Servicer Safety & Soundness and Consumer Protection

The FHFA’s Inspector General issued an audit, FHFA Actions to Manage Enterprise Risks from Nonbank Servicers Specializing in Troubled Mortgages. The audit identified two major risks in the current environment:

  • Using short-term financing to buy servicing rights for troubled mortgage loans that may only begin to pay out after long-term work to resolve their difficulties. This practice can jeopardize the companies’ operations and also the Enterprises’ timely payment guarantees and reputation for loans they back; and
  • Assuming responsibilities for servicing large volumes of mortgage loans that may be beyond what their infrastructures can handle. For example, of the 30 largest mortgage servicers, those that were not banks held a 17% share of the mortgage servicing market at the end of 2013, up from 9% at the end of 2012, and 6% at the end of 2011. This rise in nonbank special servicers has been accompanied by consumer complaints, lawsuits, and other regulatory actions as the servicers’ workload outstrips their processing capacity. (1-2)

The audit notes that “nonbank special servicers do not have a prudential safety and soundness regulator at the federal level for their mortgage servicing operations.” (6)

I think the important story here is more about consumer protection than it is about safety and soundness regulation. That is not to say that the Inspector General’s audit ignored consumer protection. Indeed, it it does spend a significant amount of time addressing that topic, noting that other federal regulators such as the CFPB have also zeroed in on the impact that non-bank servicers have on consumers.

But the safety and soundness risks may a bit overblown. A significant number of consumers, on the other hand, continue to be treated poorly, poorly, poorly by servicers.

Fannie and Freddie’s Unreported Billions of Losses

The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Inspector General has warned FHFA Acting Director DeMarco that the FHFA has allowed Fannie and Freddie to defer acknowledgment of billions of dollars of losses relating to seriously delinquent singe-family residential mortgage loans for far too long.

The Office of the IG recommends that estimates of these losses be reported immediately, on an ongoing basis. There are all sorts of obvious good reasons to do this, including the fact that “[c]lassification of loans according to risk characteristics is a critical factor considered by financial regulators to evaluate a financial institution’s safety and soundness”  and that it accords with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. (1)

directly through interest

Fannie and Freddie’s recent reports of billions of dollars of profits have caused a scrum to form around the two companies, as investors in preferred shares seek to get a slice of those profits through a series of lawsuits (here, here, here and here for example), as low-income advocates seek to fund the Housing Trust Fund through a lawsuit (here) and as some politicians forget the risks that these two companies present to the American taxpayer and seek to reanimate the two companies.

In a perfect world, we would ask what kind of residential housing finance infrastructure we want to implement for the next fifty years or so and what should happen to Fannie and Freddie should have little to nothing to do with their current profits or losses. But the political reality is that it does. With that as a given, we should at least have an honest assessment of their balance sheets. But the FHFA is keeping us in the dark. It needs to turn the lights on so that we can understand the true magnitude of these unreported losses so that the debate about Fannie and Freddie can be held with as much accurate information as possible.