Reiss on $1.5B S&P Settlement

Westlaw Journal Derivatives quoted me in S&P Settles Fraud Suits for $1.5 Billion. The story reads in part,

Standard & Poor’s has agreed to pay $1.5 billion to settle lawsuits filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, 19 states and a pension fund that accused the ratings agency of damaging the economy by inflating credit ratings in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

According to a statement issued Feb. 3 by S&P, a subsidiary of McGraw-Hill Cos, the ratings agency will pay $687.5 million each to the DOJ and the states. It also will pay $125 million to settle a lawsuit filed by California Public Employees’ Retirement System. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. Moody’s Corp. et al., No. CGC-09-490241, complaint filed (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. County July 9, 2009).

The parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on Feb. 4.

“After careful consideration, the company determined that entering into the settlement agreement is in the best interests of the company and its shareholders and is pleased to resolve these matters,” McGraw-Hill said in the statement.

S&P did not admit to any wrongdoing in agreeing to settle.

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced the settlement for the Justice Department and states.

“On more than one occasion, the company’s leadership ignored senior analysts who warned that the company had given top ratings to financial products that were failing to perform as advertised,” he said in a statement.

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David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, also said the settlement closes an important chapter of the crisis.

“S&P would have faced a lot of unquantifiable risk if it had to admit wrongdoing in the settlement,” he said. “It is unclear that the Justice Department would have wanted to expose one of the three major rating agencies to such a risk because it could have destabilized the rating agency industry.”

Reiss added that the $1.5 billion settlement should have a deterrent effect.

”[It] likely gives ratings analysts some firm ground to stand on if they are pressured to lower their standards by others in their organizations,” he said. (1, 18-19)

The article also has a sidebar that reads,

Ratings agencies had avoided liability for their actions for quite some time based on the theory that they were First Amendment actors who dealt in opinions.

Recent cases have held that the rating agencies can be held liable for some of their ratings notwithstanding the First Amendment. United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos. et al., No. 13-CV-0779, 2013 WL 3762259 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) and Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Financial Inc. et al., No. 11-10952, 2013 WL 5466631 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2013).

For instance, if the rating agency did not follow its own rating procedures, it could be held liable for fraud.

David Reiss, Brooklyn Law School (18)

Reiss on Financial Crisis Litigation

Law360 quoted me in Feds’ Moody’s Probe Marks Closing Of Financial Crisis Book (behind a paywall). It opens,

A reported investigation into Moody’s Investors Service’s ratings of residential mortgage-backed securities during the housing bubble era could be the beginning of the last chapter in the U.S. Department of Justice’s big financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

Federal prosecutors are reportedly making their way through the ratings agencies for their alleged wrongdoings prior to the financial crisis after wringing out more than $100 billion from banks and mortgage servicers for their roles in inflating the housing bubble. But the passage of time, the waning days of the Obama administration and the few remaining rich targets likely means that the financial industry and prosecutors will soon put financial crisis-era enforcement actions behind them, said Jim Keneally, a partner at Harris O’Brien St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

“I do look at this as sort of the tail end of things,” he said.

With the ink not yet dry on a rumored $1.375 billion settlement between the Justice Department, state attorneys general and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, prosecutors have already reportedly turned their attention to the ratings practices at S&P’s largest rival, Moody’s, in the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The federal government and attorneys general in 19 states and Washington, D.C., had launched several suits since the financial crisis accusing S&P of assigning overly rosy ratings to mortgage-backed securities and other bond deals that ended up imploding amid a wave of defaults, causing a cascade of investor losses that amounted to billions of dollars.

Although S&P originally elected to fight the government, it ultimately elected to settle. The coming $1.375 billion settlement arrives on top of an earlier $77 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the attorneys general of New York and Massachusetts over similar claims.

Moody’s is reportedly next in line, with Justice Department investigators reportedly having had several meetings with officials from the ratings agency that looked into whether the Moody’s Corp. unit had softened its ratings of subprime RMBS in order to win business as the housing bubble inflated.

Both the Justice Department and Moody’s declined to comment for this story.

The pursuit of Moody’s as the S&P case wraps up follows a pattern that the Justice Department set with big bank settlements for the financial crisis.

“You would expect that they would sweep through, so to speak,” said Thomas O. Gorman, a partner with Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

After reaching a $13 billion deal with JPMorgan Chase & Co. in November 2014, the Justice Department quickly turned its attention to Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., which reached their own multibillion-dollar settlements last summer.

Now prosecutors are in talks with Morgan Stanley about another large settlement, according to multiple reports.

All of those deals follow the $25 billion national mortgage settlement from 2012 that targeted banks’ pre-crisis mortgage servicing practices.

Time may be catching up with the Justice Department more than six years following the height of the crisis, even after the Justice Department began employing novel uses of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, a 1989 law passed following the savings and loan crisis, Keneally said.

Using FIRREA extended the statute of limitations on financial crisis-era cases, allowing for prosecutors to develop their cases and take a systematic approach. Even that statute may have run its course, as it pertains to the crisis.

“The passage of time is such that you have evidence that no longer exists,” Keneally said.

Politics may also play a role as the financial crisis recedes from memory and the next holder of the presidency potentially looks to move forward, he said.

“We’re getting to the end of the Obama administration,” Keneally said. “I think it’s going to be hard for any administration to ramp things up again.”

And that has some wondering whether the Obama administration and the Justice Department under Attorney General Eric Holder followed the correct path.

“The Justice Department and the states’ attorneys general collected far more in their penalties and settlements than anyone could have imagined before the financial crisis,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

Those large settlements may give investors and top management pause when it comes to questionable activity. However, because no traders or other top banking personnel went to prison, questions remain about what deterrent effect those settlements will have on individuals.

“Big institutions are now probably deterred from some of this behavior, but are individuals who work on these institutions deterred?” Reiss said.

Reiss on Catching FIRREA

Inside ABS & MBS quoted me in Experts: New AG Likely to Continue Aggressive Use of FIRREA Against Industry, Individual Executives Targeted (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

Mortgage industry executives should be aware and expect continued – and perhaps even more muscular – use of a 1989 federal law by government prosecutors to pursue mortgage-related claims. At the direction of Attorney General Eric Holder, the Department of Justice embraced the use of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) in MBS lawsuits. Despite Holder’s announcement late last month that he is stepping down after six years as AG, there is little reason to expect that President Obama’s new attorney general will surrender use of such a “potent statute” that has employed a lower burden of proof and long statute of limitations to exact large tribute from the mortgage industry, according to Marjorie Peerce of the Ballard Spahr law firm.

*     *    *

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss agrees. He added that throughout President Obama’s term, the White House at the highest level has set an agenda for corporate accountability so it’s likely that one of the chief mandates of Holder’s successor will be the continuation of the DOJ’s vigorous use of tools such as FIRREA.

During a speech last month prior to announcing his resignation, Holder called for making the FIRREA statute even stronger, with whistleblower bounties raised to induce more testimony. However, Reiss noted it’s unlikely the White House would be keen to encourage lawmakers to take another look at FIRREA given that Congress next year will likely be in Republican hands.

However, Reiss called attention to a part of Holder’s speech where the AG expressed frustration with the DOJ’s inability to hold financial services executives criminally liable for alleged misconduct. Holder suggested several ways for the DOJ to do so, including extending the “responsible corporate officer doctrine” to the financial services industry.

Under this doctrine, an individual may be prosecuted criminally under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act even absent culpable intent or knowledge of wrongdoing if the executive was in a position to prevent the wrongdoing and failed to do so.

“Focusing on individual culpability could be a new charge of the new attorney general,” said Reiss. “Given the events of the last 10 years, [a significant number of] people think that fewer individuals were held accountable for the financial crisis than should have been, so I think the Department of Justice may have heard that message as well.”

Reiss on Citigroup Settlement

Law360 quoted me in Feds Deploy Potent Bank Fraud Law In $7B Citi Pact (behind a paywall). It reads in part:

The U.S. Department of Justice’s $7 billion mortgage bond settlement with Citigroup Inc. on Monday may not have been possible without the help of a once-obscure fraud law that has become a legal magic wand for prosecutors.

Citigroup’s settlement included a $4 billion civil fine under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, the largest such penalty in history. FIRREA was passed in the wake of the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis but has been dusted off in recent years as prosecutors have targeted major Wall Street banks that packaged and sold toxic residential mortgage-backed securities before the 2008 economic collapse.

The law’s government-friendly provisions are well-documented. FIRREA contains a 10-year statute of limitations, rather than the typical five-year window for fraud suits. That has permitted the government to comfortably sue banks over conduct that occurred in 2006 and 2007, when many of the shoddy loans implicated in the crisis were securitized. Prosecutors can use tolling agreements to keep potential claims alive even longer.

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The sheer size of the government’s FIRREA fines thus far, combined with the lack of case law underpinning the statute, has placed banks and their defense counsel in a difficult negotiating position, according to David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“The message for people in negotiations is: Expect to pay a lot, or else, the government is going to call your bluff,” Reiss said. “It’s the Wild West for civil penalties.”

Monday’s settlement relates to Citigroup’s due diligence on loans that were packaged into securities and sold to investors for tens of billions of dollars. According to an agreed-upon statement of facts, the bank “received information indicating that, for certain loan pools, significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations provided to investors about the pools of loans to be securitized.”

In one case, a Citigroup trader wrote an internal email questioning the quality of loans in mortgage-backed securities issued in 2007. The trader said that he “went through the diligence reports and think that we should start praying … I would not be surprised if half of these loans went down.”

The bank did not admit to breaking any particular law, and neither it nor any individual employees were criminally charged. At the same time, DOJ officials were quick to point out that the settlement did not release Citigroup or any individuals from potential criminal liability.

Reiss said the threat of criminal prosecution could become a hallmark of FIRREA cases, giving banks another cause for concern.

“That again demonstrates a lot of leverage on the side of the government,” Reiss said. “It’s a powerful tool to keep in your back pocket.”

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.

Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity

The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).

The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.

Hawaii Court Holds that Debtor had Standing to Enforce Note and Mortgage Under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 490:3-301(ii) Even Though it was a Non-Holder

The court in deciding 1250 Oceanside Partners v. Katcher, 2013 Bankr. (D. Haw. 2013) recommended that the district court enter a decree of foreclosure in favor of the debtor.

The debtor in possession of 1250 Oceanside Partners sought to enforce a promissory note and foreclose a mortgage made by defendants, the Katchers. Oceanside sought summary judgment, the Katchers argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, that Oceanside was not entitled to foreclose, and that if it was entitled to foreclose, it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment.

The court found that there was no dispute as to any material fact and that Oceanside was entitled to foreclose on the property, but it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment against the Katchers at this stage in the litigation.

The court held that the debtor had standing to enforce the note and mortgage under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 490:3-301(ii) even though it was a non-holder, as it was in possession of the note and had the rights of a holder. The court also found that the mortgagors’ defenses to foreclosure were based entirely on debtor’s failure to develop a project as the purchase contract required, but the terms of the purchase contract provided that the mortgagors’ claims against debtor would be decided separately from debtor’s foreclosure claims. Moreover, the debtor’s claim for a deficiency judgment related to monetary damages or costs and thus, was subject to arbitration under the agreement.