Tag Archives: lawful assignment

California Court Denies Dismissal of Wrongful Foreclosure Claim

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The California court in Engler v. ReconTrust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 179950 (C.D. Cal. 2013) dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff originally filed suit against defendants BAC and MERS on June 6, 2012. On March 1, 2013, the lower court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend.

The plaintiff’s current complaint alleged thirteen causes of action: (1) Declaratory Relief; (2) Violation of RICO; (3) “Common Law Conspiracy;” (4) “Filing of Invalid Lien;” (5) “Fraudulent Conveyance Deceptive Practices Code of Federal Regulations 17 CFR Parts 204-249;” (6) Fraudulent Concealment; (7) Fraudulent Inducement; (8) Wrongful Foreclosure; (9) Violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (10) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (11) Violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices; (12) Violation of the Truth in Lending Act; and (13) Constructive Fraud.

After considering the plaintiff’s contentions the court found that the plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action were rightfully dismissed with prejudice. However, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth cause of action was denied. Accordingly, the only cause of action remaining in Plaintiff’s claim was the Eighth Cause of Action.

Ohio Court Dismisses Claims Asserting that MERS Could Not Act as Nominee

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The court in deciding Cline v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2013-Ohio-5706 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County 2013) overruled appellant’s seven assignments of error, thus this court upheld the judgment of the lower court.

The lower court granted MERS’ motion after concluding that, because appellant voluntarily signed the mortgage and agreed to the existing lien, the mortgage could not constitute a cloud on appellant’s title subject to R.C. 5303.01. On appeal, appellant argued the original loan was originated by CBSK, a company no longer in business; therefore, any agreement between CBSK and MERS that MERS would act as nominee for CBSK is void.

In appellant’s view, because the agreement between CBSK and MERS was void, the note and mortgage were no longer in effect and constituted a cloud upon her title. Appellant argued that, unlike Unger, which concerned mortgage assignments, this matter was different as it concerns the underlying mortgage itself.

Upon review, this court found that the appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Accordingly, all of the appellant’s claims were overruled.

Illinois Court Finds that Assignment was Proper, Thus Wells Fargo Could Foreclose

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The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Abatangelo, 2013 IL App (1st) 130423-U (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of plaintiff Wells Fargo. The court determined Wells Fargo had standing to bring the foreclosure action.

Mr. Abatangelo challenged the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on Wells Fargo’s foreclosure complaint, specifically its finding that Wells Fargo had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. On this appeal, Mr. Abatangelo contended that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the mortgage contract did not properly assign the right to foreclose to Wells Fargo; and (2) the trial court improperly considered new arguments raised by Wells Fargo for the first time in a reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss.

After considering the arguments put forward by Abatangelo the court affirmed the lower court decision.

Illinois Court of Appeals Upholds Lower Court Decision Finding that Wells Fargo had Standing to Foreclose

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The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Abatangelo, 2013 IL App (1st) 130423-U (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) that Wells Fargo had standing to foreclose the mortgage.

Defendant, Peter Abatangelo, appealed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, on plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint. On appeal, Mr. Abatangelo contended that the court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the mortgage contract did not properly assign the right to foreclose to Wells Fargo; and (2) the trial court improperly considered new arguments raised by Wells Fargo for the first time in a reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss.

After considering the defendant’s contentions the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Ohio Court Finds that Bank of America had Standing to Foreclose and MERS had Authority to Assign

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-5749 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 26, 2013) found there was no merit to plaintiff’s appeal, and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Frederick Harris, appealed from the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff, Bank of America. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.

Plaintiff argued that Bank of America lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure because the bank was a party solely by virtue of a purported assignment from MERS. It argued that MERS had no authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America, and thus, Bank of America had no standing to bring the suit.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s contentions, finding that the bank had standing to bring a foreclosure action because it was the real party in interest at the time that a foreclosure complaint was filed. The court also found that the bank had possession of the note, which was payable to bearer. Therefore, it was the current holder of the note and entitled to enforce it under R.C. 1303.31 and that after the merger, the bank stepped into the shoes of the absorbed company and had the ability to enforce. As such no further action was necessary to become a real party in interest.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia Dismisses Case Due to Lack of Jurisdiction

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The court in deciding Glaviano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. 180582 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s claim due to lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not have “possession of the note” or a “documented property interest in the note and mortgage or deed of trust.” Plaintiff also alleged that the “deed of trust was void and ineffective due to fraud,” and that the trustee’s foreclosure sale was “void because the alleged beneficiary . . . never had standing to substitute the trustee.” They further claimed that the sale of their property at a foreclosure sale violated their due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. Based on these allegations, plaintiff sought an injunction against the foreclosure sale.

The court considered the plaintiff’s argument and found that the court lacked jurisdiction, as such the case must be dismissed. Because the plaintiff sought the equivalent of appellate review of state court rulings, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The court found that plaintiffs in this case also asked the federal district court to review state court rulings.

Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the motion for injunction was denied as moot due to dismissal of the case.

Georgia Court Finds Chase Had Authority to Foreclose

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The court in deciding Ball v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146503 (M.D. Ga. 2013) granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiffs Johnny Frank Ball Jr. and Tempie Ball filed a suit in the Superior Court of Sumter County, Georgia, seeking to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of their home. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages against Chase and the Freddie Mac for wrongful foreclosure and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.

The legal theory underlying the plaintiff’s causes of action was premised on the definition of a “secured creditor” in the Georgia Code. Plaintiffs maintained that Chase lacked authority to foreclose its property because only a “secured creditor” [a creditor who holds the promissory note] may initiate a non-judicial foreclosure, and only Chase held the security deed.

The court in assessing the validity of this argument rejected it as the Georgia Supreme Court recently rejected this very theory. Therefore, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.