Plunging Minority Homeownership Rates

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Construction Dive quoted me in Why Minority Homeownership Rates Plunged After the Housing Crash — and How to Reverse The Trend. It opens,

The recovery from the 2007 U.S. housing crash is still underway, with the ramifications of foreclosures and subprime mortgages still playing out for many current and potential American homeowners. Northeastern markets are still struggling to clear out crisis-era inventory, largely due to foreclosure laws, and members of Generation X — one of the hardest hit groups during the crash — are just now building up the required financial strength and confidence to claw their way back to homeownership.

While the Census Bureau Housing Vacancy Survey indicated that U.S. homeownership overall was 63.5% in the first quarter of 2016 — down significantly from a 25-year average of 66.2% — the groups encountering the most difficulties snapping back from the housing crisis are the black and Hispanic populations.

The Census Bureau found that 41.5% of black households and 45.3% of Hispanic households are currently homeowners, compared to 72.1% of white households. And last year, while the Urban Institute projected that Hispanic homeownership would rise over the next 15 years, it also predicted that black homeownership would drop to 40%.

The stagnant and declining minority homeownership numbers are clear, but experts have varying views regarding why this situation is occurring and what can be done to reverse the trend.

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In Newark, NJ, for example, entire minority neighborhoods were targeted with home renovation schemes, which ended in high-interest home equity loans for the consumer, according to David Reiss, professor of law and academic program director for urban business entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “You would see entire streets with home improvement projects through the same company,” he said.

A study by University of Buffalo professor Gregory Sharp and Cornell University professor Matthew Hall found that “race was the leading explanation for why people lost homes they owned and turned back to rentals.” Sharp and Hall said that minorities were “exploited” by the mortgage lending system, which led to blacks being 50% more likely than whites to lose their homes and enter the rental market.

After the housing market crash, there weren’t enough educational resources and financial literacy programs available to minority groups to help them navigate the “new normal” of adjustable-rate mortgages and increases to their monthly payments, according to Franky Bonilla, with Churchill Mortgage in Houston. “Without access to even the most basic information, such as how to save money or properly document income, many borrowers were unequipped to overcome (these problems), and, as a result, many owners walked away from their homes,” he said.

How to boost homeownership among minorities

So with minority homeownership rates lagging — and in some cases sinking — since the housing crisis, what’s the answer to reverse the trend?

Bonilla, who is also a member of the National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals (NAHREP), said approximately 60% of his business comes from minority homeowners and that this group in particular could benefit from borrower education and outreach, such as bilingual employees, as well as workshops and seminars.

“Lenders with more cultural diversity have an advantage because they can relate and communicate more effectively with individuals who might otherwise feel disadvantaged or intimidated by the mortgage process,” Bonilla said. “In turn, this creates an opportunity to establish a relationship at a personal level and determine which mortgage options are the best fit for each borrower’s unique financial situation.”

Another possible solution to increasing minority homeownership rates, along with homeownership among those who don’t meet the credit requirements for prime loans, is an overhaul of lending criteria for mortgages.

Reiss said there has been a move by some housing advocates to have credit for mortgage purposes reflect factors more indicative of future success as a homeowner. One of the critical issues, however, is to try to determine exactly how much credit is the right amount of credit. “You want to make credit available to people without having excessive default rates,” Reiss said. “Clearly the amount of credit we had in the early 2000s was too much credit, and it ended poorly for many people.”

Reiss added that home lending has always involved a careful balance between underwriting and available credit. “I think everyone would agree that the ‘Wild West’ days of lending were not good for American households in general,” he said.

Frannie v. Private-Label Smackdown

Eric Armstrong

S&P posted a report, Historical Data Show That Agency Mortgage Loans Are Likely to Perform Significantly Better Than Comparable Non-Agency Loans. The overview notes,

  • We examined the default frequencies of both agency and non-­agency mortgage loans originated from 1999­-2008.
  • As expected, default rates for both agencies and non-­agencies were higher for crisis-­era vintages relative to pre­-crisis vintages.
  • The loan characteristics that were the most significant predictors of default were FICO scores, debt­-to­-income (DTI) ratios, and loan­-to­-value (LTV) ratios.
  • Agency loans performed substantially better than non­agency loans for all vintages examined. The default rate of agency loans was approximately 30%-­65% that for comparable non-­agency loans, whether analyzed via stratification or through a logistic regression framework. (1)

This is not so surprising, but it is interesting to see the relative performance of Frannie (Fannie & Freddie) and Private-Label loans quantified and it is worth thinking through the implications of this disparity.

S&P was able to do this analysis because Fannie and Freddie released their “loan-level, historical performance data” to the public in order to both increase transparency and to encourage private capital to return to the secondary mortgage market. (1) Given that the two companies have transferred significant credit risk to third parties in the last few years, this is a useful exercise for potential investors, regulators and policymakers.

It is unclear to me that this historical data gives us much insight into future performance of either Frannie or Private-Label securities because so much has changed since the 2000s. Dodd-Frank enacted the Qualified Mortgage, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage regimes for the primary and secondary mortgage market and they have fundamentally changed the nature of Private-Label securities. And the fact that Fannie and Freddie are now in conservatorship has changed how they do business in very significant ways just as much. So, yes, old Frannie mortgages are likely to perform better, but what about new ones?