Tag Archives: neglect of duty

United States v. CFPB

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photo by AgnosticPreachersKid

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, E. Barrett Prettyman Federal Courthouse

The Trump Administration has filed an amicus brief in PHH Corp. v. CFPB. The case is schedule for an en banc hearing in May. The filing is particularly newsworthy because the Trump Administration is siding with PHH, a mortgage lender, against the CFPB, a federal agency. The Trump Administration summarizes its position as follows:

In 2010, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, giving the CFPB authority to enforce U.S. consumer-protection laws that had previously been administered by seven different government agencies, as well as new provisions added by Dodd-Frank itself. See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b). The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years, id. § 5491(b), (c)(1), and who may be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” id. § 5491(c)(3).

The panel in this case held that this “for cause” removal provision violates the constitutional separation of powers. Op. 9-10. The panel explained—and neither party disputes—that, as a general matter, the President has “Article II authority to supervise, direct, and remove at will subordinate [principal] officers in the Executive Branch” in order to exercise his vested power and duty to faithfully execute the laws. Op. 4. The panel recognized as well that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), established an exception to that rule, holding that Congress may “forbid [the] removal except for cause” of members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—a holding that has been understood to cover members of other multi-member regulatory commissions that share certain features and functions with the FTC. Op. 4.

The principal constitutional question in this case is whether the exception to the President’s removal authority recognized in Humphrey’s Executor should be extended by this Court beyond multi-member regulatory commissions to an agency headed by a single Director. While we do not agree with all of the reasoning in the panel’s opinion, the United States agrees with the panel’s conclusion that single-headed agencies are meaningfully different from the type of multi-member regulatory commission addressed in Humphrey’s Executor.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Humphrey’s Executor was premised on the nature of the FTC as a continuing deliberative body, composed of several members with staggered terms to maintain institutional expertise and promote a measure of stability that would not be immediately undermined by political vicissitudes. A single-headed agency, of course, lacks those critical structural attributes that have been thought to justify “independent” status for multi-member regulatory commissions. Moreover, because a single agency head is unchecked by the constraints of group decision-making among members appointed by different Presidents, there is a greater risk that an “independent” agency headed by a single person will engage in extreme departures from the President’s executive policy. And as the panel recognized, while multi-member regulatory commissions sharing the characteristics of the FTC discussed in Humphrey’s Executor have existed for over a century, limitations on the President’s authority to remove a single agency head are a recent development to which the Executive Branch has consistently objected.

We therefore urge the Court to decline to extend the exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor in this case. (1-2)

This is of course an obscure argument about administrative law jurisprudence, but it also has serious real world consequences. I have previously argued that the panel reached the wrong result in this case and I think that the en banc Court will overturn it.

This amicus brief does not add too much to the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh’s majority opinion in PHH v. CFPB, although it does flesh out one important argument that it made. The brief provides some support for the position that multi-member commissions are better suited to run independent agencies than single directors. But while it makes the case that single director agencies may not be the best choice for agency design, it does not make the case that it is an unconstitutional one.

 

Testing CFPB’s Constitutionality

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by Junius Brutus Stearns

Law360 quoted me in PHH Case Poised To Test CFPB’s Constitutionality (behind a paywall). It opens,

A battle over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s interpretation of mortgage regulations in assessing a $109 million penalty against a New Jersey-based mortgage firm has morphed into a fight over the authority vested in the bureau’s director that could reshape the consumer finance watchdog, experts say.

The appeal from PHH Corp. to the D.C. Circuit originally centered on CFPB Director Richard Cordray’s decision to dramatically hike a $6 million mortgage insurance kickback penalty issued by an administrative law judge against a company subsidiary, to the final, $109 million figure. But the judges hearing the case warned the bureau to prepare to answer questions at oral arguments Tuesday about language in the Dodd-Frank Act that says the president could remove the CFPB director only for cause, and about how the court should view an administrative agency led by a single director rather than the more typical commission structure.

Those questions have been hanging over the CFPB since its inception in the 2010 law, and if the D.C. Circuit rules against the bureau, that could fundamentally alter the way the bureau operates, said Jonathan Pompan, a partner at Venable LLP.

Cordray “is potentially going to have to address questions that go to the core of his authority, which really hadn’t been at the forefront of the PHH case until now,” he said.

Challenges to the CFPB’s constitutionality are not new. Everything from the bureau’s single-director rather than commission structure to the agency’s funding through the Federal Reserve’s budget rather than the congressional appropriations process have been constant refrains for the CFPB’s opponents.

Those concerns have been addressed through legislation aimed at curtailing the CFPB’s power, and claims challenging the agency’s constitutionality have been an almost pro forma rite of any litigation involving the bureau.

Up until now, however, those complaints and attempts to curb the CFPB have gone nowhere.

So it was a surprise when the D.C. Circuit last Wednesday told the bureau’s attorneys to be prepared to face questions about whether Dodd-Frank’s provision stating that the president can remove the CFPB director only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” passed constitutional muster.

The panel, made up of three Republican appointees led by U.S. Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, is also seeking answers about potential remedies for any problems that that provision brings, including potentially removing it from the statute and allowing the president to remove the CFPB director without any specific cause.

The judges also want to know how any fix to the problem, if they determine there is one, would affect the CFPB director’s authority.

“This is not, by any stretch of the imagination, idle thinking on their part,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The questions being posed by the D.C. Circuit panel do not pose the same level of threat that the other constitutional challenges the CFPB could potentially face would, but it is certainly a more defining question than what most observers thought the case would be about.

PHH is challenging Cordray’s interpretation of violations under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act that allowed him to supersize a $6 million penalty handed down by an administrative law judge, to the $109 million that the CFPB director handed down when PHH appealed.

But the arguments set for Tuesday are expected to go far beyond that issue.

There will be the central question of whether the U.S. Constitution allows Congress to put in restrictions on when the president can fire officials at an administrative agency. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed these issues in the 2010 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board decision, which affirmed a D.C. Circuit ruling that such protections were constitutional.

Judge Kavanaugh cast a dissenting vote in that case, stating that a president should not have to notify Congress as to why the director of an administrative agency is removed.

“If the challenges were going to be taken seriously anywhere, it was probably going to be this panel,” said Brian Simmonds Marshall, policy counsel at Americans for Financial Reform, which seeks tougher banking regulations.

Removing that provision from the statute, should the D.C. Circuit elect to do so, could limit the CFPB’s independence, as well as that of other administrative agencies for which statute requires a reason for the dismissal of officials, he said.

“The CFPB doesn’t have to check with the White House right now before it brings an enforcement action,” Simmonds Marshall said.

Another case that will be heavily scrutinized will be a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., which allowed for restrictions on the removal of Federal Trade Commission commissioners.

The CFPB relied heavily on that case in its filings with the D.C. Circuit, noted Benjamin Saul, a partner at White & Case LLP.

“I’ll be looking for the questions being driven by Judge Kavanaugh and his comments from the bench, particularly on the Humphrey’s case,” Saul said.

Whether the arguments focus mostly on the constitutional questions about the ability to remove the CFPB director or on remedies to fix that could also indicate where the court is headed on these questions, according to Reiss.

“It does sound that they’re searching for remedies that are not earth-shattering remedies,” Reiss said.