Tag Archives: fannie

Where’s Perry? Are Phannie and Freddie Busted?!?

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With all apologies to Perry the Platypus who stars in my sons’ favorite TV show, Phineas and Ferb, today I look at the complaint in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al. Perry Capital has sued the federal government for destroying the value of Fannie and Freddie securities held by Perry and the investment funds it manages. In particular, the complaint (drafted by Theodore Olson and others at Gibson Dunn) states that

Perry Capital seeks to prevent Defendants from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment to preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPAs”) executed by Treasury and the FHFA, acting as conservator for the Companies. The Third Amendment fundamentally and unfairly alters the structure and nature of the securities Treasury purchased under the PSPAs, impermissibly destroys value in all of the Companies’ privately held securities, and illegally begins to liquidate the Companies. (2)

The plaintiff alleges that the government’s actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The APA governs the decision-making procedures of federal agencies like Treasury and independent agencies like the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). HERA was passed at the outset of the financial crisis and governs the process by which Fannie and Freddie may be put into conservatorship. (I discuss the enactment of HERA in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, which is also available on BePress.)

[Warning:  necessary but complex details follow.  Those who are not GSE geeks may skip to the end.]

After the two companies were put into conservatorship in 2008,

Treasury and the FHFA executed the PSPAs, according to which Treasury purchased 1 million shares of the Government Preferred Stock from each company, in exchange for a funding commitment that allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from Treasury as needed to ensure that they maintained a net worth of at least zero. As relevant here, the Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against Treasury’s funding commitment and is entitled to a cumulative dividend equal to ten percent of the outstanding liquidation preference. The PSPAs also grant Treasury warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. (2-3)

 According to the complaint, the Third Amendment to the PSPA changed the way that profits would be distributed by the two companies:

Under the original stock certificates, Treasury’s dividend was paid quarterly in the amount equal to an annual ten percent of the Government Preferred Stock’s outstanding liquidation preference. In the Third Amendment, the FHFA and Treasury amended the dividend provision to require that every dollar of each company’s net worth above a certain capital reserve amount be given to Treasury as a dividend. . . . Treasury’s additional profits from the Third Amendment are enormous. (5)

This is a very complex case, and I will return to it in future posts.  For now, I would just flag some issues that may pose problems for Perry.

First, is this case ripe for adjudication?  Perry states that they will be harmed when the two companies liquidate, but they are nowhere near liquidation.  Will the harm Perry predicts necessarily come about? The claim that they are harmed as to their expected dividends is stronger. Yet Perry acknowledges that the PSPAs “explicitly prohibit the payment of any dividend to any shareholder other than Treasury without Treasury’s consent.” (16)

Second, to what extent is this matter governed by the APA? I am not an APA expert, and I am wary of second-guessing Olson’s complaint in a blog post. But I would note that the court may not find that the APA even applies in this case and may find that HERA governs this dispute on its own. And even if the APA applies, the court may give great deference to the decisions of Treasury and the FHFA.

Finally, does the language from HERA that Perry relies on really give it much to hang its hat on? I think the crux of Perry’s argument is that the Third Amendment “created new securities”  instead of changing the terms of existing securities. (24) If a court disagrees with Perry on this (and it seems like a bit of a stretch to me), the theory of the case will be severely weakened.

All of this being said, I would agree with Perry that the holders of the Private Sector Preferred Stock — particularly the holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government.  Various regulations encouraged lending institutions to hold Fannie and Freddie preferred stock over other investments. Those incentives sure looked like an implied guarantee before the subprime crisis knocked Fannie and Freddie off their feet.

Bottom line: this dispute cannot be settled in a late night blog post.  We’ll have to wait and see if Agent P can pull off what may be his most difficult mission yet.

State of the Nation’s Housing 2013: Build It and They Will Come

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The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University released The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013.  As always there is much of interest in this annual report. I was particularly intrigued by Figure 21 on page 20, “The Government Continues to Have an Outsized Footprint in the Mortgage Market.” The report states

Despite efforts to entice private capital into the mortgage market, the GSEs and FHA continue to back the vast majority of loans(Figure 21). In 2001, loans securitized into private-label securities or held in bank portfolios accounted for nearly half of loan originations. Their market share rose to about two-thirds at the height of the housing boom before retreating to the low single-digits. Beginning in 2009, government-backed loans have accounted for roughly 90 percent of all originations. While the private securities market was still moribund in 2012, portfolio lending by banks showed its first substantial increase in years (albeit to a modest level), bringing the government share down slightly. (20-21)

As Fannie and Freddie return to profitability, policymakers are acting as if only the government can provide credit to the residential mortgage market, but from Figure 21 we can see that over a relatively short time period, capital can meaningfully shift from the secondary market (private MBS) to the government (FHA, Fannie and Freddie) to the primary market (portfolio lenders). Instead of assuming that the present structure is the best of all possible worlds, we should design the system we want and incentivize capital to find it.

Build it and they will come.

FHFA: Critical Concerns Remain, Future Uncertain

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The FHFA issued its 2012 Report to Congress which provides a report of the annual examinations of Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs. The report documents critical concerns about Fannie and Freddie, none of which are particularly newsworthy at this late date. But the report does have some intimations of what may lay ahead, which are particularly interesting now that the Senate has finally taken up GSE reform.

The report reviews the three goals set in 2012 for the ongoing conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie:

Build. Build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market.
Contract. Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations.
Maintain. Maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages. (1)

There are some interesting specifics attached to these general goals.

For the Build goal, FHFA has taken the position that there should be a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market that operates like a “market utility,” a model bandied about by Henry Paulson when he was Treasury Secretary. (13)

For the Contract goal, FHFA has indicated that it “will continue increasing guarantee fees in 2013  and evaluating how close current guarantee fee pricing is to the point where private capital would be willing to absorb credit risk.” 14)

For the Maintain goal, FHFA has taken the position that the mortgage market should transition to a more “competitive ” model, moving away from one in which “the government touches more than 9 out of every 10 mortgages.” (15)

While not surprising given Acting Director DeMarco’s past statements and actions, this report indicates that at least the FHFA believes that we should move away from such intense government involvement in the mortgage market to a system that better prices risk and which spreads that risk across a range of competitors. At such a high level of generality, I agree that these are worthwhile goals. But as with everything involving housing finance policy — the devil will be in the details.

Investor HERA-sy

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As I have previously noted, Fannie and Freddie investors have filed a complaint, Washington Federal et al. v. U.S.A., No. 1:13-cv-00385-MMS (June 10, 2013), alleging that the federal government “expropriated [Fannie and Freddie’s] common and preferred shareholders’ rights and the value of their equity in the Companies without due process, and without just compensations, thereby constituting an impermissible exaction and/or taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.” (8)

Personally, I think that there is a lot of nonsense in the complaint, both in terms of its factual description of the events that led up to the placement of Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship as well as its interpretation of those events.  But I did find its analysis interesting as to whether the government complied with HERA’s requirements for placing the two companies in conservatorship.  Not compelling, just interesting.

As the complaint notes, the federal government had a number of grounds for appointing a conservator. It takes the position that none of those grounds were met. This seems facially wrong.

One of the grounds is whether Fannie or Freddie “incurred, or became likely to incur, losses that would deplete substantially all of its capital with no reasonable prospect of becoming adequately capitalized.” (31) The complaint alleges that the two companies had not incurred such losses at the time that they were placed in conservatorship. (38-39) But it does not even argue that the two companies never “became likely to incur” such losses prior to their placement in conservatorship. Seems hard, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, to take the position that they were not “likely” to incur such losses. And if the plaintiffs can’t make that case, they lose.

Reform for Whom?

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David Stevens, the head of the Mortgage Bankers Association, gave an important and revealing speech about the direction of housing finance reform.  It contains some good ideas, but also raises an alarm.  Because the Administration and Congress are at an impasse, Stevens is leading the private sector in pushing for reform of Fannie and Freddie.

While Stevens is proposing some good ideas, the federal housing finance system should be designed — big surprise here — by the federal government first and foremost.  Unfortunately, the private sector can take the lead because the federal government has not.  Housing finance policy abhors a vacuum.

Stevens’ prepared remarks provide a “proposal for transition” for Fannie and Freddie. (3)  The proposal has three steps:

First, it is imperative in this state of overlapping regulatory confusion that the White House name a Housing Policy Coordinator.  This is an immediate need with a simple solution.

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Second, we must have absolute transparency.  FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must stop making market shifting decisions without the input of consumers or the industry.

Finally, we must have a clear path to transition out of conservatorship.   To achieve this goal, we must move toward a single security, encourage additional risk sharing by mandating Fannie and Freddie to accept lower guarantee fees for deeper credit enhancements, and redirect the FHFA platform initiative. (3-4)

The first suggestion — some kind of Housing Czar — is both intuitively right and attractive.  Housing cuts across so many arms of the federal government:  the FHFA, HUD, FHA, CFPB and on and on.  Those arms are frequently at cross purposes.  A Housing Czar could seek to rationalize them.  The second is also attractive, but given the focus of the housing finance industry, one would assume that “industry” would get a lot more input than “consumers.”  And the third suggestion may have merit, but is not the type of decision that we want industry to make — we want the government, the people, to make it.

It is no secret that both parties have punted on housing finance reform.  But it will be a tragedy if they do not recover the ball.  Otherwise, industry will write the rules for future homeowners.  Homeowners will then be playing a game designed for industry to win, not them.

Reiss on New Limits on Lending for Fannie and Freddie

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Law360 interviewed me in Fannie, Freddie Will Only Buy Qualified Mortgages, FHFA Says (behind a paywall) about the new limits on lending imposed on Fannie and Freddie:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency on Monday said that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would only be allowed to purchase so-called qualified mortgages when the new standard comes into effect in January.

Under the new standard, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will only be able to purchase and securitize mortgages that qualify to an exemption to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s ability to repay rule, which the federal consumer finance watchdog finalized in January.

* * *

Given the cautious state of mortgage lending, the change is likely to only affect Fannie, Freddie and the mortgage market along the margins, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“It will be interesting to see, however, whether the private-label market will step into the void and offer more of these products — and it will be interesting to see how the market prices them,” he said in an email.

Principled Forgiveness

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The Congressional Budget Office issued a report, Modifying Mortgages Involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Options for Principal Forgiveness, that reviews where we are with principal-forgiveness loan modifications. It notes that “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been allowed to implement principal forgiveness out of concerns about fairness, implementation costs, and the incentive that the approach could provide for people to become delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (1)

The report examines how the GSEs could employ principal forgiveness. A key issue that the report addresses is how to deal with the moral hazard of homeowners “becoming delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (3) This could result in large costs for the federal government and would be inequitable to those who are similarly situated who choose not to become delinquent.

The CBO analyzes three principal forgiveness options.  Each option would allow a GSE to choose between a standard HAMP modification or one that involved principal forgiveness, “depending on which one lowered the government’s expected costs more.” (3) CBO estimates that 1.2 million borrowers might be eligible for such a program, which would be about 40 percent of all underwater borrowers. CBO estimates that the federal government would save a modest amount of money with these options.

The CBO’s cost-benefit principle seems like a reasonable basis upon which to expand principal forgiveness loan modifications.  The FHFA should pursue these options even before its new leadership is in place.