Tag Archives: CFPB

Fightin’ Words on Consumer Complaints

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Deloitte has issued a report, CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database: Analysis Reveals Valuable Insights, that provides valuable — but superficial insights — into the CFPB’s massive database of consumer complaints.

Deloitte’s main insights are

  • Troubled mortgages are behind the majority of the complaints – a growing trend
  • Customer misunderstanding may create more complaints than financial institution error
  • Affluent, established neighborhoods were more likely sources of complaints
  • Complaint resolution times have improved (2)

As to the second insight — customer misunderstanding may create more complaints than financial institution error — Deloitte notes that

Financial institutions have a number of options for resolving consumer complaints. They can close a complaint in favor of the consumer by offering monetary or non-monetary relief, or they can close the complaint not in favor of the consumer, perhaps providing only an explanation. The percentage of complaints closed in favor of consumers declined during the analysis period, falling from 30.9 percent in June 2012 to 18.0 percent in April 2013,6 a trend that was reflected in the monthly complaint [resolutions] for all products. (4)

The report continues, “In spite of fewer complaints closed with relief, consumers have been disputing fewer resolutions. In aggregate, the percentage of resolutions that were disputed fell from a peak of 27.9 percent in January 2012 to 18.6 percent in January 2013.” (5) Deloitte finds that “the data suggests that many complaints may be the result of customer misunderstanding or frustration rather than actual mistakes or operational errors by financial institutions.” (5)

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This conclusion seems like a big leap from the data that Deloitte has presented. I can imagine many alternative explanations for the decrease in disputes other than customer misunderstanding. For instance,

  • the consumer does not see a reasonable likelihood of a favorable resolution and abandons the complaint
  • the financial institution can point to a written policy that supports its position even if the consumer complaint had a valid basis, given the actions of the institution’s employees in a particular case
  • in the case of a mortgage complaint, the consumer is moving toward a favorable or unfavorable resolution of the issue with the financial institution on another track (e.g., HAMP, judicial foreclosure)

To be clear, I am not saying that customer misunderstanding plays an insignificant role in customer complaints.  Nor am I saying that the reasons I propose are the real reasons that that complaints do not proceed further. I am only saying that Deloitte has not presented sufficient evidence to support its claim that “customer misunderstanding may create more complaints than financial institution error.” Given that these are fightin’ words in the context of consumer protection, I would think that Deloitte would choose its words more carefully.

 

 

Financial Education: Miles to Go Before We Can Sleep Easily

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The CFPB has posted Financial Empowerment Training for Social Service Programs: A Scan of Community-Based Initiatives. The report opens well, with Gail Hillebrand, the Associate Director for Consumer Education and Engagement, noting that

Consumers need four things to be financially empowered. First, consumers need consistent access and the ability to choose among high-quality financial services. Second, consumers need sufficient information about the costs, the benefits, and the risks, of choices in the marketplace. Third, consumers need a set of financial habits and skills that constitute financial capability to help them to make the financial decisions that benefit themselves and their families. Finally, consumers need to know that they can get a better shot at achieving their own life goals if they affirmatively seek information, make choices, and take steps to control their financial lives. (1)

No argument there.

But the “scan” in this document makes me fear for a strong connection between what consumers need, as outlined above, and what existing programs are doing.  Finding 9 of the report state that “Most training initiatives targeted at case managers recommended some form of assessment of the effectiveness of the initiatives, but few tracked whether case managers were using this information with clients.” (6-7)

This was the only finding that really talked about evaluating the success of financial education/empowerment initiatives. And it indicates that programs don’t really try to measure their implementation, let alone their effectiveness.  I have earlier critiqued (and here) the CFPB’s financial education agenda and this most recent report only strengthens my belief that the CFPB should do more fundamental research on what actually helps consumers make good financial decisions before it begins to fund financial education initiatives.

CFPB Tool Puts HMDA Data on Web

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has posted an online tool to make Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data available to consumers in an easy to use format.    The Bureau notes that in 2012

there were approximately 18.7million HMDA records from 7,400 financial institutions. This information includes the majority of the country’s mortgage applications and mortgages made – known as loan “originations” – by banks, savings associations, credit unions, and mortgage companies. The public information is important because it helps show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of their communities; it gives public officials information that helps them make decisions and policies; and it sheds light on lending patterns that could be discriminatory.

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 The Bureau says that the tool

focuses on the number of mortgage applications and originations, in addition to loan purposes and loan types for 2010 through 2012. It looks specifically at first-lien, owner-occupied, one- to four- family and manufactured homes. Using the tool, the public can see nationwide summaries or they can choose interactive features that allow them to isolate the information for metropolitan areas. The public can easily explore millions of data points with these user-friendly graphs and charts.

I found one of the highlights derived from the tool particularly interesting:  “Of the nearly 13 million applications in 2012 for home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancing, more than 8 million resulted in loan originations.” (2) It will be interesting to see what Google Mashups might come from all this data.

If QRM = QM, then FICO+CLTV > DTI ?@#?!?

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The long awaited Proposed Rule that addresses the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgages has finally been released, with comments due by October 30th. The Proposed Rule’s preferred definition of a QRM is the same as a Qualified Mortgage. There is going to be a lot of comments on this proposed rule because it indicates that a QRM will not require a down payment. This is a far cry from the 20 percent down payment required by the previous proposed rule (the 20011 Proposed Rule).

There is a lot to digest in the Proposed Rule. For today’s post, I will limit myself to a staff report from the SEC, Qualified Residential Mortgage: Background Data Analysis on Credit Risk Retention, that was issued a couple of days ago about the more restrictive definition of QRM contained in the 2011 Proposed Rule.  The report’s main findings included

  • Historical loans meeting the 2011 proposed QRM definition have significantly lower SDQ [serious delinquency] rates than historical loans meeting the QM definition, but applying this definition results in significantly lower loan volume than QM.
  • FICO and combined loan-to-value (CLTV) are strong determinants of historical loan performance, while the effect of debt-to-income (DTI) is much lower.
  • Adding FICO or CLTV restrictions to the QM definition reduces SDQ rates faster than the loss of loan volume: max ratios achieved at 760 FICO and 55% CLTV. (2)

Certainly, some readers’ eyes have glazed over by now, but this is important stuff and it embodies an important debate about underwriting.  Is it better to have an easy to understand heuristic like a down payment requirement? Or is it better to have a sophisticated approach to underwriting which looks at the layering of risks like credit score, loan to value ratio, debt to income ratio and other factors?

The first approach is hard to game by homeowners, lenders and politicians seeking to be “pro-homeowner.” But it can result in less than the optimal amount of credit being made available to potential homeowners because it may exclude those homeowners who do not present an unreasonable risk of default but who do not have the resources to put together a significant down payment.

The second approach is easier to game by lenders looking to increase market share and politicians who put pressure on regulated financial institutions to expand access to credit. But it can come closer to providing the optimal amount of credit, balancing the risk of default against the opportunity to become a homeowner.

It would be interesting if the final definition of QRM were able to encompass both of these approaches somehow, so that we can see how they perform against each other.

Sloppy Servicers

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I have blogged about the Alice In Wonderland-like and Dickensian situations faced by defaulting homeowners, but now the CFPB has offered a broader look at the problems that borrowers confront when facing foreclosure. The CFPB’s Supervisory Highlights Summer 2013 profiles some of the problems in the loss mitigation field, including

  • Inconsistent borrower solicitation and communication;
  • Inconsistent loss mitigation underwriting;
  • Inconsistent waivers of certain fees or interest charges;
  • Long application review periods;
  • Missing denial notices;
  • Incomplete and disorganized servicing files;
  • Incomplete written policies and procedures; and
  • Lack of quality assurance on underwriting decisions. (14)

The CFPB also noted some serious violations in the transfer of loans between servicers: “For example, examiners found noncompliance with the requirements of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) to provide disclosures to consumers about transfers of the servicing of their loans.” (12)

They also found problems processing default-related fees: “Examiners identified a servicer that charged consumers default-related fees without adequately documenting the reasons for and amounts of the fees. Examiners also identified situations where servicers mistakenly charged borrowers default-related fees that investors were supposed to pay under investor agreements.” (13-14)

Now, obviously, not all servicers had all of these problems, but the CFPB’s findings are consistent with what many courts have described anecdotally in their opinions.  Time will tell whether the CFPB will be able to get servicers to devote the necessary resources to reduce these types of problems to more acceptable levels.

 

Not That I’m Complaining, But

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Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall and Sonia Steinway have posted Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints on SSRN. It is interesting both for the details it documents, but also for what it represents.  Details first:

Analyzing a new data set of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, we find that

(i) Bank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average financial institution;

(ii) consumers of some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were significantly more likely than average to dispute the company‘s response to their initial complaints; and

(iii) among companies that provide mortgages, OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks. (1)

The financial services industry has complained that the CFPB complaint system would unfairly expose companies to unverified complaints. But this kind of comparative look at financial services companies shows the great value of the CFPB’s approach. As the authors’ note, this dataset is a treasure trove for researchers and should result in helpful information for consumers and regulators alike.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant!

Financial Literacy Literacy

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Personally, I was disappointed by the CFPB’s Financial Literacy Annual Report. It seems to me that the Bureau’s Division of Consumer Education and Engagement is thinking too small in setting forth its research agenda. For its financial education evaluation project,

The Bureau is conducting a quantitative evaluation of two existing financial coaching programs. Financial coaching generally involves one-on-one sessions with clients to increase clients’ awareness of their financial decisions and to provide support for clients to reach financial goals mutually set by the coach and client. (46)

Seems to me that there are some fundamental questions about financial literacy that need to be studied before small, resource-intensive projects like financial coaching are. I have blogged about these issues before, but the bottom line is that there is no solid empirical evidence that financial education achieves good results in general. So why study particular initiatives?

I would like to see the Bureau engage in a broad survey of financial literacy first and then develop a research agenda that reflects the big issues, including

  • do improved disclosures improve outcomes for consumers?
  • do consumers have the basic math skills to take advantage of disclosures?
  • what useful metrics exist for measuring the impact of financial literacy initiatives?

These are just a few big questions that I would want to answer before I looked at particular programs.

The Bureau should start from the premise that we have little reason to believe that financial education works.  Let’s build up a body of knowledge from there. If we assume that it works, as the Bureau’s current research agenda implies, then that assumption can lead us on a wild goose chase as we study program, after initiative, after project, looking for that golden-egg laying goose.