California Court Finds That Under State Civil Code Section 2924(a), MERS Had the Right to Foreclose

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California Oakland Division in deciding Earl A. Dancy v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No: C10-2602 SBA (2010) found that the plaintiff’s contentions lacked merit.

The court found that the plaintiff’s assertion that neither the loan servicer nor MERS were the true beneficiaries of the subject deed of trust and therefore had no authority to institute foreclosure proceedings, lacked merit. The court held that the deed of trust expressly designated that MERS was acting solely as nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.

Further, the court held that regardless of whether or not MERS owned the note or was entitled to any payments as a result, the fact remained that the deed of trust designated MERS as a beneficiary. Thus, under section 2924(a) of the California Civil Code, MERS had the right to foreclose.

Borden and Reiss on High-Stakes MBS Litigation

Brad and I posted Goliath Versus Goliath in High-Stakes MBS Litigation on SSRN (and BePress).  The abstract reads,

The loan-origination and mortgage-securitization practices between 2000 and 2007 created the housing and mortgage-backed securities bubble that precipitated the 2008 economic crisis and ensuing recession. The mess that the loan-origination and mortgage-securitization practices caused is now playing out in courts around the world. MBS investors are suing banks, MBS sponsors and underwriters for misrepresenting the quality of loans purportedly held in MBS pools and failing to properly transfer loan documents and mortgages to the pools, as required by the MBS pooling and servicing agreements. State and federal prosecutors have also filed claims against banks, underwriters and sponsors for the roles they played in creating defective MBS and for misrepresenting the quality of the assets purportedly held in MBS pools. This commentary focuses on the state of this upstream litigation. It reviews claims of several complaints and discusses some decisions on motions for summary judgment in several of the cases. The commentary is not a comprehensive review of all the activity in this area, but it does provide an overview of the issues at stake in this litigation. The litigation in this area is still relatively new, but with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, it will likely last for years to come and should reshape the MBS landscape.

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona Finds That the Borrower Gave MERS the Ability to Take Any Action, Which the Lender Would be Able to Take

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, in Blau v. America’s Servicing Company, et al, No. CV-08-773 (D. Ariz., 2009), acknowledged that MERS, acting as a beneficiary, was the proper party to execute an assignment of the deed of trust.

The borrower gave MERS the ability to take any action, which the lender would be able to take. Thus, this included the ability to assign, foreclose, and even substitute the trustee. The court also found that MERS had no liability under The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) since it had not been involved in making the loan to the plaintiff.

U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona Found the Mere Use of MERS Nid Not Constitute Common Law Fraud

The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, in Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., No. 09-cv-00517 (D.Ariz. 2009), dismissed all state and federal claims brought by all three of the borrowers. The borrowers filed a complaint against MERS as well as a group of other defendants

After considering the borrowers’ arguments, the court found the mere use of MERS did not constitute common law fraud on the borrowers. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege what effect, if any, listing the MERS system as a ‘sham’ beneficiary on the deed of trust had upon their obligations as borrowers.

Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of MERS. Accordingly, the Court held that a borrower lacked the basis to challenge the standing of an entity such as MERS. Further, the court, however, drew attention to a legal reference that such a borrower still had legal recourse by bringing an action to have the trustee’s sale set aside.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York Rules That a Party Perfects its Security Interests in Disputed Loans by Taking Possession of the Notes as Opposed to Recording the Mortgage Assignments, Pursuant to UCC Article 9

In Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 558, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled in favor of intervenor-plaintiff NetBank, granting its cross motion for summary judgment against intervenor-plaintiff, Southwest Securities Bank (herein described as Southwest) in a dispute regarding conflicting recorded mortgage assignments for nine loans. The court stated that “where parties assert competing interests in mortgage assignments,” under Article 9, “possession of the note perfects the assignee’s security interest regardless of whether any mortgage securing the note has been properly recorded.” It concluded that NetBank perfected its interest in eight of the nine disputed loans and took possession of them before Southwest, giving it a superior interest in those loans.

Confusion over who possessed the loans started when Defendant Community, a mortgage banker, entered into agreements with two banks, Southwest and RBMG (NetBank’s successor in interest), to fund a portion of its mortgage loans. Community entered Mortgage Purchase Agreements with both banks and engaged in a scheme known as “double booking,” where it “obtained duplicate funding for one loan from two different lenders and retained the entire value of the loan.” Essentially, “Community created two original notes and mortgages for each of the disputed loans.” Because of Community’s fraud “only one of the lenders would be paid in full,” and each bank claimed a priority interest in the nine loans that Community sold to it. Southwest recorded its assignments of the mortgages before RBMG for five of the loans, but RBMG received the original notes and assignments for eight of the loans before Southwest.

In determining which of the loans belonged to Southwest or NetBank and which of the mortgages were valid, the court had to decide “whether Article 9 or state real property law governs the security interests in mortgages.”  Under Article 9, a party perfects it security interest in a note by taking possession of it. Alternatively, under “race-notice statutes in state real property law,” a party perfects its security interest in a mortgage by recording the assignment. Southwest argued that the court should follow New York’s race-notice statute, whereas RBMG argued that Article 9 should govern.

Before reaching its decision, the court examined the New York Real Property Law Section 291, which states that a “bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of a junior mortgage, who records his assignment is entitled to priority over a prior unrecorded mortgage of which his assignor has full knowledge.” It explained that previous decisions applying the statute did not address instances where the “first party to record a mortgage assignment [had] a prior interest over another party who first takes possession of the note securing the mortgage.”  The court stated that in this case, the question depended on the “supremacy of perfecting the security interest in the note [as opposed to previous cases which regarded] perfecting the security interest in the mortgage.”

According to the statute’s language and precedent decisions regarding the same issue, Southwest would have a priority interest in five of the loans that it recorded before RMGA. Instead, the court applied Article 3 and Article 9 of the UCC in reaching its conclusions. It stated that “NetBank perfected its security interest in the loans and Southwest,” did not. The court agreed with previous cases in the Circuit which held that, “perfection of a security interest in the note (by taking possession under Article 9) should carry over to the mortgage incidental to it.” It explained that in New York, assignment of a note creates a security interest in the note, but a party perfects its security interest in the note by possessing it. From this reasoning, the court determined Southwest was not the first party to perfect its security interest in the loans, as it merely recorded its mortgage assignments but never possessed them. Therefore, the court denied Southwest’s motion for summary judgment requesting possession over the disputed loans.

Instead, the court granted NetBank’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Article 9, as it possessed eight of the disputed loans before Southwest. It also held that under UCC Article 3, NetBank qualified as a holder in due course (defined as a holder of a negotiable instrument who takes it for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored) in regards to seven of the loans, entitling it to those loans independent of its possession under Article 9.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, in Favor of Borrower, Vacates and Dismisses Judgment

The court in Nelson v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 97 So.3d 770 (2012) the Court granted Fannie Mae’s summary judgment as to its ejectment action against the borrower because the Court found that Fannie Mae received valid title to the property from MERS subsequent to the foreclosure sale conducted by MERS. However, on appeal, court of civil appeals of Alabama vacated the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.

https://macmiller.org/dev/cache/site/

The court of civil appeals reversed a decision by the lower court holding that under the state’s law MERS had the power and authority to conduct the foreclosure sale in its own name and the special warranty deed from MERS to Fannie Mae was valid and gave Fannie Mae superior legal title to the property. On appeal this was reversed.

Likewise, the lower court also originally held that an assignment of mortgage from MERS to the servicer was unnecessary for MERS to proceed with the foreclosure on behalf of the servicer. Accordingly the court of civil appeals also vacated this.

Florida Court Dismisses Class Action to Declare MERS in Violation of Florida Consumer Protection Laws

The debtors in Trent v. MERS, 288 Fed. App’x 571 (11th Cir. 2008) argued that Mortgage Systems sent them deceptive notices that were in violation of section 559.72(9) of the Collection Act. The debtors further argued that the notice misidentified Mortgage Systems as their “creditor.” Lastly, the debtors alleged that the lower court should have applied the “least-sophisticated-debtor” standard to determine whether these notices were misleading.

The debtors also argued that MERS violated the Collection Act when it filed foreclosure actions against them, but the court rejected this argument. The court reasoned that even if MERS engaged in “debt collection activities” under the Collection Act, MERS did not violate section 559.72(9), because MERS had the authority to file foreclosure actions.

Ultimately the court decided that the debtors’ arguments failed. The court found that under the mortgage contracts, MERS had the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property. Mortgage Systems was the mortgagee, the notices sent to the debtors restated information from the mortgage contracts and were not likely to mislead even the least sophisticated debtor.