Tag Archives: banks

Kroll: Non-Banks A Non-Systemic Risk

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Kroll Bond Rating Agency released a Commentary on Capital Requirements for Non-Bank Mortgage Companies. I may be missing something, but this just seems to be a love letter to the securitization industry. The Commentary opens,

Federal and state regulators are currently considering the imposition of capital requirements and other prudential rules on various classes of non-bank financial institutions, including insurers and mortgage servicers. This report examines some of the issues involving non-bank financial companies with a focus on non-bank loan mortgage originators and/or servicers (“seller/servicers”) in the context of the evolving discussion among regulators and researchers toward developing “appropriate” regulation and supervision like that traditionally applied to insured depository institutions (IDIs).

We believe that regulatory efforts to impose capital requirements on non-bank financial institutions such as mortgage loan seller/servicers need to consider the following factors:

• First, most non-bank financial companies operating in the mortgage space have significantly higher levels of tangible capital and lower risk-weighted assets than do IDIs, especially when considering that much of the asset base of a seller/servicer is collateralized and that the mortgages which they service typically are owned by third parties, in most cases institutional investors. The chief sources of risk for seller/servicers are operational and legal, not credit or market risk.

• Second, the recent call by state and federal regulators for capital requirements for non-bank mortgage companies somewhat ignores the real point of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, namely the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.

• Third, since non-banks in the US are already dependent upon the commercial banking system for short-term funding and are effectively prohibited from capitalizing their asset and maturity transformation activities in the short-term debt capital markets (e.g., commercial paper), it is unclear why capital requirements for non-banks are appropriate.

We believe that large non-bank companies and particularly seller/servicers in the mortgage sector do not require formal capital requirements and other types of prudential regulation. In our view, the real issue behind the 2007-2009 financial crisis involved securities fraud and the resulting withdrawal of investor liquidity behind various classes of securities issued by off balance sheet vehicles, not a lack of capital in either IDIs or non-bank firms. (1, footnotes omitted)

First of all, it is not clear to me why Kroll is conflating mortgage originators with seller/servicers in this analysis. I think that Kroll is right that seller/servicers predominantly face operational risk, and whatever credit risk they might face (unless they own mortgages that they service) is quite low. But mortgage originators are a different story completely. If they fund themselves from the short-term commercial paper market they are subject to runs much like an uninsured bank would be. See generally Gary Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand (2009). One would expect that regulators would prescribe different capital levels for different types of non-banks — and could conceivably exempt some seller/servicers completely.

Second, Kroll writes that the financial crisis was caused by “the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.” But capital requirements go directly to investor confidence in individual firms as well as in an entire sector.

Third, Kroll’s analysis is heavily dependent on describing the troubles of IDIs. Yes, big banks were at the heart of the problems of the financial crisis, but that does not mean that non-banks should get a free pass on regulation, one that will allow them to grow to be the 800 pound gorillas of the next crisis.

Finally, Kroll writes,

One of the most widely held views espoused by US regulators is that non-bank financial firms caused the subprime crisis. A better way to state the reality is that the non-bank firms were involved in subprime mortgage origination and sales because the largest commercial banks and their partners such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a monopoly position in the prime mortgage space. Large banks and the GSEs made the whole subprime market work by being willing to buy the senior tranches of subprime deals. (7)

I am not sure how to best characterize that argument, but it is of the ilk of “The Devil made me do it” or “Everyone else was doing it” or “I was just a small fry — much bigger companies than mine were doing it.” This is really not an argument against regulation — if anything it is a call for regulation. If appropriate incentives do not align without regulation, then that is just when the government should step in.

Connecticut Court Rejects Invalid Assignment and Standing Claims

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Samaha, 2013 Conn. Super.  (Conn. Super. Ct., 2013) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage executed by Joseph Samaha and Denise Samaha in favor of the Webster Bank in the principal amount of $162,000.00.

The defendant raised several special defenses to this foreclosure action. First, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this litigation. Second, the defendant claimed that as a result of the death of one of the makers of the note, Joseph Samaha, that his estate had an indivisible interest in the subject property and was subject to probate court jurisdiction. Third, the defendant challenged the authority of MERS to assign this mortgage to the plaintiff. Four, that the defendant had tendered payment with regard to the note and she alleged accord and satisfaction. Fifth, the defendant challenged whether or not the note in question was a negotiable instrument.

Regarding the first special defense, the court decided that the plaintiff had standing.
The court found there was simply no authority for the defendant’s second assertion. Further, the court found there were no facts alleged in the special defense and there is no affidavit from the defendant providing any factual foundation for the third assertion. Regarding the fourth special defense the court found that the mere assertion of this defense, without any evidence to support it, and thereby contest or create a material issue of fact for a motion of summary judgment is insufficient. Lastly, the fifth special defense was deemed to be an assertion of a legal conclusion.

The court in deciding this case granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

New York Court Denies Defendant’s Cross-Move to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3)

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The court in deciding Waterfall Victoria Master Fund, Ltd. v Hayle, 2013 N.Y. Misc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2013) denied the defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the plaintiff’s lack of standing is denied. The court granted the motion proffered by the plaintiff.

Plaintiffs brought an action to foreclose on the defendant’s property, and sought summary judgment in its favor against the defendant’s affirmative defenses and counter claims. Defendants, Parkers, opposed the plaintiff’s motion and cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3), asserting that plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action.

The court found that the plaintiff’s well documented motion which included a copy of the note endorsed in blank, the written assignment of the mortgage by MERS, the subsequent assignments of the mortgage and note to Waterfall Victoria Master Fund, and the assignment of the mortgage and note Waterfall Victoria Master Fund, established its entitlement to summary judgment, including its standing. As such the court granted the plaintiff’s motion.

New Jersey Court Finds that Plaintiff had Both Possession of the Original Note and Assignment

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The court in deciding Assets Recovery 23, LLC v. Odoemene, 2013 N.J. Super. (App.Div., 2013) this court affirmed the ruling of the lower court that the plaintiff was permitted to foreclose.

In this foreclosure matter, defendants Emmanuel C. Odoemene and Doris D. Odoemene appealed from a June 11, 2012 Chancery Division order, which granted summary judgment to plaintiff Assets Recovery 23, LLC and dismissed defendants’ answer, and denied defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. After considering the plaintiff’s contentions this court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

On appeal, defendants merely reiterated that plaintiff lacked standing because it did not physically possess the note at the time it filed the foreclosure complaint. They also argued that the April 2011 assignment did not properly assign the note; however, the court found this argument to be lacking.

This court also found that the evidence in this case clearly established that plaintiff had standing when it filed the foreclosure complaint. Here, the plaintiff had both possession of the original note and an assignment of the mortgage and note prior to filing the complaint.

Minnesota Court Rejects Tweaked Version of Show-Me-the-Note Claim

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The court in deciding Mutua v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 Minn. Dist. 65 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2013) found that since the defendant had a valid legal title to plaintiffs’ mortgage. Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim against either defendant and their respective motions to dismiss are granted.

This Court reasoned that there was a valid assignment of plaintiffs’ mortgages to defendant which gave defendant legal title to the mortgages and allowed Defendant to foreclose on plaintiffs’ properties.

The court noted that both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had rejected the legal theory, which has become known as “show-me-the-note,” advanced by plaintiffs.

In the present action, the court noted that plaintiffs merely tweaked this legal theory and argued that based on the language of the plaintiffs’ mortgage and note, an entity different from defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company had the legal right to foreclose on plaintiffs’ homes. This argument was rejected.

Hawaiian Court Finds That Foreclosure was Permissible on 1250 Oceanside

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The court in deciding In re 1250 Oceanside Partners, (Bankr. D. Haw., 2013) ultimately came to the conclusion that Oceanside was entitled to foreclose.

The debtor in possession, 1250 Oceanside (Oceanside), sought to enforce a promissory note and foreclose a mortgage made by defendants Lawrence Shaw and Lisa Shaw (the Shaws). The other defendants claimed interests in the mortgaged property. Oceanside now sought summary judgment. The Shaws argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, that Oceanside was not entitled to foreclose, and that if it was entitled to foreclose, it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment.

The court decided that there was no dispute as to any material fact. Oceanside was entitled to foreclose on the property, but it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment against the Shaws at this stage in the litigation.

Tennessee Court Dismisses TILA, RICO, and RESPA Claims

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The Tennessee court in deciding Mhoon v. United States Bank Home Mortg., 2013 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Tenn., 2013) dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff [Mhoon] filed a complaint against defendant U.S. Bank. This case was an action to prohibit a non-judicial foreclosure of real property. The complaint alleged that U.S. Bank was engaged in efforts to illegally foreclosure on Mhoon’s home. The complaint also alleged that U.S. Bank acted with gross negligence and violated its duty of good faith.

In addition, the complaint alleged breach of contract because U.S. Bank failed to send any and all acceleration, default, and foreclosure notices to Mhoon in the manner required by the deed of trust.

The complaint further alleged U.S. Bank violated Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); violated Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) by failing to provide a good faith estimate; violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) statute and engaged in fraud; and lacked standing to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the Property.

The court ultimately held (1) plaintiff has not sufficiently plead a breach of contract claim; (2) plaintiff’s claims for gross negligence and violation of the duty of good faith fail as a matter of law; (3) plaintiff’s allegations based on violations of the TILA and the RESPA were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and failed to state a claim because U.S. Bank was not the originating lender; and (4) plaintiff’s claims for fraud violations of the RICO, and lack of standing all failed as a matter of law.

For those reasons, this court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).