Tag Archives: MERS

Arizona’s “Unholy” Foreclosure Mess

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Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary about Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. County of Maricopa, 2014 WL 333575 (Ariz. Court of Appeals, Jan. 30, 2014) on the Dirt listserv:

A defaulting borrower may defend against foreclosure on ground that the chain of assignments of the deed of trust is defective, and also on a variety of other theories.

The residential mortgage loan in this case was originally made in 2005 to Steinberger’s 87-year-old father, who died two years later, leaving her the property. By 2008, she was having difficulty making the payments, and asked IndyMac FSB to consider a loan modification. She was advised that she must first default, and she did so. There followed a period of more than two years during which she was “jerked around” by IndyMac, with successive promises to consider a loan modification, the setting of (and then vacating of) foreclosure dates, and assertions by IndyMac that she had not properly submitted all of the paperwork required for a modification.

In November 2010 she filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that IndyMac had no authority to foreclose on the house, and upon filing a $7,000 bond, she obtained a TRO against foreclosure. The following summarizes the theories on which she obtained a favorable result.

1. Lack of a proper chain of title to the deed of trust. The Court of Appeals seems to have assumed that no foreclosure would be permissible without the foreclosing party having a chain of assignments from the originator of the loan. If one accepts this assumption, IndyMac was in trouble. The first assignment, made in 2009, was from MERS, acting as nominee of IndyMac Bank, to IndyMac Federal FSB, but it was made before IndyMac Federal FSB even existed!

A second assignment was made in 2010 by IndyMac Federal FSB to DBNTC, the trustee of a securitized trust. But Steinberger alleged that by this date, IndyMac Federal FSB no longer existed, so this assignment was void as well. She also made the familiar allegation that this assignment was too late to comply with the 90-day transfer period required by the trust’s Pooling and Servicing Agreement, but the court did not pursue this theory.

The court’s opinion is significant for its treatment of Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Sav. Bank, the 2012 case in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that “Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary [of a deed of trust] to prove its authority.² The Court of Appeals, in Steinberger, read this statement to mean that the beneficiary need not prove its authority unless the borrower alleges a lack of authority in her complaint. There was no such allegation in Hogan, but there was in Steinberger. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that Steinberger could contest IndyMac’s right to foreclose. And it felt that Steinberger’s allegations about the defects in the chain of title to the deed of trust, if proven, could constitute a successful attack on IndyMac’s authority to foreclose.

It’s important to realize what the Court of Appeals did not do. It did not disagree with Hogan’s holding that the beneficiary need not show possession of the promissory note in order to foreclose. Several commentators (including me) have criticized Hogan for this holding, but the Steinberger opinion leaves it intact. Indeed, in Steinberger, the borrower raised no issue as to whether IndyMac had the note, and seems to have conceded that it did. The discussion focuses on the legitimacy of the chain of title to the deed of trust, not on possession of the note.

Is the court correct that a valid chain of title to the deed of trust is necessary to foreclose under Arizona law? As a general proposition, one would think not. Arizona not only has adopted the common law rule that the mortgage follows the note, but even has a statute saying so: Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 33 817:  “The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.” So if the note is transferred, no separate assignment of the deed of trust would be needed at all. And a recent unreported Court of Appeals case, Varbel v. Bank of America Nat. Ass’n, 2013 WL 817290 (Ariz. App. 2013), quotes the Bankruptcy Court as reaching the same conclusion: In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (“Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale.”).

By the way, that’s the rule with respect to mortgages in virtually every state. A chain of assignments, recorded or not, is completely unnecessary to proof of the right to foreclose. The power to foreclose comes from having the right to enforce the note, not from having a chain of assignments of the mortgage or deed of trust.

However, since Hogan has told us that no showing of holding the note is necessary in order to foreclose, what is necessary? It defies common sense to suppose that a party can foreclose a deed of trust in Arizona without at least alleging some connection to the original loan documents. If that allegation is not that one holds the note, perhaps it must be the allegation that one has a chain of assignments of the deed of trust. If this is true, then the opinion in Steinberger, written on the assumption that the assignments must be valid ones, makes sense.

The ultimate problem here is the weakness of the foreclosure statute itself. Ariz. Stat. 33-807 provides, “The beneficiary or trustee shall constitute the proper and complete party plaintiff in any action to foreclose a deed of trust.” Fine, but when the loan has been sold on the secondary market, who is the “beneficiary?” The statute simply doesn’t say. The normal answer would be the party to whom the right to enforce the note has been transferred, but Hogan seems to have deprived us of that answer. An alternative answer (though one that forces us to disregard the theory that the mortgage follows the note) is to say that the “beneficiary” is now the party to whom the deed of trust has been assigned. But the Arizona courts don’t seem to be willing to come out and say that forthrightly, either. Instead, as in the Steinberger opinion, it’s an unstated assumption.

As Wilson Freyermuth put it, after graciously reading an earlier version of this comment, “The Steinberger court couldn’t accept the fact that a lender could literally foreclose with no connection to the loan documents — so if Hogan says the note is irrelevant, well then it has to be the deed of trust (which would presumably then require proof of a chain of assignments).  It’s totally backwards — right through the looking glass.  And totally inconsistent with Ariz. Stat. 33-817.”

To say that this is an unsatisfactory situation is an understatement; it’s an unholy mess. The statute was written with no recognition that any such thing as the secondary mortgage market exists, and the Arizona courts have utterly failed to reinterpret the statute in a way that makes sense. It’s sad, indeed.

There are a number of other theories in the Steinberger opinion on which the borrower prevailed. Some of these are quite striking, and should give a good deal of comfort to foreclosure defense counsel. In quick summary form, they are:

2. The tort of negligent performance of an undertaking (the “Good Samaritan” tort). This applies, apparently, to IndyMac’s incompetent and vacillating administration of its loan modification program.

3. Negligence per se, in IndyMac’s recording of defective assignments of the deed of trust in violation of the Arizona statute criminalizing the recording of a false or forged legal instrument.

4. Breach of contract, in IndyMac’s failure to follow the procedures set out in the deed of trust in pursuing its foreclosure.

5. Procedural unconscionability, in IndyMac’s making the original loan to her elderly father without explaining its unusual and onerous terms, particularly in light of his failing mental health.

6. Substantive unconscionability, based on the terms of the loan itself. It was an ARM with an initial interest rate of 1%, but which could be (and apparently was) adjusted upward in each succeeding month. This resulted in an initial period of negative amortization, and once the amortization cap was reached, a large and rapid increase in monthly payments. At the same time, some of Steinberger’s other theories were rejected, including an argument that, because IndyMac had intentionally destroyed the note, it had cancelled the debt. The court concluded that, in the absence of proof of intent to cancel the debt, it remained collectible.

 

 

Nevada Court Dismisses Show-me-the-Note Action Brought Against Chase and MERS

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The court in Leong v. JPMorgan Chase, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144678 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2013) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

This action arose out of the foreclosure proceedings initiated against the property of pro se Plaintiff Teresa Leong. Pending before the court was a motion to dismiss filed by defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff continued to request “to see my original documents Note and Deed.”

Plaintiff insisted that defendant failed to provide the original note. The court found that the only possibly relevant Nevada statute requiring the presentation of the original note or a certified copy is at a Foreclosure Mediation. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.086(4). Moreover, the court noted that it treats copies in the same way as it treats originals: “a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 52.245.

The court noted that the defendants correctly point out that plaintiff failed to cite to any authority that requires defendants to produce the original note, and defendants additionally provided non-binding legal authority to the contrary. As such, the court dismissed this cause of action with prejudice.

Tennessee Court Finds Allegation of Fraud Was Pled With Sufficient Particularity Pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03

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The court in deciding Zhong v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145916 (W.D. Wash. 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling dismissing the mortgagor’s intentional misrepresentation claim on the pleadings pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03.

Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and defendants advised plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff subsequently sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

This court ruled that the lower court erred in dismissing the mortgagor’s intentional misrepresentation claim on the pleadings pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 because her allegation of fraud stemming from an intentional misrepresentation were pleaded with sufficient particularity.

Moreover, because the amended complaint alleged particular intentional misrepresentations of a material fact, that signatories possessed authority to execute the deed of trust, as well as the mortgagor’s detrimental reliance upon such, the claim satisfied the heightened requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Further, this court found that the mortgagor’s claim was not correctly dismissed based upon the statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105, because it was at least plausible that the mortgagor was unable to discover the alleged intentional misrepresentation until the mortgagees commenced foreclosure against her.

Georgia Court Finds Chase Had Authority to Foreclose

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The court in deciding Ball v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146503 (M.D. Ga. 2013) granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiffs Johnny Frank Ball Jr. and Tempie Ball filed a suit in the Superior Court of Sumter County, Georgia, seeking to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of their home. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages against Chase and the Freddie Mac for wrongful foreclosure and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.

The legal theory underlying the plaintiff’s causes of action was premised on the definition of a “secured creditor” in the Georgia Code. Plaintiffs maintained that Chase lacked authority to foreclose its property because only a “secured creditor” [a creditor who holds the promissory note] may initiate a non-judicial foreclosure, and only Chase held the security deed.

The court in assessing the validity of this argument rejected it as the Georgia Supreme Court recently rejected this very theory. Therefore, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Nevada Court Found Plaintiff’s Claim for Quiet Title Failed as a Matter of Law Based on Statute’s Express Language

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The court in dealing with Beverly v. Weaver-Farley, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146150 (D. Nev. 2013) ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that pursuant to NRS 116.3116(2)(b), Wells Fargo’s first deed of trust was extinguished by the HOA’s foreclosure and sale of the underlying property.

The court found that, the first deed of trust was recorded in October 2004; also defendant Wells Fargo was assigned all rights under the first deed of trust in April 2009, a full month before the delinquent HOA assessment was recorded on the subject property. Thus, Wells Fargo’s lien meets the statutory requirements of NRS 116.3116(2)(b) as such survived the HOA sale. Therefore, the plaintiff took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust.

As an alternative argument, plaintiff contended that Section 3116(2)(c) carved out a limited exception to Section 3116(2)(b) that is applicable in this matter.

Plaintiff further contended that this section provided that the foreclosure of a delinquent HOA assessment lien extinguished the first security interest on the property if it related to charges incurred during the nine months prior to the foreclosure.

However, once again the court found that the plaintiff misconstrued the statute. The court found that the plain language of NRS 116.3116(2)(c) simply created a limited super priority lien for nine months of HOA assessments leading up to the foreclosure of the first mortgage, but it did not eliminate the first security interest. Based on the express language of the statutes, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim for quiet title failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss.

 

Texas Court Dismisses Action Claiming Fraud in Concealment, Fraud in Inducement, Quiet Title, & Rescission

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The court in deciding Diaz-Angarita v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147091 (S.D. Tex. 2013) eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff asserted causes of action for “fraud in the concealment,” fraud in the inducement, to quiet title, and for rescission. Defendants moved to dismiss.

In claims one and seven, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the substitute trustee’s deed was void as there was no valid notice of foreclosure and no appointment of a substitute trustee recorded, and because there was no assignment of the note and deed of trust recorded.

In claim two, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants had no standing to foreclose. Claim three asserted “fraud in the concealment” based on the allegation that Defendants failed to inform Schonacher, the original borrower, that the loan was securitized. Plaintiff’s fourth claim asserted a fraud in the inducement claim based on the allegation that defendants misrepresented their entitlement to foreclose and that they were the holder and owner of the note.

In claim five, plaintiff asserted a quiet title claim under Texas law. In claim six, plaintiff asserted a cause of action for rescission, which is a remedy and not a recognized cause of action. After categorically analyzing the plaintiff’s claims the court ultimately dismissed all seven of the plaintiff’s claims.

Although a court typically may grant the plaintiff at least one chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed a complaint based on key facts that were within his own knowledge. The court noted that it appeared unlikely that the plaintiff could amend to state viable claims for relief. As a result, the Court enters the dismissal without leave to amend and dismissed with prejudice.

California Court Finds That Defendants Complied With Statutory Mandate That the Notice of Default Include Sufficient Contact Information

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The court in deciding Wagma Safi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147005 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) ultimately granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In her first cause of action, the plaintiff asked for declaratory relief in the form of a judicial declaration that the plaintiff had the right to reinstate the loan for which the deed of trust was collateral, and that the defendants were required to provide her with the information necessary to do so.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s first cause of action for declaratory relief. Despite defendants’’ alleged refusal to provide plaintiff with information regarding the loan, their compliance with the notice requirements of section 2924c(b)(1) provided plaintiff with sufficient information to exercise her right to reinstate the loan.

In her second cause of action, plaintiff asked for declaratory relief, contending that “Bank of America was the sole beneficiary under the deed of trust and that MERS had no authority to transfer or assign any rights under the deed” Plaintiff alleged that MERS signed the deed of trust “solely as nominee” and thus lacked the authority to assign its interest to a third party.

The court found that plaintiff made no showing that would call into question the validity of MERS’ assignment. The court found that she failed to state a claim and the second cause of action was dismissed.