Tag Archives: possession

Property Taken by Eminent Domain Unused

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Photo by Marc A. Hermann / MTA New York City Transit

CBS2’s Mary Calvi, photo by Marc A. Hermann / MTA New York City Transit

I was interviewed by Mary Calvi on CBS New York in Man Wants Back Property NYC Took From His Family In 1967 (click here to watch the segment). The transcript of the segment reads, in part,

There is a property battle that has been brewing in the Bronx for some time.

A man is fighting to get back a piece of land that he claims belongs to his family.

He says the city took the land five decades ago saying it wants to extend a road, but all these years later nothing has changed, CBS2’s Mary Calvi reported Monday.

Fred Filomio fixes what’s broken on trucks in the Bronx. For decades, one problem has lingered, unfixed.

You see, back in 1967, when he was entering military service, the city of New York, using eminent domain, took part of his family’s property.

“When my uncle Freddie came back from World War II, they bought the whole block,” Filomio said.

A 13,000-square foot piece that sits up 22 feet above street level is a small part of a larger piece of property on Boston Road in the Bronx for his family’s trucking business. Back those 50 years ago, the city said it had to have the property in order to widen a street adjacent to it.

“They haven’t used one square foot of the property,” Filomio said, adding it looks the same as it did five decades ago.

In 50 years, the city has literally done nothing with the property. Filomio even uses it to park his trucks. His lawyer, Richard Apat, has filed suit.

“We feel showing number one it was an excess taking. Number two, it’s now being held as a proprietary. Number three, that we have been in possession we should get it back. But even with that, Fred is a reasonable person. If the city will talk to us and say let’s work something out, he’ll pay them some money, he’ll start paying taxes and that’s why I say I think it’s win-win,” Apat said.

The city responded to CBS2’s numerous requests for comment, with only the following from a spokesperson: “The property involved in this ongoing litigation is not subject to a claim of adverse possession, as a matter of law. We have no further comment while this litigation is pending.”

Professor David Reiss teaches students about eminent domain at Brooklyn Law School. He said he believes this one, like most others, is a difficult one to win.

“It looks like they have a tough row to hoe,” Reiss said. “Once the government takes ownership of the property, generally it’s theirs.”

Hefner’s Life “Estate”

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Plan of Playboy Mansion Pool and Grotto 2 by Ron Dirsmith

Fox News quoted me in Playboy Mansion for Sale — With One Tenant for Life. It reads, in part,

We called it: In October, we revealed that the Playboy mansion — home to Hugh Hefner and the site of epic parties back in the day — is in need of major renovations. Now, if a new report from TMZ is to be believed, it looks like Hef is finally ready to throw in the towel: Within a month, the crumbling 6-acre estate will be up for sale.

In spite of the 29-room (six-bedroom) Beverly Hills mansion’s decrepit condition, its owner, Playboy Enterprises, hopes to sell it for north of $200 million. Plus, the buyer will have to grapple with another huge catch: According to TMZ, the buyer will have to grant 89-year-old Hef a “life estate,” which means he can continue living there until death parts him from his beloved bachelor pad.

Ummm … who the heck wants to buy a home with someone living in it? Strange as it may seem, “life estate” arrangements are as old as the hills.

“Life estates go way back to the earliest roots of the common law, and they are great for providing for someone to live in his or her own home until death,” says David Reiss, research director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “Effectively, a life estate grants the [original owner] many of the indicia [characteristics] of full ownership for the rest of his life. Upon death, complete ownership of the property can pass to another. A common example would be where a husband bequeaths a life estate in the home to his wife, with the remainder to his children upon her death.”

But Hefner’s deal differs in one key way: He’s not bequeathing his home to family members or even a deserving Playboy bunny, but to an as-yet unknown third party who’ll be forking over millions to move in once Hef passes on.

 “This seems like a version of a reverse mortgage, because it frees up equity in the home during the owner’s lifetime without interfering too much with his use and enjoyment of the property,” Reiss continues.

But this privilege will likely drag down the asking price, a lot. While the listing price may be $200 million, most experts say that $80 million to $90 million is more realistic.

“The life estate would likely significantly reduce the fair market of the property, because the purchaser must defer taking possession as well as other aspects of ownership — renovating it, for example — until the death of the life tenant,” Reiss says. “Moreover, the purchaser must deal with the uncertainty of the life estate: Will it end in a year or in 10 years?”

And aside from these uncertainties, there’s the question of liability. Without adequate legal protection, the owner could be responsible for any damage to the property or its inhabitants. Granted, Hef is 89 and probably passes his days playing chess, but if Playboy bunnies continue to hop in and out, anything could happen.

“What if there’s a fire and the place burns down? What if Hefner falls down and breaks his hip?” asks Wendy Flynn, a Realtor in College Station, TX. “After all, it is known as a party house.”

All in all, if you’re salivating for a piece of Playboy history, make sure to man up your legal team to protect you from all that could go wrong before you’re able to take possession. And even though the mansion is a decent candidate for a tear-down, “don’t start spending money on plans for the property,” Reiss adds.

Even though Hef is already past the average U.S. male’s life expectancy of 84.3, “a lot can happen before possession of the property is actually conveyed.”

Possession of Note Confers Standing to Foreclose

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Jupiter.Aurora.HST.UV

Dale Whitman posted this discussion of Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 2015 WL 3616293 (N.Y. Ct. App., June 11, 2015) on the DIRT listserv:

There is nothing even slightly surprising about this decision, except that it sweeps away a lot of confused and irrelevant language found in decisions of the Appellate Division over the years. The court held simply holds (like nearly all courts that have considered the issue in recent years) that standing to foreclose a mortgage is conferred by having possession of the promissory note. Neither possession of the mortgage itself nor any assignment of the mortgage is necessary. “[T]he note was transferred to [the servicer] before the commencement of the foreclosure action — that is what matters.” And once a note is transferred, … “the mortgage passes as an incident to the note.” Here, there was a mortgage assignment, the validity of which the borrower attacked, but the attack made no difference; “The validity of the August 2009 assignment of the mortgage is irrelevant to [the servicer’s] standing.”

The opinion in Aurora makes it clear that prior Appellate Division statements are simply incorrect and confused when they suggest that standing would be conferred by an assignment of the mortgage without delivery of the note. See, e.g., GRP Loan LLC v. Taylor 95 A.D.3d at 1174, 945 N.Y.S.2d 336; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Codio, 94 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 943 N.Y.S.2d 545 [2d Dept 2012].) For an excellent analysis of why these decisions are wrong, see Bank of New York Mellon v. Deane, 970 N.Y.S.2d 427  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).

The Aurora decision implicitly rejects such cases as Erobobo, which suppose that the failure to comply with a Pooling and Servicing Agreement would somehow prevent the servicer from foreclosing. In the present case, the loan was securitized in 2006, but the note was delivered to the servicer on May 20, 2010, only four days before filing the foreclosure action. This presented no problem at all the court. If the servicer had possession at the time of the filing of the case (as it did), it had standing. (I must concede, however, that the rejection is only implicit, since the Erobobo theory was not argued in Aurora.)

If there is a weakness in the Aurora decision, it is its failure to determine whether the note was negotiable, and (assuming it was) to analyze the application UCC Article 3’s “person entitled to enforce” language. But this is not much of a criticism, since it is very likely that under New York law, the right to enforce would be transferred by delivery of the note to the servicer even if the note were nonnegotiable.

It has taken the Court of Appeals a long time to get around to cleaning up this area of the law, but its work is exactly on target.

Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?

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The financial crisis and the foreclosure crisis have pushed many scholars to take a fresh look at all sorts of aspects of the housing finance system. John Patrick Hunt has added to this growing body of literature with a posting to SSRN, Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?. It is an interesting and important article, taking a a fresh look at the legal platitude, “the mortgage follows the note” and asking — should it?!? The abstract reads,

The law of mortgage assignment has taken center stage amidst foreclosure crisis, robosigning scandal, and controversy over the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. Yet a concept crucially important to mortgage assignment law, the idea that “the mortgage follows the note,” apparently has never been subjected to a critical analysis in a law review.

This Article makes two claims about that proposition, one positive and one normative. The positive claim is that it has been much less clear than typically assumed that the mortgage follows the note, in the sense that note transfer formalities trump mortgage transfer formalities. “The mortgage follows the note” is often described as a well-established principle of law, when in fact considerable doubt has attended the proposition at least since the middle of the last century.

The normative claim is that it is not clear that the mortgage should follow the note. The Article draws on the theoretical literature of filing and recording to show that there is a case that mortgage assignments should be subject to a filing rule and that “the mortgage follows the note,” to the extent it implies that transferee interests should be protected without filing, should be abandoned.

Whether mortgage recording should in fact be abandoned in favor of the principle “the mortgage follows the note” turns on the resolution of a number of empirical questions. This Article identifies key empirical questions that emerge from its application of principles from the theoretical literature on filing and recording to the specific case of mortgages.

The article does not answer the core question that it asks, but it certainly demonstrates that it is worth answering.

Show Me The Note, NY Style

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Steiner, Goldstein & Sohn published a short article in the New York Law Journal, Clearing The Confusion:  Misplaced Notes and Allonges (Sept. 18, 2012) (behind a paywall). While intended to address commercial real estate finance, it relies on an interesting residential real estate finance case, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Deane, 2013 Slip Op. 23244 (Sup. Ct. Kings Country July 11, 2013). The authors write that

Mortgage assignments, when properly drafted, assign both the mortgage and the note. Assuming the chain of mortgage assignments is intact, lenders can gain comfort knowing that under New York case law they have standing to enforce the full amount of the debt evidenced by these assignments. Nevertheless, defendants in foreclosure proceedings often challenge the lenders’ standing to enforce the note, demanding that lenders demonstrate physical possession of the note to initiate a foreclosure despite the fact that physical possession is not required by the law.

They conclude:

New York courts in the cases described herein consistently follow well-established precedent permitting standing in a foreclosure action without the plaintiff having physical possession of the original notes. New York case law makes clear that physical possession of all notes in a chain of loan assignments and refinancings is unnecessary for standing in a foreclosure action and that proper execution of a [Consolidated Extension and Modification Agreement] is sufficient to confer standing when missing notes have been consolidated. Likewise, inclusion of an allonge or other endorsement for every note transfer is not required under New York law for standing in a foreclosure action when the note has been assigned by other means, such as through a properly drafted assignment of mortgage.

The article’s discussion of Deane is most interesting:

the court found physical possession of the note to be determinative regardless of whether a written assignment was executed. The court criticized the approach followed by case law in New York, stating that allowing an assignee to have standing without possession of the note “would be inconsistent with Revised Article 3, and put New York out-of-step with the 49 states that have adopted the revision[.]” Notably, however, New York has opted not to adopt those proposed revisions to Article 3. The court continued, “that misstep, however, if such it is, has apparently already been taken. The case law quoted and cited above clearly speaks, in the disjunctive, of standing obtained by ‘assignment’ or ‘physical delivery’ of the note[.]”

I will return to Deane in a later post.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York Rules That a Party Perfects its Security Interests in Disputed Loans by Taking Possession of the Notes as Opposed to Recording the Mortgage Assignments, Pursuant to UCC Article 9

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In Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 558, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled in favor of intervenor-plaintiff NetBank, granting its cross motion for summary judgment against intervenor-plaintiff, Southwest Securities Bank (herein described as Southwest) in a dispute regarding conflicting recorded mortgage assignments for nine loans. The court stated that “where parties assert competing interests in mortgage assignments,” under Article 9, “possession of the note perfects the assignee’s security interest regardless of whether any mortgage securing the note has been properly recorded.” It concluded that NetBank perfected its interest in eight of the nine disputed loans and took possession of them before Southwest, giving it a superior interest in those loans.

Confusion over who possessed the loans started when Defendant Community, a mortgage banker, entered into agreements with two banks, Southwest and RBMG (NetBank’s successor in interest), to fund a portion of its mortgage loans. Community entered Mortgage Purchase Agreements with both banks and engaged in a scheme known as “double booking,” where it “obtained duplicate funding for one loan from two different lenders and retained the entire value of the loan.” Essentially, “Community created two original notes and mortgages for each of the disputed loans.” Because of Community’s fraud “only one of the lenders would be paid in full,” and each bank claimed a priority interest in the nine loans that Community sold to it. Southwest recorded its assignments of the mortgages before RBMG for five of the loans, but RBMG received the original notes and assignments for eight of the loans before Southwest.

In determining which of the loans belonged to Southwest or NetBank and which of the mortgages were valid, the court had to decide “whether Article 9 or state real property law governs the security interests in mortgages.”  Under Article 9, a party perfects it security interest in a note by taking possession of it. Alternatively, under “race-notice statutes in state real property law,” a party perfects its security interest in a mortgage by recording the assignment. Southwest argued that the court should follow New York’s race-notice statute, whereas RBMG argued that Article 9 should govern.

Before reaching its decision, the court examined the New York Real Property Law Section 291, which states that a “bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of a junior mortgage, who records his assignment is entitled to priority over a prior unrecorded mortgage of which his assignor has full knowledge.” It explained that previous decisions applying the statute did not address instances where the “first party to record a mortgage assignment [had] a prior interest over another party who first takes possession of the note securing the mortgage.”  The court stated that in this case, the question depended on the “supremacy of perfecting the security interest in the note [as opposed to previous cases which regarded] perfecting the security interest in the mortgage.”

According to the statute’s language and precedent decisions regarding the same issue, Southwest would have a priority interest in five of the loans that it recorded before RMGA. Instead, the court applied Article 3 and Article 9 of the UCC in reaching its conclusions. It stated that “NetBank perfected its security interest in the loans and Southwest,” did not. The court agreed with previous cases in the Circuit which held that, “perfection of a security interest in the note (by taking possession under Article 9) should carry over to the mortgage incidental to it.” It explained that in New York, assignment of a note creates a security interest in the note, but a party perfects its security interest in the note by possessing it. From this reasoning, the court determined Southwest was not the first party to perfect its security interest in the loans, as it merely recorded its mortgage assignments but never possessed them. Therefore, the court denied Southwest’s motion for summary judgment requesting possession over the disputed loans.

Instead, the court granted NetBank’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Article 9, as it possessed eight of the disputed loans before Southwest. It also held that under UCC Article 3, NetBank qualified as a holder in due course (defined as a holder of a negotiable instrument who takes it for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored) in regards to seven of the loans, entitling it to those loans independent of its possession under Article 9.