Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

A Shared Appreciation for Underwater Mortgages

New York State’s Department of Financial Services has proposed a rule that would allow for “shared appreciation” of a property’s value if an underwater loan is refinanced. The Department states that this will provide a helpful option for underwater homeowners facing foreclosure. If a homeowner were to take a shared appreciation mortgage, he or she would get a principal reduction (and thus lower monthly payments) in exchange for giving up as much as fifty percent of the increase in the home’s value, payable when the property is sold or the mortgage is satisfied.

The precise formula for the holder of the mortgage is as follows:

The Holder’s share of the Appreciation in Market Value shall be limited to the lesser of:

1. The amount of the reduction in principal (deferred principal), plus interest on such amount calculated from the date of the Shared Appreciation       Agreement to the date of payment based on a rate that is applicable to the Modified Mortgage Loan; or

2. Fifty percent of the amount of Appreciation in Market Value. Section 82-2.6(b).

The principal balance of a shared appreciation mortgage “shall be no greater than: (i) an amount which when combined with other modification factors, such as lower interest rate or term extension, results in monthly payments that are 31% or less of the Mortgagor’s DTI; or (ii) 100% of the Appraised Value.” Section 82-2.11(i). The proposed regulation contains mandatory disclosures for the homeowner, including some examples of how a shared appreciation mortgage can work.

How does this all play out for the homeowner? We should note that similarly situated homeowners can be treated differently in a variety of ways. Here are a few examples. First, two similarly situated homeowners with different incomes can receive different principal balances because of the DTI limitation contained in section 82-2.11(i). Second, similarly situated homeowners can receive different principal balances because their houses appraise for different amounts. And third, different rates of appreciation of homes can make two similarly situated homeowners give up very different absolute dollars in appreciated value.

All of this is to say that homeowners will have to consider many variables in order to evaluate whether a share appreciation mortgage is a good option for them. They should also know that what is a good deal for one homeowner may not be a good deal for a similarly situated one. It is unlikely that the mandatory disclosures will be sufficient to explain this to them in all of its complexity. It is not even clear that loan counselors could do a great job with this either.

I am not arguing that the share appreciation mortgage is a bad innovation. But I do think that lenders will be able evaluate when offering one is a good deal for them while homeowners may have trouble evaluating when accepting one is a good deal on their end. I would guess that many may take one for non-economic reasons — I want to keep my home — and just take their chances as to how it all will play out financially.

Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Your Town?

Bob Hockett has posted Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Seattle. I recommend it to those interested in issues beyond Seattle’s borders because it actually covers foreclosure-prevention and mitigation options across the country, although it looks at them with a Seattle focus.

He argues that

There is a potentially bewildering array of means available to at least some underwater homeowners, and these programs are also noteworthy for failing to solve the fundamental problems affecting these mortgages. There are three vitiating weakness share by nearly all of these means . . ..

The first weakness among currently available options is that they do not concentrate upon mortgage principal-reduction, meaning that they do nothing about the underwater status of underwater mortgage loans – which is the principal predictor of default and foreclosure – at all. Instead they rely upon temporary forbearance, term-extension, or interest rate reduction. . . .

The second weakness of the currently available options is that they are voluntary from the creditor’s point of view. That is problematic not because creditors lack in appreciation of their own enlightened self-interest or in desire to do the right thing, but because where there are structural or contractual barriers to principal reduction, as we shall see there are here in abundance, even creditor-benefiting such changes cannot occur on an adequate scale. Creditors are very often unable to do what benefits themselves and homeowners alike, meaning that voluntary programs can be useless.

Finally, the third weakness that the options discussed here suffer is that they do not extend to underwater PLS loans, which, as seen above, constitute the great bulk of troubled mortgage loans; they are in general available only to GSE and bank portfolio loans . . .. (11)

I found the review of “publicly encouraged debt relief” programs useful. (14) They include

  1. HAMP (the federal Home Affordable Modification Program)
  2. HARP (the federal Home Affordable Refinance Program)
  3. Miscellaneous Specialized HAMP Analogues
  4. FHA Short Refinance Program
  5. HAFA(federal Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative)
  6. “Hardest Hit” Fund & Program (Treasury)
  7. HOPE NOW Alliance
  8. The Attorney Generals’ Settlement

Hockett also proposes some innovative approaches that he suggests that Seattle should consider including the use of eminent domain as well as a land bank. Worth the read.