Tag Archives: Bank of America

Reiss on Countrywide Verdict

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Law360 interviewed me in DOJ’s Countrywide Win Could Force More Bank Settlements (behind a paywall).  The story opens

The U.S. Department of Justice’s victory in a case against Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide subsidiary over a housing-bubble-era mortgage program shows the power of a 1980s fraud statute, and could further encourage banks to settle future financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

A federal jury in New York on Wednesday unanimously found that Countrywide Financial Corp. and one of its former executives defrauded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a program designed to speed up mortgage issuing in 2007 and 2008.

The court victory was significant in part because of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara’s use of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law that grew out of the 1980’s savings-and-loan crisis, to bring a case over the 2007-09 financial crisis. With a fairly low standard of proof and a 10-year statute of limitations, a jury’s verdict based on FIRREA bodes well for future government cases, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“This successful use of FIRREA makes it much more likely that financial institutions are going to settle with the government,” he said.

Glaski Full of It?

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I had blogged about Glaski v. Bank of America, No. F064556 (7/31/13, Cal. 5th App. Dist.) soon after it was decided, arguing that it did not bode well for REMICs that did not comply with the rules governing REMICS that are contained in the Internal Revenue Code. The case is highly controversial. Indeed, the mere question of whether it should be a published opinion or not has been highly contested, with the trustee now asking that the case be depublished. The request for depublication is effectively a brief to the California Supreme Court that argues that Glaski was wrongly decided.

Because of its significance, there has been a lot of discussion about the case in the blogosphere. Here is Roger Bernhardt‘s (Golden Gate Law School) take on it, posted to the DIRT listserv and elsewhere:

If some lenders are reacting with shock and horror to this decision, that is probably only because they reacted too giddily to Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 CA4th 1149 (reported at 34 CEB RPLR 66 (Mar. 2011)) and similar decisions that they took to mean that their nonjudicial foreclosures were completely immune from judicial review. Because I think that Glaski simply holds that some borrower foreclosure challenges may warrant factual investigation (rather than outright dismissal at the pleading stage), I do not find this decision that earth-shaking.

Two of this plaintiff’s major contentions were in fact entirely rejected at the demurrer level:

-That the foreclosure was fraudulent because the statutory notices looked robosigned (“forged”); and

-That the loan documents were not truly transferred into the loan pool.

Only the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure count survived into the next round. If the bank can show that the documents were handled in proper fashion, it should be able to dispose of this last issue on summary judgment.

Bank of America appeared to not prevail on demurrer on this issue because the record did include two deed of trust assignments that had been recorded outside the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) period and did not include any evidence showing that the loan was put into the securitization pool within the proper REMIC period. The court’s ruling that a transfer into a trust that is made too late may constitute a void rather than voidable transfer (to not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the other assets in the trust) seems like a sane conclusion. That ruling does no harm to securitization pools that were created with proper attention to the necessary timetables. (It probably also has only slight effect on loans that were improperly securitized, other than to require that a different procedure be followed for their foreclosure.)

In this case, the fact that two assignments of a deed of trust were recorded after trust closure proves almost nothing about when the loans themselves were actually transferred into the trust pool, it having been a common practice back then not to record assignments until some other development made recording appropriate. I suspect that it was only the combination of seeing two “belatedly” recorded assignments and also seeing no indication of any timely made document deposits into the trust pool that led to court to say that the borrower had sufficiently alleged an invalid (i.e., void) attempted transfer into the trust. Because that seemed to be a factual possibility, on remand, the court logically should ask whether the pool trustee was the rightful party to conduct the foreclosure of the deed of trust, or whether that should have been done by someone else.

While courts may not want to find their dockets cluttered with frivolous attacks on valid foreclosures, they are probably equally averse to allowing potentially meritorious challenges to wrongful foreclosures to be rejected out of hand.

Judge Rakoff Is All FIRREA-ed Up

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Law360 quoted me in a story, Rakoff Gives DOJ License To Be Bold In Bank Crackdown (behind a paywall), that reads in part,

U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff’s expansive Monday opinion backing the federal government’s $1 billion mortgage fraud suit against Bank of America Corp. leaves the U.S. Department of Justice wide latitude to use its favorite financial fraud tools in cases linked to the recent financial crisis.

Judge Rakoff’s opinion expanded his May decision allowing the Justice Department’s October suit against Bank of America over lending practices during the housing bubble and financial crisis to move forward under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act, while also explaining why portions of its case using the False Claims Act failed.

The ruling, which accepted the government’s broad view of which federally insured financial institutions can be sued under FIRREA and on what grounds, gives the government further ammunition to bring such cases in the future, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“The federal government has taken an expansive view of this phrase, and Judge Rakoff agrees that it can be read broadly in certain circumstances, such as when the affected federally insured financial institution is the alleged wrongdoer itself,” he said.

* * *

[T]he Second Circuit will look closely at other appellate rulings related to interpreting congressional intent, as well as any rulings dealing specifically with FIRREA should an appeal come its way, as many observers expect.

However, it is likely to look closely at Judge Rakoff’s opinion when rendering an ultimate decision, which is why he considered those issues, Reiss said.

“Judge Rakoff stated that this result clearly flowed from the plain language of FIRREA, so the defendants may have a hard time on appeal,” he said.

Not That I’m Complaining, But

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Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall and Sonia Steinway have posted Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints on SSRN. It is interesting both for the details it documents, but also for what it represents.  Details first:

Analyzing a new data set of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, we find that

(i) Bank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average financial institution;

(ii) consumers of some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were significantly more likely than average to dispute the company‘s response to their initial complaints; and

(iii) among companies that provide mortgages, OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks. (1)

The financial services industry has complained that the CFPB complaint system would unfairly expose companies to unverified complaints. But this kind of comparative look at financial services companies shows the great value of the CFPB’s approach. As the authors’ note, this dataset is a treasure trove for researchers and should result in helpful information for consumers and regulators alike.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant!

A REMIC Unraveling?

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An unpublished opinion, Glaski v. Bank of America, No. F064556 (7/31/13, Cal. 5th App. Dist.), presents one possible future for REMICs that failed to comply with the strict rules set for them by Congress and the IRS. Glaski, a homeowner, argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his case challenging the nonjudicial foreclosure of the deed of trust secured by his home. For my purposes, I am interested in the Court’s consideration of “whether a post-closing date transfer into a [REMIC] securitized trust is the type of defect that would render the transfer void.” (20) I am going to quote the opinion at length because the reasoning is somewhat complex:

The allegation that the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed under New York law supports the conclusion that New York law governs the operation of the trust.  New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law section 7-2.4, provides:  “If the trust is expressed in an instrument creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void.”

Because the WaMu Securitized Trust was created by the pooling and servicing  agreement and that agreement establishes a closing date after which the trust may no longer accept loans, this statutory provision provides a legal basis for concluding that the trustee’s attempt to accept a loan after the closing date would be void as an act in contravention of the trust document.

We are aware that some courts have considered the role of New York law and rejected the post-closing date theory on the grounds that the New York statute is not interpreted literally, but treats acts in contravention of the trust instrument as merely voidable.

Despite the foregoing cases, we will join those courts that have read the New York statute literally.  We recognize that a literal reading and application of the statute may not always be appropriate because, in some contexts, a literal reading might defeat the statutory purpose by harming, rather than protecting, the beneficiaries of the trust.  In this case, however, we believe applying the statute to void the attempted transfer is justified because it protects the beneficiaries of the WaMu Securitized Trust from the potential adverse tax consequence of the trust losing its status as a REMIC trust under the Internal Revenue Code.  Because the literal interpretation furthers the statutory purpose, we join the position stated by a New York court approximately two months ago:  “Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust is void.  EPTL § 7-2.4.  Therefore, the acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed, would be void.” [quoting Erobobo] Relying on Erobobo, a bankruptcy court recently concluded “that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars’ Note after the start up day is void ab initio.  As such, none of the Saldivars’ claims will be dismissed for lack of standing.”(quoting Saldivar)

We conclude that Glaski’s factual allegations regarding post-closing date attempts to transfer his deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust are sufficient to state a basis for concluding the attempted transfers were void.  As a result, Glaski has a stated cognizable claim for wrongful foreclosure under the theory that the entity invoking the power of sale (i.e., Bank of America in its capacity as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust) was not the holder of the Glaski deed of trust. (20-22, citations and footnotes omitted)

We are now seeing a trend that started with Erobobo and continued with Saldivar:  courts are finally addressing the REMIC attributes of the mortgage-backed securities at issue in downstream cases. I am not sure that the reasoning of those three cases will hold up on appeal, but it is interesting to see judges add another level of understanding to foreclosures in the age of of the mortgage-backed security.

[Hat tip April Charney]

UPDATE:  I just heard (August 8, 2013) from Richard L. Antognini, Glaski’s appellate lawyer, that the court has decided to publish this opinion. As he notes, “It now can be cited to other California and federal courts, and it is binding authority, until another court of appeal disagrees or the California Supreme Court decides to review it.”

Washington Court Holds That the Language of the Security Instrument Gave MERS Both the Authority to Foreclose and Assign the Deed of Trust

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The court Salmon v. Bank of America, MERS et al., No. 10-446 (D. Wash. May 25, 2011) dismissed claims against Bank of America and MERS. The plaintiffs argued that MERS was a “ghost-beneficiary” and as such could not be the beneficiary of a deed of trust under Washington law, as it did not have an interest in the note. The court rejected this argument, and noted that the beneficiary of a deed of trust is not required to be the note holder

The court, in their holding, noted that MERS had both the authority to foreclose and the authority to assign the deed of trust, based on the language of the security instrument.

BofA No Worm Ouroboros

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The Worm Ouroboros of myth was a gigantic serpent that encircled the earth only to bite its own tail. Judge Sweet (SDNY) has ruled that Bank of America is no modern-day Ouroboros that is so enormous that it must sue itself. In BNP Paribas Mortgage Corporation et al. v. Bank of America, N..A., No. 1:09-CV-09783 (June 6, 2013), Judge Sweet granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss in its entirety (although this did not do away with all of the plaintiffs’ claims).

The Court noted that Bank of America served “in several distinct but related capacities for” what was a type of warehouse credit facility for Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. subsidiary, Ocala. (8) In particular, BoA served “as Indenture Trustee, Collateral Agent, Depositary and Custodian” for the transaction. (8) You may remember that the chairman of TBW was sentenced to 30 years in jail for running a massive fraud, from which this case ultimately springs.

The Plaintiffs “allege that BoA had contractual duties as Collateral Agent (under the Security Agreement) and as Indenture Trustee (under the Base Indenture) to sue itself in its other capacities for breaches of the  Custodial and Depositary Agreements,  respectively, and that it breached those duties by failing to bring suit against itself for these alleged cIaims.” (15, citations omitted)

Relying on well-settled law, the Court held that the transaction documents did not require BoA to sue itself. While this case does not really cover new legal terrain, its logic brings to mind S&P’s motion to dismiss DoJ’s FIRREA case.  In that case, S&P argued that “the Complaint fails to allege that S&P possessed the requisite intent to defraud the investors in the CDOs at issue. It is more than ironic that two of the supposed ‘victims,’ Citibank and Bank of America—investors allegedly misled into buying securities by S&P’s fraudulent ratings—were the same huge financial institutions that were creating and selling the very CDOs at issue.” (3) The aftermath of the financial crisis laid much bare about the securitization process, but the utter incestuousness of it can still shock.

This is not to say that this complexity and self-dealing are per se bad. Just that it seems that the sophisticated business people who put the deals together did not think through at all what would happen if deals went south.  Will they during the next boom?  Probably not.

So what does that mean for regulators?