Tag Archives: lawful assignment

Oregon Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Oregon Revised Statute § 86.745(1) Claim

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The court in Woods v. United States Bank N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146485 (D. Or. 2013) ultimately granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment voiding and setting aside the foreclosure of their property on the ground that the May 25, 2011, notice of default and election to sell listed only MERS as the beneficiary and did not identify USB as beneficiary, and, therefore, the Notice of Default did not comply with the requirements of Oregon Revised Statute §86.745(1).

Defendants asserted that plaintiffs’ claim was barred by Oregon Revised Statute § 86.770 because plaintiffs did not and could not allege they did not receive the notice required under Oregon Revised Statute §86.740, the foreclosure sale was completed, and the property was sold to a bona fide purchaser.

The court noted that this court, other courts in this district, and Oregon state courts have held §86.770 bars rescission of a foreclosure sale when a borrower has received the notice required under §86.740 and the property is sold to a bona fide purchaser.

Here, Plaintiffs admitted they received notice of the foreclosure sale within the time required under the OTDA, that the property was sold to a bona fide purchaser, and that the sale of the property was recorded.

The court thus concluded that plaintiff’s claim was barred under §86.770(1) and, therefore, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Ohio Appeals Court Affirms Lower Court Decision Granting Summary Judgement in Favor of Bank of America

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Hizer, 2013-Ohio-4621 (Ohio Ct. App., Lucas County 2013) ultimately granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

This case was an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Bank of America, N.A. in a foreclosure action filed by the bank after appellants Jennifer and Brian Hizer defaulted in payment on a note and mortgage held by the bank. After considering the appellants appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action, the court affirmed a lower court decision that there was no abuse in discretion by denying appellants’ motion to strike the affidavit of appellee bank’s vice president, whose identity the bank failed to disclose in discovery and whom appellants were thus unable to depose, because they did not complain of the discovery violation until the bank moved for summary judgment, and did not show that they were prejudiced by their inability to depose the vice president.

The court noted that since appellants did not deny executing the note and mortgage or dispute the authenticity of the documents the bank offered, and produced no evidence to dispute the assignment of these documents to the bank. The evidence established that the bank was the holder of the note and mortgage. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in that there was no error in permitting the bank summary judgment.

Texas Court Dismisses Action Claiming Fraud in Concealment, Fraud in Inducement, Quiet Title, & Rescission

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The court in deciding Diaz-Angarita v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147091 (S.D. Tex. 2013) eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff asserted causes of action for “fraud in the concealment,” fraud in the inducement, to quiet title, and for rescission. Defendants moved to dismiss.

In claims one and seven, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the substitute trustee’s deed was void as there was no valid notice of foreclosure and no appointment of a substitute trustee recorded, and because there was no assignment of the note and deed of trust recorded.

In claim two, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants had no standing to foreclose. Claim three asserted “fraud in the concealment” based on the allegation that Defendants failed to inform Schonacher, the original borrower, that the loan was securitized. Plaintiff’s fourth claim asserted a fraud in the inducement claim based on the allegation that defendants misrepresented their entitlement to foreclose and that they were the holder and owner of the note.

In claim five, plaintiff asserted a quiet title claim under Texas law. In claim six, plaintiff asserted a cause of action for rescission, which is a remedy and not a recognized cause of action. After categorically analyzing the plaintiff’s claims the court ultimately dismissed all seven of the plaintiff’s claims.

Although a court typically may grant the plaintiff at least one chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed a complaint based on key facts that were within his own knowledge. The court noted that it appeared unlikely that the plaintiff could amend to state viable claims for relief. As a result, the Court enters the dismissal without leave to amend and dismissed with prejudice.

District Court Rejects Claims That MERS Lacked Standing

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The court in deciding Pratt v. Bank of Am. NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151671 (D. Me. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged that the existence of forged documents related to a mortgage loan and that MERS lacked standing to transfer the plaintiff’s deed to Bank of America. The plaintiff wanted his promissory note returned to him along with the deed of trust.

The plaintiff’s assertion revolved around the claim that the separation of the deed of trust from the promissory note by the intervention of MERS as a nominee for Quicken Loans somehow breached the contracts between Pratt and Quicken or Bank of America. Plaintiff claimed that MERS, as nominee, had no “standing” to transfer the note and/or mortgage to Bank of America and that Bank of America has no “standing” to enforce these instruments.

Bank of America filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand and his motion for entry of default. The court also granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Lower Court’s Grant of Summary Judgement Affirmed by Nevada Court

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The court in deciding Castro v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 Nev. LEXIS 1602 (Nev. 2013) affirmed the lower courts judgment against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff obtained a home loan from Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC and executed a promissory note in favor of Decision One. The note was secured by a deed of trust naming Decision One as the lender and MERS, as the beneficiary and nominee of the lender. The deed of trust authorized MERS, as nominee of the lender, to transfer the deed of trust and appoint a successor trustee.

MERS assigned the deed of trust to defendant, who instituted this action for quiet title seeking to expunge the documents that appellants recorded. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was not opposed by plaintiff. Plaintiffs provided no evidence of any kind to the district court, and the district court entered summary judgment in respondent’s favor.

The court considered the plaintiff’s assertions, and concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in defendant’s favor.

Ohio Court Finds That Plaintiffs Were Not Bona Fide Purchasers

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The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth Appellate District, in deciding Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Casey, 2013-Ohio-4686 (Ohio Ct. App., Fairfield County Oct. 21, 2013) affirmed the lower court’s judgment and held that the plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers and the defendants had standing.

The court found that under the doctrine of lis pendens plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of a property encumbered by the mortgage because they took title during the pendency of a declaratory judgment action to which they were a party. Consequently, they did not take the property free from unrecorded liens. The claim that the mortgage was invalid was barred by res judicata as the validity of the mortgage was fully litigated in the declaratory judgment action.

Lastly, the court found that the defendant had standing to seek the foreclosure, as it was the current holder of the note and mortgage, and that it had physical possession of the note and mortgage documents.

North Carolina Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims of Fraud Against MERS, Bank of America, & Trustee Services of Carolina

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The court in deciding Porterfield v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152318 (E.D.N.C. 2013) dismissed plaintiff’s claims and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff asserted the following claims: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) fraud; (3) fraudulent misrepresentation; (4) fraud by use of MERS; (5) fraud through securitization; (6) promissory fraud; (7) unfair and deceptive trade practices; (8) violations of the Fair Debt Collections and Practices Act; (9) violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (10) slander of title; and (11) a quiet title action.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and MERS motioned to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and defendant Trustee Services of Carolina motioned to dismiss to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The court ultimately granted the defendants’ motions. Plaintiff’s claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, MERS, and Trustee Services of Carolina, LLC were dismissed with prejudice.