Author Archives: Ebube Okoli

U.S. Bank Had Standing to Bring Action

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The court in deciding United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. McHugh, 2013-Ohio-5473 (Ohio Ct. App., Lucas County, 2013) affirmed the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.

In their sole assignment of error, McHugh argued that US Bank did not have standing to pursue the underlying foreclosure action. US Bank responded by arguing that McHugh’s argument was misplaced in that it failed to address the applicable standard for a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Further, US Bank argued that the trial court’s decision was proper in light of McHugh’s failure to meet the standard for Civ.R. 60(B) motions.

Ultimately the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

Connecticut Court Denies All Five of Defendant’s Special Defenses to Foreclosure Action

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Samaha, 2013 Conn. Super. (Conn. Super. Ct., 2013) granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In this action, the plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage executed by Joseph Samaha and Denise Samaha in favor of the Webster Bank.

The defendant raised several special defenses to this foreclosure action. First, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this litigation. Second, defendant claimed that as a result of the death of one of the makers of the note, Joseph Samaha, that his estate had an indivisible interest in the subject property and was subject to probate court jurisdiction. Third, the defendant challenged the authority of MERS to assign this mortgage to the plaintiff. Fourth, the defendant alleged that she had tendered payment with regard to the note and she alleged accord and satisfaction. Fifth, the defendant challenged whether or not the note in question was a negotiable instrument.

With regard to the first special defense, the court found that the affidavits supplied by the plaintiff established that they had standing for the purposes of doing this litigation.

In regards to the second defense, the court found that there was simply no authority for this assertion. The third special defense challenged the authority of the MERS to assign the note and mortgage. The court found that there were no facts alleged in the special defense and there was no affidavit from the defendant providing any factual foundation for her assertions.

The court found that the fourth defense was a mere assertion, without any evidence to support it, and thereby contest or create a material issue of fact for a motion of summary judgment is insufficient. Finally, the fifth special defense was deemed to be an assertion of a legal conclusion.

Tennessee Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim

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The court in deciding Amour v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Tenn., 2013) granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss

The plaintiffs brought three separate causes of action each of which the defendant moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 47-18-101, et seq., and wrongful foreclosure.

The court ultimately decided to allow all but the one of the plaintiffs’ claims. The one cause of action dismissed was the TCPA claim.

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.

Texas Court Rejects Claims Brought on the Grounds of “Show-me-the-Note” and “Split-the-Note” Theories

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The court in deciding Hunt v. Worldwide Mortg. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety and specifically granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud (only against MidFirst and its mortgage servicer), wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and Finance Code. The plaintiffs also sought to quiet title and declaratory relief.

Specifically, the plaintiffs argued variations of the roundly discounted “show me the note” and “split the note” theories, alleging that the defendants did not have the authority to foreclose on the Property because MERS was not holder of the note and thus was not entitled to enforce the deed of trust.

The plaintiffs also contended MidFirst perpetrated a fraud by misrepresenting that it was the holder or beneficiary of the deed of trust entitled to receive mortgage payments on the note, thus collecting on a debt that it had “no legal, equitable or pecuniary interest in.”

Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, arguing that the defendant had failed to produce the note and that it is very likely that the defendant was not the holder of the note.

Defendants’ moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, this was granted by the court.

Alabama Court Rejects “Split-the-Note” Theory

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The court in deciding Gray v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ala., 2013) rejected the split the note theory put forward by Gray.

This matter arose out of a note and mortgage executed in March 2007 by plaintiffs Clayburn Kyle Gray and Carrie Ann Gray, defendant Quicken Loans, Inc., and defendant MERS.

Plaintiffs’ resulting suit primarily consisted of two allegations: (1) that the defendant Quicken wrongfully and deceptively caused the plaintiffs’ entire ten-acre property to be encompassed by the mortgage and (2) that the defendant OneWest, to whom the mortgage was subsequently assigned by defendant MERS, was incapable of foreclosing on the mortgaged property, due to “a separation of the note and mortgage in this cause.”

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, this was subsequently granted. The court noted that Alabama courts, have roundly rejected the “split the note” theory, thus rendering it ineffective and inapplicable in the present case.

Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity

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The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).

The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.