Texas Court Dismisses Claims of Texas Debt Collection Act and Texas Property Code Violations

The court in deciding Katz v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist., (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss put forth by the defendant.

Plaintiff Katz alleged that defendant JP Morgan: (1) violated the Texas Property Code by failing to give proper notice because all transfers of the lien were not recorded timely; (2) was unjustly enriched because Katz may have been paying the wrong lender or account and that foreclosure would yield value above the amount owed; (3) violated or will violate the Texas Business and Commerce Code because defendants had failed to produce the original note with all transfers and assignments, thus the defendant could not enforce the mortgage without the promissory note; and that the defendant (4) violated the Texas Debt Collection Act by taking actions to collect on the note despite having no authority to collect on the note.

After methodically considering the plaintiff’s assertions, the court categorically dismissed them.

Texas Court Dismisses Claims Centered Around FDCPA and TDCPA Violations

The court in deciding Warren v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss all of the claims brought by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that MERS could not assign the note or deed of trust because it was not a party to, and never had a beneficial interest in, the note. Plaintiff further alleged that the note was “securitized”, thus defendant was not the owner of the note or deed of trust and had no right to foreclose on the Property. Plaintiff asserted a claim to quiet title and requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to restrain defendant from foreclosing and evicting him from the Property.

Although the complaint did not formally list any substantive claims, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief contained allegations that may liberally construed as claims for wrongful foreclosure and violations of the Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(B), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA).

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to notify him of the pending foreclosure sale, since the foreclosure notice was “returned as undeliverable” by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). Before filing suit, he sent the defendant a request “for a verification of the debt” pursuant to the federal FDCPA and the TDCPA. Plaintiff believed that pursuant to the FDCPA, the foreclosure could not have been conducted until 30 days had passed after the date he sent his request.

Plaintiff further claimed that the defendant could not foreclose because there were defects in the original loan financing and the original foreclosure order and because defendant failed to “physically post” a copy of the foreclosure sale notice at “the courthouse” where the sale was to take place.

This court considered the plaintiff’s contentions and eventually found them without merit.

Texas Court Rejects Break-in-the-Chain Claim

The court in deciding Martinez v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist., (W.D. Tex. 2013) found that plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim to which relief could be granted and dismissed the action.

Plaintiffs argued that the 2005 assignment was “fraudulent and forged,” “manufactured,” and “void and invalid,” constituting a “break in the chain.” Plaintiffs also claimed that defendant had no standing to foreclose on the instrument.

Plaintiffs alleged the 2005 assignment from Washington Mutual to Wells Fargo was “suspicious” due to the five year delay in recordation and because “Washington Mutual was bankrupt in August of 2010 and no longer existed in 2010.” According to plaintiffs, the 2005 assignment was flawed because it was recorded “some twelve years after the original transaction.”

Defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs lacked standing to complain of any alleged defects in the assignments, and, standing aside, plaintiffs’ claims lack viability. Plaintiffs argued that defendant’s motion was moot. This court ultimately found that the defendant’s motion to dismiss had merit and granted it.

Maryland Court Denies Claim Alleging Violations of Federal and State Consumer Laws

The court in deciding Bolden v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist., 182057 (D. Md. 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff in bringing this action alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law, § 14-201 et seq., and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq.

After considering the plaintiff’s arguments, the court found that the sparse factual allegations in the complaint could not sustain the claims, as such the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

Washington Court Dismisses Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Washington Deed of Trust Act Violation Claims

The court in deciding Dietz v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2014) granted Wells Fargo and MERS’ motion to dismiss.

This action involved is a post-sale wrongful foreclosure case. Plaintiff Timothy Dietz alleged causes of action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)(Counts I and IV) and violation of the Washington Deed of Trust Act (DTA)(Counts II and III).

The court in deciding this case noted that Dietz’s first and fourth causes of action were for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b) and 1692e(5) respectively. These causes of action did not mention MERS  and there was no allegation in the complaint that MERS engaged in any activities that could be construed as a “debt collection.” As such, this court dismissed the FDCPA causes of action against MERS.

Similarly, the court found that Dietz had not alleged facts that gave rise to a violation of the debt validation notice requirements. Dietz’s claim that that Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) by failing to notify him within 30 days after it purchased the Loan. Wells Fargo purchased the Loan in 2008 and the assignment was recorded in 2011. The court found that under either date, the claim was barred by FDCPA‘s one year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), as this lawsuit was not filed until 2013.