Tag Archives: standing

Stand-Offish

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Judge Swain (SDNY) issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. in which she followed “the weight of caselaw throughout the country” to effectively hold that “a non-party to a [Pooling and Servicing Agreement lacks standing to assert non-compliance with the PSA as a claim or defense unless the non-party is an intended (not merely incidental) third party beneficiary of the PSA.” (6) The Opinion cites a number of cases to that effect.

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KeAupuni Akina, Brad Borden and I will be posting a draft of an article on the “Show Me The Note!” foreclosure defense soon.  There is a real thicket of cases addressing the extent to which homeowners can raise real and evidentiary problems with the loan documents.  The general rule seems to be that courts do not find these problems to be germane to the homeowner’s foreclosure, eviction or bankruptcy proceeding.  There are exceptions, however, such as the Eaton v. Fannie Mae case which held that the Show Me The Note defense would apply prospectively in Massachusetts. But more often than not, courts stick closely to the language of their jurisdiction’s foreclosure statute which tend not to touch upon many issues that arise from the complexities of the securitization process through which these mortgages have traveled.

Massachusetts District Court Holds that MERS, as Mortgagee and Nominee for Lender, has Authority to Assign Mortgage

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The court in Rosa v. Mortg. Elec. Sys., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D. Mass. 2011) held that the assignee bank had standing to foreclose on the homeowners. The homeowners argued that the bank did not have standing because MERS lacked authority to assign the mortgage. They made several arguments as to why MERS lacked authority, including (1) the original noteholder did not authorize the assignment; (2) MERS could only act as nominee for the original noteholder, who dissolved in 2008; and (3) MERS did not hold the note at the time of assignment, and thus could not assign what it did not hold.

First, the court looked at MERS’s authority to assign the mortgage. The court rejected the homeowner’s argument, stating, “[s]ince Massachusetts law does not require a signatory to prove authority to execute a mortgage assignment, a mortgagee need not prove authorization from the note holder to assign a mortgage.” The court then held that the assignment by MERS to the assignee bank was valid because MERS was a mortgagee under the terms of the mortgage agreement.

Next, the court determined that the original noteholder’s dissolution had no effect on MERS’s authority to assign. The court held, “[the original noteholder’s] dissolution [did not] terminate MERS’ nominee relationship with a successor purchaser or assignee of the Note or affect MERS'[s] status as mortgagee. . . . As mortgagee, MERS continued to hold the Mortgage in trust for whomever happened to own the Note.”

Finally, the court rejected the argument that MERS must hold the note in order to assign the mortgage. They found this argument contrary to case law. The court stated, “In Massachusetts, the mortgage does not automatically follow the note and the mortgage and the note may be held by different parties. . . . An assignor of a mortgage is not required to have possession of or beneficial interest in the note in order to assign the mortgage because it holds the mortgage in trust for the note holder. ” Thus, MERS had authority to assign the mortgage despite not being in possession of the underlying note.

Massachusetts Superior Court Holds that Assignee of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities has Standing to Seek Statutory Damages

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In Cambridge Place Inv. Mgmt., Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 10-2741-BLS1, 2012 WL 5351233, at *20 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Co. Sept. 28, 2012), the Superior Court of Massachusetts held that Cambridge Place Investment Management, Inc. (CPIM), as assignee of residential mortgage backed securities, had standing to seek damages under the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act (MUSA) that resulted from alleged false and/or misleading statements made by the “underwriters, dealers, and depositors of the securities at issue.” In this case, the assignor of the securities was a group of nine hedge funds that had received advice from CPIM to purchase the securities at issue. The securities turned out to produce “substantial losses” for the hedge funds. In order to recoup their losses, CPIM further advised the hedge funds to assign the securities to it, so that it could bring an action in Massachusetts state court.

The underwriters, dealers, and depositors of the securities (Morgan Stanley) argued that CPIM lacked standing for three reasons: “First, [Morgan Stanley] contend[s] that the assignments of claims were done for an “improper purpose”—to collusively destroy federal diversity jurisdiction. . . . Second, [Morgan Stanely] argue[s] that the remedies under MUSA are only available to the direct purchaser of the securities, and, as assignee, CPIM lacks privity with [Morgan Stanely]. . . . Third, [Morgan Stanley] assert[s] that CPIM lacks standing to seek the rescission of the securities because rescission is a personal right that is not assignable.” The court addressed these arguments, rejecting each in turn.

The court held that the first argument must be rejected because “[e]ven if the assignments were made collusively to destroy federal diversity jurisdiction, that, in itself, does not invalidate them. . . . [T]hat the assignments were improperly made to CPIM only affects their validity under federal jurisdictional law, and do not affect their validity under state law.” The court found that for this argument to be accepted, Morgan Stanley needed to show “additional facts to invalidate the assignments under state law.”

The court then rejected Morgan Stanley’s second argument. In doing so, it characterized CPIM as an investment advisor, and applied a functional test “based on the decision-making authority that the investment advisor possessed.” Quoting a Massachusetts district court case, the court stated the test as follows: “as long as the investment advisor has discretion in determining what securities to buy and sell, it qualifies as a purchaser with standing to bring a securities fraud action.” The court then found that CPIM sufficiently alleged that it had discretion in determining what securities to buy and sell.

The court finally rejected Morgan Stanley’s final argument, stating, “The court is unwilling to conclude that CPIM’s claim is ‘personal’ and not subject to assignment. . . . Accordingly, CPIM is entitled to assert all available statutory remedies, including rescission.”

New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department Holds that MERS has Standing to Foreclose

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In Mtge. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674 (2d Dept. 2007), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department found that MERS had standing to foreclose on the homeowner. The court held, “[t]he record shows that the promissory note was. . . ultimately transferred and tendered to MERS. Therefore, at the time of the commencement of this action, MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note and of the mortgage, which passed as an incident to the promissory note. . . . Moreover, further support for MERS’s standing to commence the action may be found on the face of the mortgage instrument itself. Pursuant to the clear and unequivocal terms of the mortgage instrument, Coakley expressly agreed without qualification that MERS had the right to foreclose upon the premises in the event of a default.” Thus, in this case MERS was able to prove that it held both the mortgage and the underlying note, which was enough for the court to determine that MERS had standing to foreclose.