Tag Archives: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

CFPB Tool Puts HMDA Data on Web

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has posted an online tool to make Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data available to consumers in an easy to use format.    The Bureau notes that in 2012

there were approximately 18.7million HMDA records from 7,400 financial institutions. This information includes the majority of the country’s mortgage applications and mortgages made – known as loan “originations” – by banks, savings associations, credit unions, and mortgage companies. The public information is important because it helps show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of their communities; it gives public officials information that helps them make decisions and policies; and it sheds light on lending patterns that could be discriminatory.

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 The Bureau says that the tool

focuses on the number of mortgage applications and originations, in addition to loan purposes and loan types for 2010 through 2012. It looks specifically at first-lien, owner-occupied, one- to four- family and manufactured homes. Using the tool, the public can see nationwide summaries or they can choose interactive features that allow them to isolate the information for metropolitan areas. The public can easily explore millions of data points with these user-friendly graphs and charts.

I found one of the highlights derived from the tool particularly interesting:  “Of the nearly 13 million applications in 2012 for home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancing, more than 8 million resulted in loan originations.” (2) It will be interesting to see what Google Mashups might come from all this data.

If QRM = QM, then FICO+CLTV > DTI ?@#?!?

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The long awaited Proposed Rule that addresses the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgages has finally been released, with comments due by October 30th. The Proposed Rule’s preferred definition of a QRM is the same as a Qualified Mortgage. There is going to be a lot of comments on this proposed rule because it indicates that a QRM will not require a down payment. This is a far cry from the 20 percent down payment required by the previous proposed rule (the 20011 Proposed Rule).

There is a lot to digest in the Proposed Rule. For today’s post, I will limit myself to a staff report from the SEC, Qualified Residential Mortgage: Background Data Analysis on Credit Risk Retention, that was issued a couple of days ago about the more restrictive definition of QRM contained in the 2011 Proposed Rule.  The report’s main findings included

  • Historical loans meeting the 2011 proposed QRM definition have significantly lower SDQ [serious delinquency] rates than historical loans meeting the QM definition, but applying this definition results in significantly lower loan volume than QM.
  • FICO and combined loan-to-value (CLTV) are strong determinants of historical loan performance, while the effect of debt-to-income (DTI) is much lower.
  • Adding FICO or CLTV restrictions to the QM definition reduces SDQ rates faster than the loss of loan volume: max ratios achieved at 760 FICO and 55% CLTV. (2)

Certainly, some readers’ eyes have glazed over by now, but this is important stuff and it embodies an important debate about underwriting.  Is it better to have an easy to understand heuristic like a down payment requirement? Or is it better to have a sophisticated approach to underwriting which looks at the layering of risks like credit score, loan to value ratio, debt to income ratio and other factors?

The first approach is hard to game by homeowners, lenders and politicians seeking to be “pro-homeowner.” But it can result in less than the optimal amount of credit being made available to potential homeowners because it may exclude those homeowners who do not present an unreasonable risk of default but who do not have the resources to put together a significant down payment.

The second approach is easier to game by lenders looking to increase market share and politicians who put pressure on regulated financial institutions to expand access to credit. But it can come closer to providing the optimal amount of credit, balancing the risk of default against the opportunity to become a homeowner.

It would be interesting if the final definition of QRM were able to encompass both of these approaches somehow, so that we can see how they perform against each other.

Sloppy Servicers

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I have blogged about the Alice In Wonderland-like and Dickensian situations faced by defaulting homeowners, but now the CFPB has offered a broader look at the problems that borrowers confront when facing foreclosure. The CFPB’s Supervisory Highlights Summer 2013 profiles some of the problems in the loss mitigation field, including

  • Inconsistent borrower solicitation and communication;
  • Inconsistent loss mitigation underwriting;
  • Inconsistent waivers of certain fees or interest charges;
  • Long application review periods;
  • Missing denial notices;
  • Incomplete and disorganized servicing files;
  • Incomplete written policies and procedures; and
  • Lack of quality assurance on underwriting decisions. (14)

The CFPB also noted some serious violations in the transfer of loans between servicers: “For example, examiners found noncompliance with the requirements of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) to provide disclosures to consumers about transfers of the servicing of their loans.” (12)

They also found problems processing default-related fees: “Examiners identified a servicer that charged consumers default-related fees without adequately documenting the reasons for and amounts of the fees. Examiners also identified situations where servicers mistakenly charged borrowers default-related fees that investors were supposed to pay under investor agreements.” (13-14)

Now, obviously, not all servicers had all of these problems, but the CFPB’s findings are consistent with what many courts have described anecdotally in their opinions.  Time will tell whether the CFPB will be able to get servicers to devote the necessary resources to reduce these types of problems to more acceptable levels.

 

Not That I’m Complaining, But

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Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall and Sonia Steinway have posted Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints on SSRN. It is interesting both for the details it documents, but also for what it represents.  Details first:

Analyzing a new data set of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, we find that

(i) Bank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average financial institution;

(ii) consumers of some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were significantly more likely than average to dispute the company‘s response to their initial complaints; and

(iii) among companies that provide mortgages, OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks. (1)

The financial services industry has complained that the CFPB complaint system would unfairly expose companies to unverified complaints. But this kind of comparative look at financial services companies shows the great value of the CFPB’s approach. As the authors’ note, this dataset is a treasure trove for researchers and should result in helpful information for consumers and regulators alike.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant!

Financial Literacy Literacy

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Personally, I was disappointed by the CFPB’s Financial Literacy Annual Report. It seems to me that the Bureau’s Division of Consumer Education and Engagement is thinking too small in setting forth its research agenda. For its financial education evaluation project,

The Bureau is conducting a quantitative evaluation of two existing financial coaching programs. Financial coaching generally involves one-on-one sessions with clients to increase clients’ awareness of their financial decisions and to provide support for clients to reach financial goals mutually set by the coach and client. (46)

Seems to me that there are some fundamental questions about financial literacy that need to be studied before small, resource-intensive projects like financial coaching are. I have blogged about these issues before, but the bottom line is that there is no solid empirical evidence that financial education achieves good results in general. So why study particular initiatives?

I would like to see the Bureau engage in a broad survey of financial literacy first and then develop a research agenda that reflects the big issues, including

  • do improved disclosures improve outcomes for consumers?
  • do consumers have the basic math skills to take advantage of disclosures?
  • what useful metrics exist for measuring the impact of financial literacy initiatives?

These are just a few big questions that I would want to answer before I looked at particular programs.

The Bureau should start from the premise that we have little reason to believe that financial education works.  Let’s build up a body of knowledge from there. If we assume that it works, as the Bureau’s current research agenda implies, then that assumption can lead us on a wild goose chase as we study program, after initiative, after project, looking for that golden-egg laying goose.

CFPB Complaints Vary by State, Unsurprisingly

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The Baltimore Sun quoted me today in Marylanders Aren’t Shy About Complaining: New Federal Consumer Agency Finds State Residents Quick to Gripe About Mortgages, Credit Cards, Banks. The story opens,

Marylanders are big complainers.

At least when it comes to the financial services they receive.

Maryland ranked No. 2 in the nation in mortgage complaints per capita, second only to New Hampshire, for grievances lodged with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The state came in third for grousing about credit cards and placed fifth for gripes about banks and service.

The CFPB’s database, launched toward the end of 2011, catalogs thousands of gripes about banking, credit cards and mortgages that the newfound agency has received. The agency forwards complaints — ranging from disputes about billing and interest rates on credit cards to incorrect information on credit reports and problems with loan payments — to the businesses involved. Not all complaints are resolved.

Why are Marylanders more motivated to complain? Experts point to the state’s higher education levels, relative wealth and proximity to the do-gooders in Washington, D.C.

“Education level predicts complaint behavior, and this is a very well-educated area,” said Rebecca Ratner, a professor of marketing at the University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business.

The more educated consumers are the more likely they are to feel that they can affect outcomes and know what steps to take to complain, Ratner said.

Consumers here also are more aware of the new agency because of our proximity to Washington, the CFPB’s home, she said.

Indeed, Washingtonians also are big whiners, ranking No. 1 in complaints about bank accounts and credit cards and coming in third for mortgage grievances.

Consumers near the Beltway also may have more faith in the government to correct problems, given that they are likely to have friends and neighbors who work for Uncle Sam, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School with an expertise in consumer finance.

“The federal government has a face when you live in Maryland and D.C.,” he said.

Maryland also has the highest median income in the country. Moneyed consumers, Reiss said, are more inclined to speak up when there’s a problem.

“Wealthier people are more likely to expect more from financial institutions,” he said.

They also know that financial institutions are regulated and can be held accountable, he said.

The rest of the story is here.

Why We Need The CFPB

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Judge Illston (N.D. CA.) has preliminarily approved a settlement of a class action in Jordan et al. v. Paul Financial LLC et al., No. 3:07-cv-04496 (June 14, 2013). The class action arises from lender practices during the Subprime Boom of the early 2000s.  The class is composed of

All individuals who within the four-year period preceding the filing of Plaintiffs’ original complaint through the date that notice is mailed to the Class (the “Class Period”), obtained an Option ARM loan from Paul Financial, LLC that either (a) was secured by real property located in the State of California, or (b) was secured by real property located outside the State of California where the loan was approved in or disseminated from California, which loan had the following characteristics: (i) the yearly numerical interest rate listed on page one of the Note is 3.0% or less; (ii) in the section entitled “Interest,” the Promissory Note states that this rate “may” instead of “will” or “shall” change, (e.g., “The interest rate I will pay may change”); (iii) the yearly numerical interest rate listed on page one of the Note was only effective through the due date for the first monthly payment and then adjusted to a rate which is the sum of an “index” and “margin;” and (iv) the Note does not contain any statement that paying the amount listed as the “initial monthly payment(s),” will definitely result in negative amortization or deferred interest. (2)

Of the problems alleged by the lead plaintiffs and given credibility by the judge’s order, the most disturbing is that the lender described a rate that was fixed for only one month as a “yearly” one. It is hard to see how consumers can parse the language of a mortgage note on their own, especially in California where borrowers typically are not represented by counsel in a residential real estate transaction.

Many commentators claim that more disclosure and financial education are all that are necessary to ensure that consumers have access to credit on reasonable terms.  But residential finance transactions are too complex under the best of circumstances. And they  become just plain abusive when lenders describe an interest rate that adjusts after one month as “fixed.”  And they become too predatory when an interest rate that adjusts monthly is described as a “yearly” one.

This case, arising from lender behavior during the Boom, reminds us why we now have the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, post-Bust.  When pundits inevitably claim that even reasonable consumer protection regulation initiatives are too paternalistic and too restrictive of credit, let’s remind them of this case and the many others like it.