Relegating Consumer Protection To The Shadows

The Department of the Treasury released its report on Asset Management and Insurance, which follows on the heels of its report on the capital markets. The latest report calls for replacing the term “shadow banking” with “market based finance.” (63) The term “shadow banking” reflected a belief that there was a less regulated sector of the financial services industry that operated in the shadows of heavily regulated financial services sectors like banking.

While innocent enough as a matter of nomenclature, retiring “shadow banking” reflects the Trump Administration’s desire to reduce regulation across the financial services industry and to put an end to any negative connotations that the term shadow banking carries. The report makes this crystal clear:  “Applying the term “shadow banking” to registered investment companies is particularly inappropriate as the word “shadow” could be interpreted as implying insufficient regulatory oversight, or disclosure.” (63)

Given that the Trump Administration is focused on rolling back many of the provisions of Dodd-Frank, it is worth reviewing the changes that this report advocates. I focus here on how the report seeks to limit the regulatory oversight role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:

Title X of Dodd-Frank expressly excludes the “business of insurance” from the list of financial products and services within the CFPB’s jurisdiction. Dodd-Frank also prohibits the CFPB from exercising enforcement authority over “a person regulated by a State insurance regulator.” A “person” is defined to be “any person that is engaged in the business of insurance and subject to regulation by any State insurance regulator, but only to the extent that such person acts in such capacity.”

There are, however, a limited number of exceptions where the CFPB may exercise its authority over the business of insurance and persons regulated by state insurance regulators:

• If an insurer offers a financial product or service to the extent that the insurer is engaged in the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service (e.g., debt protection contracts that are administered by insurers on behalf of a bank); To supervise and enforce violations of federal consumer laws (e.g., violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act that relate to insurers);

• If persons knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance in an Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts and Practices (UDAAP) violation (i.e., if an insurer knowingly or recklessly supports a covered person or service provider in violation of the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank); or

• To request information from a person regulated by a state insurance regulator in connection with the CFPB’s rulemaking, investigative, subpoena, or hearing powers.

Despite the general exclusions, these statutory exceptions create considerable uncertainty concerning what the CFPB can examine or regulate. Insurers are concerned that, if the CFPB interprets the exceptions broadly, it could potentially regulate insurers or the business of insurance in a manner more expansive than the statutory exceptions intend. Such regulatory actions could also be duplicative of actions undertaken by state insurance regulators.

Recommendations

Treasury recommends that Congress clarify the “business of insurance” exception to ensure that the CFPB does not engage in the oversight of activities already monitored by state insurance regulators. (108-09)

This recommendation seeks to further reduce consumer protection in the financial services industry. Republicans have been quite open with this goal, so there is really nothing hypocritical about this recommendation. It is just a bad one. There have been a lot of abusive debt protection contracts like credit life insurance products that are priced way higher than comparable life insurance products. Blocking the CFPB from regulating in this area will be bad news for consumers.

 

Contract Selling Is Back, Big-Time

The Chicago Reader quoted me in The Infamous Practice of Contract Selling Is Back in Chicago. It reads, in part,

When Carolyn Smith saw a for sale sign go up on her block one evening in the fall of 2011, it felt serendipitous. The now 68-year-old was anxiously looking for a new place to live. The landlord of her four-unit apartment building in the city’s Austin neighborhood was in foreclosure and had stopped paying the water bill. That month, she and the other tenants had finally scraped together the money themselves to prevent a shutoff and were planning to withhold rent until the landlord paid them back. Exhausted with this process and tired of dealing with “slumlords,” Smith wanted to buy a home in the neighborhood to ensure that she, her mother, Gwendolyn, and their dog, Sugar Baby, would have a stable place to live. But due to a past bankruptcy, Smith thought she would never be able to get a mortgage. So when she saw a house on her street for sale with a sign that said “owner financing,” she was excited. The next morning, she called the number listed and learned that the down payment was just $900—a sum she could fathom paying. “I figured I was blessed,” she says.

Her good fortune continued. A man on the other end of the line told her she was the very first one to inquire. The seller, South Carolina-based National Asset Advisors, called her several more times and mailed her paperwork to sign. Smith says she never met in person with anyone from National Asset Advisors or Harbour Portfolio Advisors, the Texas-based company that owned the home. But she says the agents she spoke with assured her that her credit was good enough for the transaction, despite the past bankruptcy. Next, they gave her a key code that allowed her to go in and look at the house, explaining that she’d be purchasing it “as is.” Smith thought the two-flat looked like a fixer-upper—the door had been damaged in an apparent break-in, and there was no hot-water heater, furnace, or kitchen sink—but given her poor luck with apartments of late, she felt she couldn’t pass up the chance to own a home. Both she and her mother, now 84, had been renting their whole lives; after pulling together the down payment, they beamed with pride when, in December 2011, they received a letter from National Asset Advisors that read “Congratulations on your purchase of your new home!”

But within a year, Smith discovered that the house was in even worse shape than she’d realized. In her first months in her new home, Smith estimates that she spent more than $4,000 just to get the heat and running water working properly, drinking bottled water in the meantime. Then the chimney started to crumble. Smith would hear the periodic thud of stray bricks tumbling into the alleyway as she sat in her living room or lay in bed at night; she began to worry that a passerby would be hit in the head and soon spent another $2,000 to replace the chimney. Public records show that the house had sat vacant earlier that year, and the city had ordered its previous owners to make extensive repairs.

Had Smith approached a bank for a mortgage, she likely would’ve received a Federal Housing Administration-issued form advising her to get a home inspection before buying. But as far as she recalls, no one she spoke to ever suggested one, and in her rush to get out of her old apartment, she didn’t think to insist.

The documents Smith signed with Harbour and National Asset Advisors required her to bring the property into habitable condition within four months, and with all the unexpected expenses, she soon fell behind on her monthly payments of $545.

Smith’s retirement from her job as an adult educator at Malcolm X College, in the spring of 2013, compounded the financial strain. Living on a fixed income of what she estimates was around $1,100 a month in pension and social security payments, she fell further behind, and the stress mounted.

“When we got to be two months behind, they would call me every day,” she remembers.

National Asset Advisors also began sending her letters threatening to evict her. That’s when Smith had a heart-stopping realization: She hadn’t actually purchased her home at all. The document she had signed wasn’t a traditional mortgage, as she had believed, but a “contract for deed”—a type of seller-financed transaction under which buyers lack any equity in the property until they’ve paid for it in full. Since Smith didn’t actually have a deed to the house, or any of the rights typically afforded home owners, she and her mother could be thrown out without a foreclosure process, forfeiting the thousands of dollars they’d already spent to rehabilitate the home.

“I know people always say ‘buyer beware’ ” she acknowledges. “But I’d never had a mortgage before, and I feel like they took advantage of that.”

What felt like a private nightmare for Smith has been playing out nationwide in the wake of the housing market crash, as investment firms step in to fill a void left by banks, now focused on lending to wealthier borrowers with spotless credit histories. In a tight credit market, companies like Harbour, which has purchased roughly 7,000 homes nationwide since 2010, including at least 42 in Cook County, purport to offer another shot at home ownership for those who can’t get mortgages. Such practices are increasingly common in struggling cities hard hit by the housing crash. A February 2016 article in the New York Times titled “Market for Fixer-Uppers Traps Low-Income Buyers” examined Harbour’s contract-for-deed sales in Akron, Ohio, and Battle Creek, Michigan. The Detroit News has reported that in 2015 the number of homes sold through contract-for-deed agreements in the city exceeded those sold through traditional mortgages.

*     *     *

Contract-for-deed sales also offered an attractive loophole from the growing set of regulations on traditional mortgages following the financial crisis. “In the same way that you saw [subprime lenders like] Countrywide get really big in the late 1990s,” says David Reiss, research director of the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, “one of the real attractions for the businesses operating in this space is that they are underregulated.”

The Money Problem

Professor Ricks

I recently read The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation by Morgan Ricks (University of Chicago Press 2016).  While it is not a book for the financially faint of heart, it does provide a great introduction to what money is and what banks and other financial intermediaries do. The back matter reads,

Years have passed since the world experienced one of the worst financial crises in history, and while countless experts have analyzed it, many central questions remain unanswered. Should money creation be considered a ‘public’ or ‘private’ activity—or both? What do we mean by, and want from, financial stability? What role should regulation play? How would we design our monetary institutions if we could start from scratch?

In The Money Problem, Morgan Ricks addresses all of these questions and more, offering a practical yet elegant blueprint for a modernized system of money and banking—one that, crucially, can be accomplished through incremental changes to the United States’ current system. He brings a critical, missing dimension to the ongoing debates over financial stability policy, arguing that the issue is primarily one of monetary system design. The Money Problem offers a way to mitigate the risk of catastrophic panic in the future, and it will expand the financial reform conversation in the United States and abroad.

I particularly recommend Part I to those trying to get their hands around money (the concept, not hard currency itself) and how it is created. Ricks reviews the “standard textbook description” of bank money creation and others’ account of it before providing his own “modified story.” (58-59)

Parts II and III provides a far-reaching blueprint for reforming the monetary system.  This reform agenda is not without its critics, but I think Ricks gives a fair reading to competing views so you can make up your own mind as to who is right.

Kroll: Non-Banks A Non-Systemic Risk

Kroll Bond Rating Agency released a Commentary on Capital Requirements for Non-Bank Mortgage Companies. I may be missing something, but this just seems to be a love letter to the securitization industry. The Commentary opens,

Federal and state regulators are currently considering the imposition of capital requirements and other prudential rules on various classes of non-bank financial institutions, including insurers and mortgage servicers. This report examines some of the issues involving non-bank financial companies with a focus on non-bank loan mortgage originators and/or servicers (“seller/servicers”) in the context of the evolving discussion among regulators and researchers toward developing “appropriate” regulation and supervision like that traditionally applied to insured depository institutions (IDIs).

We believe that regulatory efforts to impose capital requirements on non-bank financial institutions such as mortgage loan seller/servicers need to consider the following factors:

• First, most non-bank financial companies operating in the mortgage space have significantly higher levels of tangible capital and lower risk-weighted assets than do IDIs, especially when considering that much of the asset base of a seller/servicer is collateralized and that the mortgages which they service typically are owned by third parties, in most cases institutional investors. The chief sources of risk for seller/servicers are operational and legal, not credit or market risk.

• Second, the recent call by state and federal regulators for capital requirements for non-bank mortgage companies somewhat ignores the real point of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, namely the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.

• Third, since non-banks in the US are already dependent upon the commercial banking system for short-term funding and are effectively prohibited from capitalizing their asset and maturity transformation activities in the short-term debt capital markets (e.g., commercial paper), it is unclear why capital requirements for non-banks are appropriate.

We believe that large non-bank companies and particularly seller/servicers in the mortgage sector do not require formal capital requirements and other types of prudential regulation. In our view, the real issue behind the 2007-2009 financial crisis involved securities fraud and the resulting withdrawal of investor liquidity behind various classes of securities issued by off balance sheet vehicles, not a lack of capital in either IDIs or non-bank firms. (1, footnotes omitted)

First of all, it is not clear to me why Kroll is conflating mortgage originators with seller/servicers in this analysis. I think that Kroll is right that seller/servicers predominantly face operational risk, and whatever credit risk they might face (unless they own mortgages that they service) is quite low. But mortgage originators are a different story completely. If they fund themselves from the short-term commercial paper market they are subject to runs much like an uninsured bank would be. See generally Gary Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand (2009). One would expect that regulators would prescribe different capital levels for different types of non-banks — and could conceivably exempt some seller/servicers completely.

Second, Kroll writes that the financial crisis was caused by “the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.” But capital requirements go directly to investor confidence in individual firms as well as in an entire sector.

Third, Kroll’s analysis is heavily dependent on describing the troubles of IDIs. Yes, big banks were at the heart of the problems of the financial crisis, but that does not mean that non-banks should get a free pass on regulation, one that will allow them to grow to be the 800 pound gorillas of the next crisis.

Finally, Kroll writes,

One of the most widely held views espoused by US regulators is that non-bank financial firms caused the subprime crisis. A better way to state the reality is that the non-bank firms were involved in subprime mortgage origination and sales because the largest commercial banks and their partners such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a monopoly position in the prime mortgage space. Large banks and the GSEs made the whole subprime market work by being willing to buy the senior tranches of subprime deals. (7)

I am not sure how to best characterize that argument, but it is of the ilk of “The Devil made me do it” or “Everyone else was doing it” or “I was just a small fry — much bigger companies than mine were doing it.” This is really not an argument against regulation — if anything it is a call for regulation. If appropriate incentives do not align without regulation, then that is just when the government should step in.