SEC To Focus on Structured Finance Ratings

A SEC staff study looks at three ways to reform the manner in which ratings are produced for structured finance securities.

The study, required by Dodd-Frank, addresses

(1) The credit rating process for structured finance products and the conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models;

(2) The feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) assigns NRSROs to determine the credit ratings for structured finance products, including:

(a) An assessment of potential mechanisms for determining fees for NRSROs for rating structured finance products;
(b) Appropriate methods for paying fees to NRSROs to rate structured finance products;
(c) The extent to which the creation of such a system would be viewed as the creation of moral hazard by the Federal Government; and

(d) Any constitutional or other issues concerning the establishment of such a system;5

(3) The range of metrics that could be used to determine the accuracy of credit ratings for structured finance products;6 and
(4) Alternative means for compensating NRSROs that would create incentives for accurate credit ratings for structured finance products.

 

NCUA Sues JP Morgan over MBS Representations

The National Credit Union Administration has sued J.P. Morgan Securities and Bear, Stearns & Co. for alleged securities laws violations relating to the sale of mortgage-backed securities to 4 credit unions that are now in NCUA conservatorship.  According to the complaint, Bear Stearns (now owned by JPMorgan) made misrepresentations to the purchasing credit unions as part of its underwriting and sales of the MBS.  The press release notes that NCUA has initiated eight similar suits against a variety of financial institutions.

One of the representations at issue states that “a mortgage loan will be considered to be originated in accordance with a given set of underwriting standards if, based on an overall qualitative evaluation, the loan is in substantial compliance with those underwriting standards.” (Complaint paragraph 408, page 170)

Given what we know about a lot of the securities that were issued, it is hard to imagine that reps like this were not violated for many of them.

CFPB Issues Fair Lending Report That Highlights Data Collection

The Fair Lending Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau provides an overview of the Bureau’s actions over the last year.  Some of the most interesting elements of the report relate to future HMDA and TILA rulemaking:

Section 1094 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends HMDA to require the collection and submission of additional data fields related to mortgage loans, including certain applicant, loan, and property characteristics, as well as “such other information as the Bureau may require.” The CFPB is examining what changes it may propose to Regulation C. . . .

Finally, section 1403 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the CFPB prescribe regulations under TILA to prohibit “abusive or unfair lending practices that promote disparities among consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race, ethnicity, gender or age. The CFPB has begun preliminary planning with regard to this rule. (26) (emphasis added)

Data collection about borrower and mortgage characteristics is very fraught.  Lenders have typically fought against efforts to increase such data collection as it could only hurt them if others knew their business so well.  Academics and consumer advocates have complained that data about the mortgage market is very hard to come by unless one had massive financial resources to pay private providers for it.

This was especially true, given the rapid rate of change in that market.  Working with data that is twelve months old was the same as working with outdated information during the Boom years of the early 2000s.  If the CFPB collects and analyzes data in something approximating real-time, it will be far more nimble than previous regulators.  If it shares its data with outside researchers, it is likely to become even more sophisticated in its approach to the dynamic housing finance sector.

Levitin and Wachter’s New History of American Housing Finance

Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter have released a very interesting paper on The Public Option in Housing Finance.  The paper provides a history of the development of the housing finance infrastructure in the United States.  It concludes that

[t]he experience of the U.S. housing finance market teaches us that public options can only succeed as a regulatory mode in certain circumstances. A public option that coexists with private parties in the market is only effective at shaping the market if all parties in the market have to compete based on the same rules and standards. Otherwise, the result is merely market segmentation. Moreover, without basic standards applicable to all parties, the result can quickly become a race-to-the-bottom that can damage not only private parties, but also public entities.(60)

Personally, I wish they struggled more with the trillion dollar issue that they highlight in the middle of the paper:  “It is not clear how deep of a housing market can be supported if credit risk is borne by private parties rather than by government.”  (30)  As the Obama Administration seeks to impose a new order on the housing finance market that will likely last for generations, we should seek a consensus (or as close to one as we can) among policymakers as to how much credit risk the private sector can take when it comes to mortgages secured by single and multifamily housing.  Personally, I believe it can handle a lot more than we give it credit for.

CRL Issues Report on State of Lending

The Center for Responsible Lending has issued a new report, The State of Lending in America and its Impact on U.S. Households.  CRL, Cassandra-like, warned of an epidemic of millions of foreclosures at the height of the Subprime Boom, so they have a lot of street cred.  And while they are consumer advocates, their research is solid.

Their policy recommendations include “the following key principles to ensure a robust and secure secondary market:”

Government Guarantee: The U.S. government should provide an explicit, actuarially sound guarantee for mortgages in a future secondary market structure. This is an appropriate role to for the government to play in the event of a housing-market crash or market disruption. Discussion about the role of private capital in sharing losses is an important part of the conversation, but a catastrophic government guarantee is essential to the future of mortgage finance.

Duty to Serve Entire Market: Mortgage finance reform should require secondary market entities that benefit from federal guarantees to serve all qualified homeowners, rather than preferred market segments. Without a duty to serve the entire market, lenders could recreate the dual credit market that characterized lending during the subprime crisis.

Encourage Broad Market Access by All Lenders: The future mortgage finance system should encourage competition and further broad market access to the secondary capital markets for both small and large lenders. These goals should be met by establishing a cooperative secondary market model of one non-lender entity, owned in equal shares by member-users, that is able to issue guaranteed securities. Such a model of aligned interests will correct the shortcomings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s past and also prevent a further concentrated lending marketplace in the future. (53)

Retail Trading Comes to Mortgage-Backed Securities

In a recent paper, Bessembinder et al. look at the implications of FINRA’s proposal to disseminate trade prices for structured products like mortgage-backed securities to the public.  They evaluate how price transparency has impacted the corporate bond market and find that it “increased bonds’ propensity to trade and increased overall volume.”  (24)  They note that trading costs shrank.  They argue that the same impact may be felt in structured product markets.

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It is unclear what this change will mean for the homeowner, but it would seem to mean that there will be a reduction in interest expense and an increase in liquidity in the market for credit but perhaps also an increase in the role that “animal spirits” will play as the business cycle inexorably turns from bust to plateau to boom to bust . . ..

Opposition to FHFA Increase in Guaranty Fees for States with Lengthy Foreclosures

Senators from the five affected states have written a letter to the FHFA’s DeMarco.  This debate presents a choice between risk-based pricing on the one hand and what is generally considered a pro-homeowner legal regime on the other.

The FHFA’s notice is here.