in proportion with a building’s contribution to the affordable housing supply.” (4)

I don’t have any real disagreement with the thrust of this brief. I would just add that the fight over 421-should be expanded to include an overhaul of the City’s property tax regime. It is unclear, of course, whether Governor Cuomo and NYS legislators have the stomach for a battle so large.

Real Affordability for All New Yorkers?

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The Real Affordability for All campaign has issued An Affordable Housing Policy Platform for Mayor de Blasio. A stated goal of the campaign “is to ensure that Mayor de Blasio’s housing policies prioritize and deliver real affordability for the most economically vulnerable households” in the CIty. (1) As with many such studies (this one, for instance), it does a good job of identifying the problem — incomes are not sufficient to keep housing costs affordable — but its solutions do not match the identified problem.

I am not going to focus on all of the good things in the report (for instance, enhancing enforcement of housing laws to protect tenants), but on fundamental flaws in its proposal that the City implement a 50/50 model for increasing the supply of new affordable housing units. The report states that

Affordable housing developers, private sector developers and housing experts agree on two broad 50/50 scenarios that are viable and pragmatic, based on existing developments, current real-estate market assumptions, and the latest mathematical modeling:

1) For high-cost areas of the city (particularly Manhattan), depending on the level of up-zoning, new developments can ensure that 50 percent of the units are market rate and 50 percent are real affordable units targeted to low-income households: specifically, households of four earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income.

2) For the outer boroughs, where land costs are lower, 100% of new developments can be affordable: 50 percent of the units can be for low-income households (those earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income) and 50 percent for moderate income households (those earning up to 100 percent of Area Median Income). 100% real affordability can be achieved by increasing current per unit subsidies in the outer boroughs and applying those subsidies to real affordable housing units for low-and moderate-income households. (3)

The first fundamental flaw is an assumption that if the government requires something of developers, developers will do it. For-profit developers will only build if they can make a profit. Otherwise they will just not build.  Given the low rates of new housing construction that we have seen in NYC over long periods of time, this is just a fact of life.

This leads to a second flaw — the proposal leaves fewer market rate units to cross-subsidize more affordable units. Given that the costs of development are relatively fixed, this proposal would have to come up with some real new cost-cutting measures for new developments or new sources of revenue to add to the existing subsidies. But the recommendations put forward by the report don’t really do either of those things. Their recommendations are

  1. Use Subsidies More Wisely to Drive Real Affordability.
  2. Implement a New Low-Income Real Affordability Framework Across All Housing Programs.
  3. Enable Not-for-Profit Developers and Owners to Play a Strong and Active Role in the City’s Housing Agenda.
  4. Prioritize Permanent Affordability for All City-owned Land Dispositions.
  5. Require that Developers and Investors Receiving Any Type of City Subsidy Provide a Reserve Fund that Creates a Safety Net for Excessively Rent-Burdened Tenants.
  6. Flip Tax.
  7. Non-Occupancy Tax.
  8. Water and Sewer Tax Reform
  9. Property Tax Overhaul.
  10. Density Bonuses.(4-5)

Many of these recommendations amount to moving things around, not to reducing costs or increasing subsidies. The ones that do raise revenues, raise relatively small amounts. For instance, the flip tax proposal is estimated to generate between $100 million and $150 million per year.  Using a conservative cost estimate of $200,000 per unit of new housing, $150 million in new revenue would only produce 750 new units of real affordable housing per year, a drop in the bucket.

Many have been trying to shape the Mayor’s housing agenda in recent days (here for instance). But few have seriously faced the real market and political constraints that the City faces as it attempts to increase the supply of affordable housing. There is reason to think that the Mayor’s housing team will grapple with these issues seriously, so let’s wait patiently for their plan to be released . . ..

 

Long-Term Homeownership Affordability

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Amnon Lehavi has posted Can the Resale Housing Market Be Split to Facilitate Long-Term Affordability? to SSRN.  The paper argues that

a comprehensive affordable housing policy requires the formal splitting of the homeownership market into (at least) two distinct segments: one designated for the general public and following a conventional pricing mechanism through free market supply and demand, and the other designated for eligible households and controlling both initial supply and subsequent resale of housing units through regulated affordability-oriented pricing mechanisms.

While regulation of the pricing of affordable housing units during their initial allocation is a standard feature of housing policy–whether such affordable units are produced by a public authority or a private developer–regulation of pricing upon resale to subsequent buyers has received less attention as a matter of both theory and practice, thus leaving a substantial gap in

design mechanisms aimed at promoting a sustainable affordable housing policy.(1)

This is not really a new argument, but the paper takes the position that existing efforts to regulate resales of affordable housing in the homeownership market can be scaled up significantly. The paper does not take on some of the bigger questions that this position implicates — for instance, should scarce homeownership dollars be spent on rental housing instead — but it does develop a concrete proposal:

This paper seeks to enrich policy design options by introducing two alternative cap-on-resale mechanisms for the affordable housing segment: “Mixed Indexed Cap” (MIC) and “Pure Indexed Cap” (PIC). It explains how such models could be utilized to attain a policy goal of promoting long-term social mobility, allowing multiple low- and modest-income households to engage in capital building by sequentially enjoying increments of appreciation of properties in the affordable housing segment.

In so doing, the paper addresses a series of challenges posed by the design of a cap-on-resale mechanism: Could such a mechanism ensure that the homeowner is granted a fair return upon resale, providing the owner with proper incentives to invest efficiently in the property during the tenure, while setting up a resale rate that would make the unit truly affordable for future homebuyers? (1)

New York Ciy has experimented with affordable homeownership and has not come up with an ideal solution to the problem of affordability upon resale. Given the renewed focus on affordable housing policy in NYC, this attention to affordable homeownership policy is most welcome.

Reforming NYC’s Property Tax Regime

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Andrew Hayashi has posted Property Taxes and Their Limits: Evidence from New York City to SSRN. There probably could not be a more obscure and dull topic than this to the general reader (and coming from me, as the author of this blog, that is saying something!). But for those of us who think about such things, this is an incredibly important topic that is at its heart fundamentally about fairness and treating like people alike.

Hayashi argues that

The property tax is the largest source of tax revenue for local governments. It is also an almost irresistible policy instrument for municipalities, which typically do not have control over any other tax with which to influence the urban landscape and the local distribution of income and wealth. The widespread use of the property tax for planning and redistribution means that virtually no jurisdiction straightforwardly calculates the tax liability for a property as a fixed percentage of its market value. Instead, property tax rates tend to vary with the use to which a property is put or the identity of its owner. As a consequence, many of the potential benefits of the property tax, such as ease of administration, transparency, the clear reflection of the costs and benefits of local services, and the intuitive fairness of imposing taxes in proportion to property wealth, are lost. (2, footnotes omitted)

He concludes

The property tax is a hated tax, but attempts to curtail its most offensive feature, the rapid increase in taxes that can accompany paper gains in property value, have had unintended distributional consequences that are hard to justify on policy grounds. In New York City, the caps are regressive and tend to benefit new homebuyers and sellers rather than current homeowners on fixed incomes. The caps should be replaced with a property tax circuit breaker [that limits increases for lower-income homeowners] or deferral system [that delays full payment until the property is conveyed]. (27)

This issue is even bigger than these selections suggest as there are big disparities in the tax burden among different types of property. For example similarly priced single family homes have a lower tax burden than coops or condos in multifamily properties. NYU’s Furman Center (with which Hayashi is affiliated) has studied these issues and, even better, has highlighted them as part of the De Blasio transition.

Property tax fairness is not a Republican or a Democratic issue — it is a good government issue. Hopefully, the De Blasio  Department of Finance will take up this obscure but important issue. Fairness demands it.

Reiss on “Sexy Tax Breaks” for Luxury Housing

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MainStreet.com quoted me in Luxury Real Estate with Sexy Tax Breaks. The story reads in part,

Buying a high end property doesn’t always cost a fortune for the wealthy especially if there are tax breaks attached.

Property tax deductions and even exemptions exist for buyers of luxury properties under special incentives, such as New York City’s J-51 and 421a program.

“A J-51 unit in a luxury building will likely sell for more than a comparable condo without a tax break, because monthly expenses are lower due to reduced property taxes. It’s a deal but not dollar for dollar, and that’s true everywhere you look for tax breaks in luxury properties,” said David Reiss, professor of real estate law at Brooklyn Law School.Benefits include no tax by reducing the assessed value of the property to the pre-renovated price and secondly by capping property taxes.

“These benefits phase out typically over a 14 year period for market rate properties,” Reiss told MainStreet.

Most J-51 buildings in the borough of Manhattan are above 110 Street due to state restrictions.

For example, for interested buyers there’s a two-bedroom J-51 condominum on West 140th Street available for $620,000 advertised on condo-living-west.com.

“The tax reduction will be priced into the cost of the home,” said Reiss.

A back end strategy would be to buy and sell early rather than buy early and sell late to make a profit after purchase.

“Because the closer you are to the 14 year phase out when you sell, the less of a benefit the tax break is to the owners’ sale price,” Reiss said.

The 421a program is another tax break available for new construction not rehabilitation or conversion of existing buildings in Manhattan.

For example, an owner in a $90 million duplex penthouse in Midtown Manhattan would normally pay $230,000 in taxes without an abatement and $20,000 in taxes under an abatement program.

About 150,000 units in New York City receive partial tax exemptions under 421a.

The downside is that taxes gradually go up as the abatement is phased out.