Tag Archives: foreclosure

Deane Finds Us East of Eden

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Last week, I discussed a NYLJ article about the “Show Me The Note” argument in New York. The article discussed a recent case, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Deane, 2013 Slip Op. 23244 (Sup. Ct. Kings Country July 11, 2013). Brad and I have earlier noted that “many scholars and leaders of the bar are befuddled by courts’ failure to do a comprehensive analysis under the UCC as part of their reasoning in mortgage enforcement cases . . ..”  As if to prove us wrong, Judge Battaglia has taken on the UCC in Deane even while acknowledging that “quotation of the Code, or even its citation, has virtually disappeared from the caselaw on this part of negotiable instruments law, at least where addressed in mortgage foreclosure actions.” (5) Judge Battaglia also notes how NY mortgage enforcement caselaw diverges from the contemporary UCC caselaw.

Judge Battaglia framed the issue of standing as follows:

As recently summarized by the Second Department:”In order to commence a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the subject mortgage…A plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note prior to commencement of the action with the filing of the complaint…Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident.” (GRP Loan, LLC v. Taylor, 95 AD3d at 1173 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added].) (2)

He continued, “the cursory treatment of the standing question in the memorandum of law evidences a misunderstanding of the general law of negotiable instruments in its equation of the status as “holder” to mere possession of the instrument. The core of the law of negotiable instruments is found in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code . . ..” (3) He finds that the plaintiff has not established that it is a holder or a nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder. He states that

To allow an assignee to sue without possession of the note, therefore, would be inconsistent with Revised Article 3, and put New York out-of-step with the 49 states that have adopted the revision, including, in particular, a conception of “transfer” as “deliver[y] by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument” (see Revised UCC §3-203 [1].) That misstep, however, if such it is, has apparently already been taken. (7)

Doing its best to reconcile the the mortgage enforcement and UCC caselaw, Judge Battaglia concludes that

in the usual case, a plaintiff has “standing” to prosecute a mortgage foreclosure action where, at the time the action is commenced: (1) the plaintiff is the holder of the note (see NYUCC §1-201 [20]); or (2) the plaintiff has possession of the note by delivery (see NYUCC §1-201[14]), from a person entitled to enforce it, for the purpose of giving the plaintiff the right to enforce it; or (3) the plaintiff has been assigned the note, by a person entitled to enforce it, for the purpose of giving the plaintiff the right to collect the debt evidenced by the note, and the plaintiff tenders the note at the time of any judgment. (8)

New York’s law in this area is not satisfying and it looks to me like courts need to make a concerted effort to synthesize UCC law with foreclosure law.  Otherwise, mortgage litigants are left to wander like Cain in the land of Nod, east of Eden, not knowing what law governs their disputes.

United States District Court for the Central District of California Finds hat MERS Was the Beneficiary and Entitled to Foreclose

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The United States District Court for the Central District of California in Derakhshan v. MERS, No. SACV08-1185 AG (2009) found that MERS was the beneficiary and therefore entitled to foreclose. This case, like many others before this court, involved the sale of an option adjustable rate mortgage loan.

The court held that MERS was the named beneficiary in the deed of trust. By signing the deed, the plaintiff thus agreed that MERS would be the beneficiary and act as nominee for the lender. Further, the deed explicitly stated that the borrower understood and agreed that MERS held only legal title and had the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the property.

Thus, the plaintiff explicitly authorized MERS to act as beneficiary with the right to foreclose on the property.

California Court Finds That Under State Civil Code Section 2924(a), MERS Had the Right to Foreclose

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of California Oakland Division in deciding Earl A. Dancy v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No: C10-2602 SBA (2010) found that the plaintiff’s contentions lacked merit.

The court found that the plaintiff’s assertion that neither the loan servicer nor MERS were the true beneficiaries of the subject deed of trust and therefore had no authority to institute foreclosure proceedings, lacked merit. The court held that the deed of trust expressly designated that MERS was acting solely as nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.

Further, the court held that regardless of whether or not MERS owned the note or was entitled to any payments as a result, the fact remained that the deed of trust designated MERS as a beneficiary. Thus, under section 2924(a) of the California Civil Code, MERS had the right to foreclose.

Court Holds That California State Law Did Not Require Possession of the Note to Commence a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The court in Chilton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, No. 1:09-cv-02187-OWW-SKO (2010), held that California state law did not necessitate possession of the promissory note in order to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, after hearing the plaintiff’s arguments alleging wrongful foreclosure and lack of standing. Even though MERS was not named as a party to the action, the plaintiff argued that based on recent Kansas case law, MERS did not have standing to foreclose since the note and deed of trust had been separated.

The court distinguished Kansas’s recent precedent from this case in that the court held that Kansas’s case law did not consider the requirements of California’s non-judicial foreclosure process.

Court Holds MERS’ Previous Business Activities Prior to Proper Registration in California Did Not Render its Foreclosing Illegal

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The court in Perlas et al v. MERS, No. C 09-4500 (N.D.Cal. 2010) held that MERS’ previous business activities prior to becoming registered to do business in California did not render its foreclosing activities illegal.

Despite the plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the court noted that since MERS is now registered in California any alleged error had since been retroactively fixed. The Court in delivering their holding also noted that MERS, acting as the lender’s agent, had the authority to initiate non judicial foreclosures.

California Court of Appeals Holds That the Right to Challenge a Nominee’s Authority to Foreclose on Behalf of Note Holder Would Fundamentally Undermine the Non-Judicial Nature of the Process

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The Fourth District California Court of Appeals in considering Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 (2011), affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding MERS’ ability to initiate non-judicial foreclosure actions.

The appellant argued that he was entitled to bring a lawsuit to challenge whether MERS was authorized to initiate a foreclosure action, however the California Court of Appeals rejected this argument. In rejecting the appellant’s argument, the court held that the text of the statue failed to provide a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized. Further, the court noted that there were no grounds for implying such an action.

The Court found that “the recognition of the right to bring a lawsuit to determine a nominee’s authorization to proceed with foreclosure on behalf of the note holder would fundamentally undermine the non-judicial nature of the process and introduce the possibility of lawsuits filed solely for the purpose of delaying valid foreclosures.”

Show Me The Note, NY Style

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Steiner, Goldstein & Sohn published a short article in the New York Law Journal, Clearing The Confusion:  Misplaced Notes and Allonges (Sept. 18, 2012) (behind a paywall). While intended to address commercial real estate finance, it relies on an interesting residential real estate finance case, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Deane, 2013 Slip Op. 23244 (Sup. Ct. Kings Country July 11, 2013). The authors write that

Mortgage assignments, when properly drafted, assign both the mortgage and the note. Assuming the chain of mortgage assignments is intact, lenders can gain comfort knowing that under New York case law they have standing to enforce the full amount of the debt evidenced by these assignments. Nevertheless, defendants in foreclosure proceedings often challenge the lenders’ standing to enforce the note, demanding that lenders demonstrate physical possession of the note to initiate a foreclosure despite the fact that physical possession is not required by the law.

They conclude:

New York courts in the cases described herein consistently follow well-established precedent permitting standing in a foreclosure action without the plaintiff having physical possession of the original notes. New York case law makes clear that physical possession of all notes in a chain of loan assignments and refinancings is unnecessary for standing in a foreclosure action and that proper execution of a [Consolidated Extension and Modification Agreement] is sufficient to confer standing when missing notes have been consolidated. Likewise, inclusion of an allonge or other endorsement for every note transfer is not required under New York law for standing in a foreclosure action when the note has been assigned by other means, such as through a properly drafted assignment of mortgage.

The article’s discussion of Deane is most interesting:

the court found physical possession of the note to be determinative regardless of whether a written assignment was executed. The court criticized the approach followed by case law in New York, stating that allowing an assignee to have standing without possession of the note “would be inconsistent with Revised Article 3, and put New York out-of-step with the 49 states that have adopted the revision[.]” Notably, however, New York has opted not to adopt those proposed revisions to Article 3. The court continued, “that misstep, however, if such it is, has apparently already been taken. The case law quoted and cited above clearly speaks, in the disjunctive, of standing obtained by ‘assignment’ or ‘physical delivery’ of the note[.]”

I will return to Deane in a later post.