Tag Archives: FHFA

Fannie/Freddie Take Down 3: Washington Federal v. The U.S. of A.

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This should catch us up on the Fannie/Freddie preferred stock Takings litigation (see here and here for two other suits).  Washington Federal et al. v. United States was filed June 10, 2013 and is a class action complaint. The theories are pretty similar in the three cases. I had earlier written about the importance of narrative in these Takings cases. Having lived through this history myself and having read the “first draft” of history carefully in the pages of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and many trade periodicals, I am somewhat taken aback by this revisionist history. For instance, the complaint states that the companies were not “likely to incur losses that would deplete all or substantially all of” their capital. (38) News to me!

But what is most striking about the complaint is this notion that if the government had just taken this action (allowing the companies to buy more subprime mortgages) or not taken that action (strong arming the board to accept the conservatorship) or not deferring taking this other action (waiting to raise the guarantee fee), then everything would have worked out for the companies and their shareholders.  Maybe so, but it sure will be hard to categorize each of the government’s actions as either totally okay or completely inappropriate for the companies’ health in the context of the financial crisis. This leaves the plaintiffs with some tough work ahead. They are going to need to show a judge just how to categorize each of those facts and ensure that the categorization does not interfere with their theory of the case.

All of this raises a bigger, more interesting question. What role should these types of lawsuits play after a crisis has passed? Some would say that they are an outrage — second-guessing what are leaders did to avert financial ruin. Others might say that this is an efficient way to respond to crises: allow the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis, but use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized. I don’t have a fully thought out view on this, but I am struck by the dangers of each approach. The first allows for various kinds of scapegoating (as Hank Greenberg argues in the AIG bailout litigation) while the second allows for the kind of revisionism that favors the wealthy and powerful (as with these Takings suits by powerful investors who bought Fannie and Freddie preferred shares on the cheap as a sort of long shot bet on what the two companies will look like going forward). Tough to choose between the two . . ..

The Taking of Fannie and Freddie 2

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Today, I look at one more complaint filed in response to the federal government’s amendment to its Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements with Fannie and Freddie (the PSPAs).  Cacciapelle et al. v. United States, filed July 10, 2013, is another takings clause case like the one filed by Fairholme the day before. The facts alleged in the complaint should be familiar to readers of REfinblog.com (here, here and here), although this is a class action complaint.

The plaintiffs state that the members of the class “paid valuable consideration to acquire these rights, and in doing so helped provide financial support for Fannie and Freddie, both before and after the conservatorship, by contributing to a viable market for Fannie’s and Freddie’s issued securities. Plaintiffs certainly had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the property they acquired could not be appropriated by the Government without payment of just compensation.” (4-5)

Now having read four complaints dealing with the same issue arising from the financial crisis, I am struck by the importance of narrative in litigation. Given that the federal government saved the Fannie and Freddie from certain financial ruin, we may label the Cacciapelle narrative the “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” storyline.

One can well imagine the government’s version of events in its inevitable motion to dismiss.

Fannie and Freddie were at the brink of ruin.  We swept in, provided unlimited capital and rescued the companies, the housing market, the country and the world from the Second Great Depression.  To have the private preferred shareholders engage in Monday Morning Quarterbacking and focus on the details from the crisis response that harmed them, to have them ignore the competing concerns that were at stake for each of these critical decisions, adds insult to this injurious lawsuit.  Judge, do not succumb to this hindsight bias!

Let’s label this the Corialanus storyline.

These lawsuits have caught reporters’ eyes and will be well-covered in the press. I would look to see which narratives resonate and I wouldn’t be surprised if the dominant narrative finds its way into the judicial opinions that decide these cases.

Federal Government’s a Fairholme-weather Friend?

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Following up on my posts (here and here) about other suits against the federal government over its amendment of the terms of the distribution of dividends and other payments by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I now look at Fairholme Funds, Inc. et al. v. FHFA et al., filed July 10, 2013.  The suit alleges very similar facts to those found in Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, filed July 9, 2013, but the claims for relief are more similar to those found in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al.

Here are some of the key claims made by the plaintiffs (owners of Fannie and Freddie preferred shares):

  • While the FHFA is the conservator of the two companies, it is acting acting like a receiver by “winding down” Fannie and Freddie’s “affairs and liquidating” their assets, while conservatorship should aim to return a company “to normal operation.” (15) The goal of the conservator, claim the plaintiffs, is to return the company “to a safe, sound and solvent condition.” (15, quoting Conservatorship and Receivership, 76 Fed. Reg. 35, 724, 35, 730(June 20, 2011)) As a result, plaintiffs argue that the Net Worth Sweep (which gives to the federal government substantially all of Fannie and Freddie’s profit) “is squarely contrary to FHFA’s statutory responsibilities as conservator of Fannie and Freddie” because it does not put them in “a sound and solvent condition” and it does not “conserve the assets and property” of the two companies. (25, quoting 12 U.S.C. section 4617(b)(2)(D))
  • “Neither Treasury nor FHFA made any public record of their decision-making processes in agreeing to the Net Worth Sweep.” (29) The plaintiffs argue that the FHFA’s “authority as conservator of” Fannie and Freddie “is strictly limited by statute.” (31, citing 12 U.S.C. section 4617(b)(2)(D)) As a result, the FHFA’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” (33, quoting the APA, 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A))
  • The plaintiffs’ relationship with Treasury as Fannie and Freddie’s controlling shareholders is governed by state corporate law and thus Treasury owes “fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.” (38)
  • “Implicit in every contract is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of the bargain.” (41) Plaintiffs argue that their contractual rights pursuant to their preferred shares have been breached by FHFA’s consent to the Net Worth Sweep.

The validity of these claims should not be assessed superficially. The courts will need to read HERA in the context of the APA and the amendment to the terms of the government’s preferred shares in the context of the contractual obligations found in the private preferred shares. The court will also need to assess the extent to which state corporate law governs the actions of the federal government when it is acting in the multiple capacities of lender, investor, regulator and conservator.  Let the memoranda in support and in opposition to motions to dismiss come forth and enlighten us as to how it should all play out . . ..

 

 

 

Where’s Perry? Are Phannie and Freddie Busted?!?

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With all apologies to Perry the Platypus who stars in my sons’ favorite TV show, Phineas and Ferb, today I look at the complaint in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al. Perry Capital has sued the federal government for destroying the value of Fannie and Freddie securities held by Perry and the investment funds it manages. In particular, the complaint (drafted by Theodore Olson and others at Gibson Dunn) states that

Perry Capital seeks to prevent Defendants from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment to preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPAs”) executed by Treasury and the FHFA, acting as conservator for the Companies. The Third Amendment fundamentally and unfairly alters the structure and nature of the securities Treasury purchased under the PSPAs, impermissibly destroys value in all of the Companies’ privately held securities, and illegally begins to liquidate the Companies. (2)

The plaintiff alleges that the government’s actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The APA governs the decision-making procedures of federal agencies like Treasury and independent agencies like the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). HERA was passed at the outset of the financial crisis and governs the process by which Fannie and Freddie may be put into conservatorship. (I discuss the enactment of HERA in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, which is also available on BePress.)

[Warning:  necessary but complex details follow.  Those who are not GSE geeks may skip to the end.]

After the two companies were put into conservatorship in 2008,

Treasury and the FHFA executed the PSPAs, according to which Treasury purchased 1 million shares of the Government Preferred Stock from each company, in exchange for a funding commitment that allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from Treasury as needed to ensure that they maintained a net worth of at least zero. As relevant here, the Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against Treasury’s funding commitment and is entitled to a cumulative dividend equal to ten percent of the outstanding liquidation preference. The PSPAs also grant Treasury warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. (2-3)

 According to the complaint, the Third Amendment to the PSPA changed the way that profits would be distributed by the two companies:

Under the original stock certificates, Treasury’s dividend was paid quarterly in the amount equal to an annual ten percent of the Government Preferred Stock’s outstanding liquidation preference. In the Third Amendment, the FHFA and Treasury amended the dividend provision to require that every dollar of each company’s net worth above a certain capital reserve amount be given to Treasury as a dividend. . . . Treasury’s additional profits from the Third Amendment are enormous. (5)

This is a very complex case, and I will return to it in future posts.  For now, I would just flag some issues that may pose problems for Perry.

First, is this case ripe for adjudication?  Perry states that they will be harmed when the two companies liquidate, but they are nowhere near liquidation.  Will the harm Perry predicts necessarily come about? The claim that they are harmed as to their expected dividends is stronger. Yet Perry acknowledges that the PSPAs “explicitly prohibit the payment of any dividend to any shareholder other than Treasury without Treasury’s consent.” (16)

Second, to what extent is this matter governed by the APA? I am not an APA expert, and I am wary of second-guessing Olson’s complaint in a blog post. But I would note that the court may not find that the APA even applies in this case and may find that HERA governs this dispute on its own. And even if the APA applies, the court may give great deference to the decisions of Treasury and the FHFA.

Finally, does the language from HERA that Perry relies on really give it much to hang its hat on? I think the crux of Perry’s argument is that the Third Amendment “created new securities”  instead of changing the terms of existing securities. (24) If a court disagrees with Perry on this (and it seems like a bit of a stretch to me), the theory of the case will be severely weakened.

All of this being said, I would agree with Perry that the holders of the Private Sector Preferred Stock — particularly the holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government.  Various regulations encouraged lending institutions to hold Fannie and Freddie preferred stock over other investments. Those incentives sure looked like an implied guarantee before the subprime crisis knocked Fannie and Freddie off their feet.

Bottom line: this dispute cannot be settled in a late night blog post.  We’ll have to wait and see if Agent P can pull off what may be his most difficult mission yet.

FHFA: Critical Concerns Remain, Future Uncertain

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The FHFA issued its 2012 Report to Congress which provides a report of the annual examinations of Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs. The report documents critical concerns about Fannie and Freddie, none of which are particularly newsworthy at this late date. But the report does have some intimations of what may lay ahead, which are particularly interesting now that the Senate has finally taken up GSE reform.

The report reviews the three goals set in 2012 for the ongoing conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie:

Build. Build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market.
Contract. Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations.
Maintain. Maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages. (1)

There are some interesting specifics attached to these general goals.

For the Build goal, FHFA has taken the position that there should be a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market that operates like a “market utility,” a model bandied about by Henry Paulson when he was Treasury Secretary. (13)

For the Contract goal, FHFA has indicated that it “will continue increasing guarantee fees in 2013  and evaluating how close current guarantee fee pricing is to the point where private capital would be willing to absorb credit risk.” 14)

For the Maintain goal, FHFA has taken the position that the mortgage market should transition to a more “competitive ” model, moving away from one in which “the government touches more than 9 out of every 10 mortgages.” (15)

While not surprising given Acting Director DeMarco’s past statements and actions, this report indicates that at least the FHFA believes that we should move away from such intense government involvement in the mortgage market to a system that better prices risk and which spreads that risk across a range of competitors. At such a high level of generality, I agree that these are worthwhile goals. But as with everything involving housing finance policy — the devil will be in the details.

These Are A Few of My Favorite Things

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Along with raindrops on roses and whiskers on kittens, reforming Government-Sponsored Enterprises and rationalizing rating agency regulation are two of my favorite things. The Federal Housing Finance Agency noticed a proposed rulemaking to remove some of the references to credit ratings from Federal Home Loan Bank regulations. This is part of a broader mandate contained in Dodd Frank (specifically, section 939A) to reduce the regulatory privilege that the rating agencies had accumulated over the years. This regulatory privilege resulted from the rampant reliance of ratings from Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (mostly S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) in regulations concerning financial institutions and financial products.

The proposed new definition of “investment quality” reads as follows:

Investment quality means a determination made by the Bank with respect to a security or obligation that based on documented analysis,including consideration of the sources for repayment on the security or obligation:

(1) There is adequate financial backing so that full and timely payment of principal and interest on such security or obligation is expected; and

(2) There is minimal risk that that timely payment of principal or interest would not occur because of adverse changes in economic and financial conditions during the projected life of the security or obligation. (30790)

The FHFA expects that such a definition will preclude the FHLBs from relying “principally” on an NRSRO “rating or third party analysis.” (30787)

This definition does not blaze a new path for the purposes of Dodd Frank section 939A as it is in line with similar rulemakings by the NCUA, FDIC and OCC. But it does the trick of reducing the unthinking reliance on ratings by NRSROs for FHLBs. Forcing financial institutions to “apply internal analytic standards and criteria to determine the credit quality of a security or obligation” has to be a good thing as it should push them to look at more than just a credit rating to  make their iinvestment decisions. (30784) This is not to say that we will avoid bubbles as a result of this proposed rule, but it will force FHLBs to take more responsibility for their decisions and be able to document their decision-making process, which should be at least a bit helpful when markets become frothy once again.

When the cycle turns, when greed sings
When I’m feeling sad,
I simply remember
my favorite things
and then I don’t feel so bad!

Reiss on Threats to Housing

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CBS News interviewed me (and gave a shout out to REFinblog.com) about The 5 Biggest Threats to the Housing Recovery. It reads in part:

3. The government’s role in the mortgage market will change

The U.S. government currently backs about 97 percent of mortgages though the Federal Housing Authority, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That’s unlikely to continue. It may take years, but the feds will eventually start edging out of the mortgage market. Private mortgage financiers will have to fill the void. But exactly how that will happen and what effect it will have on borrowers remains to be seen.

“The entire lending industry needs [government] leadership as to what the bulk of the market is going to look like in the long run,” said David Reiss, professor at Brooklyn Law School and editor of real estate finance industry site REFinBlog. “How tight or loose will credit be? The Federal Housing Finance Agency will decide this to a large extent, as seen by the recent announcement that Fannie and Freddie will no longer buy interest only mortgages.”