Tag Archives: FHFA

Where’s Perry? Are Phannie and Freddie Busted?!?

Posted on by

With all apologies to Perry the Platypus who stars in my sons’ favorite TV show, Phineas and Ferb, today I look at the complaint in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al. Perry Capital has sued the federal government for destroying the value of Fannie and Freddie securities held by Perry and the investment funds it manages. In particular, the complaint (drafted by Theodore Olson and others at Gibson Dunn) states that

Perry Capital seeks to prevent Defendants from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment to preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPAs”) executed by Treasury and the FHFA, acting as conservator for the Companies. The Third Amendment fundamentally and unfairly alters the structure and nature of the securities Treasury purchased under the PSPAs, impermissibly destroys value in all of the Companies’ privately held securities, and illegally begins to liquidate the Companies. (2)

The plaintiff alleges that the government’s actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The APA governs the decision-making procedures of federal agencies like Treasury and independent agencies like the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). HERA was passed at the outset of the financial crisis and governs the process by which Fannie and Freddie may be put into conservatorship. (I discuss the enactment of HERA in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, which is also available on BePress.)

[Warning:  necessary but complex details follow.  Those who are not GSE geeks may skip to the end.]

After the two companies were put into conservatorship in 2008,

Treasury and the FHFA executed the PSPAs, according to which Treasury purchased 1 million shares of the Government Preferred Stock from each company, in exchange for a funding commitment that allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from Treasury as needed to ensure that they maintained a net worth of at least zero. As relevant here, the Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against Treasury’s funding commitment and is entitled to a cumulative dividend equal to ten percent of the outstanding liquidation preference. The PSPAs also grant Treasury warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. (2-3)

 According to the complaint, the Third Amendment to the PSPA changed the way that profits would be distributed by the two companies:

Under the original stock certificates, Treasury’s dividend was paid quarterly in the amount equal to an annual ten percent of the Government Preferred Stock’s outstanding liquidation preference. In the Third Amendment, the FHFA and Treasury amended the dividend provision to require that every dollar of each company’s net worth above a certain capital reserve amount be given to Treasury as a dividend. . . . Treasury’s additional profits from the Third Amendment are enormous. (5)

This is a very complex case, and I will return to it in future posts.  For now, I would just flag some issues that may pose problems for Perry.

First, is this case ripe for adjudication?  Perry states that they will be harmed when the two companies liquidate, but they are nowhere near liquidation.  Will the harm Perry predicts necessarily come about? The claim that they are harmed as to their expected dividends is stronger. Yet Perry acknowledges that the PSPAs “explicitly prohibit the payment of any dividend to any shareholder other than Treasury without Treasury’s consent.” (16)

Second, to what extent is this matter governed by the APA? I am not an APA expert, and I am wary of second-guessing Olson’s complaint in a blog post. But I would note that the court may not find that the APA even applies in this case and may find that HERA governs this dispute on its own. And even if the APA applies, the court may give great deference to the decisions of Treasury and the FHFA.

Finally, does the language from HERA that Perry relies on really give it much to hang its hat on? I think the crux of Perry’s argument is that the Third Amendment “created new securities”  instead of changing the terms of existing securities. (24) If a court disagrees with Perry on this (and it seems like a bit of a stretch to me), the theory of the case will be severely weakened.

All of this being said, I would agree with Perry that the holders of the Private Sector Preferred Stock — particularly the holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government.  Various regulations encouraged lending institutions to hold Fannie and Freddie preferred stock over other investments. Those incentives sure looked like an implied guarantee before the subprime crisis knocked Fannie and Freddie off their feet.

Bottom line: this dispute cannot be settled in a late night blog post.  We’ll have to wait and see if Agent P can pull off what may be his most difficult mission yet.

FHFA: Critical Concerns Remain, Future Uncertain

Posted on by

The FHFA issued its 2012 Report to Congress which provides a report of the annual examinations of Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs. The report documents critical concerns about Fannie and Freddie, none of which are particularly newsworthy at this late date. But the report does have some intimations of what may lay ahead, which are particularly interesting now that the Senate has finally taken up GSE reform.

The report reviews the three goals set in 2012 for the ongoing conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie:

Build. Build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market.
Contract. Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations.
Maintain. Maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages. (1)

There are some interesting specifics attached to these general goals.

For the Build goal, FHFA has taken the position that there should be a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market that operates like a “market utility,” a model bandied about by Henry Paulson when he was Treasury Secretary. (13)

For the Contract goal, FHFA has indicated that it “will continue increasing guarantee fees in 2013  and evaluating how close current guarantee fee pricing is to the point where private capital would be willing to absorb credit risk.” 14)

For the Maintain goal, FHFA has taken the position that the mortgage market should transition to a more “competitive ” model, moving away from one in which “the government touches more than 9 out of every 10 mortgages.” (15)

While not surprising given Acting Director DeMarco’s past statements and actions, this report indicates that at least the FHFA believes that we should move away from such intense government involvement in the mortgage market to a system that better prices risk and which spreads that risk across a range of competitors. At such a high level of generality, I agree that these are worthwhile goals. But as with everything involving housing finance policy — the devil will be in the details.

These Are A Few of My Favorite Things

Posted on by

Along with raindrops on roses and whiskers on kittens, reforming Government-Sponsored Enterprises and rationalizing rating agency regulation are two of my favorite things. The Federal Housing Finance Agency noticed a proposed rulemaking to remove some of the references to credit ratings from Federal Home Loan Bank regulations. This is part of a broader mandate contained in Dodd Frank (specifically, section 939A) to reduce the regulatory privilege that the rating agencies had accumulated over the years. This regulatory privilege resulted from the rampant reliance of ratings from Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (mostly S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) in regulations concerning financial institutions and financial products.

The proposed new definition of “investment quality” reads as follows:

Investment quality means a determination made by the Bank with respect to a security or obligation that based on documented analysis,including consideration of the sources for repayment on the security or obligation:

(1) There is adequate financial backing so that full and timely payment of principal and interest on such security or obligation is expected; and

(2) There is minimal risk that that timely payment of principal or interest would not occur because of adverse changes in economic and financial conditions during the projected life of the security or obligation. (30790)

The FHFA expects that such a definition will preclude the FHLBs from relying “principally” on an NRSRO “rating or third party analysis.” (30787)

This definition does not blaze a new path for the purposes of Dodd Frank section 939A as it is in line with similar rulemakings by the NCUA, FDIC and OCC. But it does the trick of reducing the unthinking reliance on ratings by NRSROs for FHLBs. Forcing financial institutions to “apply internal analytic standards and criteria to determine the credit quality of a security or obligation” has to be a good thing as it should push them to look at more than just a credit rating to  make their iinvestment decisions. (30784) This is not to say that we will avoid bubbles as a result of this proposed rule, but it will force FHLBs to take more responsibility for their decisions and be able to document their decision-making process, which should be at least a bit helpful when markets become frothy once again.

When the cycle turns, when greed sings
When I’m feeling sad,
I simply remember
my favorite things
and then I don’t feel so bad!

Reiss on Threats to Housing

Posted on by

CBS News interviewed me (and gave a shout out to REFinblog.com) about The 5 Biggest Threats to the Housing Recovery. It reads in part:

3. The government’s role in the mortgage market will change

The U.S. government currently backs about 97 percent of mortgages though the Federal Housing Authority, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That’s unlikely to continue. It may take years, but the feds will eventually start edging out of the mortgage market. Private mortgage financiers will have to fill the void. But exactly how that will happen and what effect it will have on borrowers remains to be seen.

“The entire lending industry needs [government] leadership as to what the bulk of the market is going to look like in the long run,” said David Reiss, professor at Brooklyn Law School and editor of real estate finance industry site REFinBlog. “How tight or loose will credit be? The Federal Housing Finance Agency will decide this to a large extent, as seen by the recent announcement that Fannie and Freddie will no longer buy interest only mortgages.”

Strategies to Improve the Housing Market

Posted on by

Boston Consulting prepared this Strategies to Improve the Housing Market report on behalf of The Pew Charitable Trusts.  The report focuses “on practical solutions that can readily be implemented by industry, agencies, and regulators working within existing mandates, or by nongovernmental organizations.”  (6)  I highlight three proposals in their report that I find particularly interesting.

1.  Promulgate Consistent Set of Loan Servicing Standards

Mortgage servicing is governed by a number of loan servicing standards—including standards under the DOJ settlement, OCC consent orders, FHFA Servicing Alignment Initiative, CFPB, as well as those of individual states—which vary in scope and individual provisions. A consistent set of loan servicing standards across the servicing life cycle can both ensure a basic standard of service for all homeowners and reduce the operational complexity of complying with multiple, varying standards for servicers.  (8)

This seems to be key to dealing with the misaligned incentives and anticommons problems that have become so apparent during the Subprime Bust.

2.  Streamline The Foreclosure Process in Key States

The long foreclosure process, particularly in judicial states, creates negative impacts on both lenders and communities, particularly when borrowers are “free riding.” While preserving the primacy of states and localities in foreclosure law, experts highlighted the desirability of working with them to develop a “model” foreclosure process based on best practices, to be adopted by states and localities on a voluntary basis. We recommend that an NGO takes the lead on developing such a model, based on best practices across jurisdictions, brings in key states and other relevant stakeholders to build consensus, and advocates for change with state policy makers and legislatures.  (9)

This issue is more complicated than the report (and most other commentators) concedes.  The claim that borrowers are “free riding” is not exactly true.  Lengthy foreclosure periods existed before the mortgages were entered into and were presumably priced into the cost of mortgages.  Indeed, the FHFA is trying to reprice mortgages in jurisdictions with the longest periods.  There are clearly policy choices at issue in the design of a foreclosure process.  For homeowners and lenders alike, the difference between the lengthy judicial process and the relatively rapid non-judicial process is only the most stark example of how process (in this case, length of process) affects substantive rights (that is, post-default occupancy periods).

3.  Rationalize First and Subordinate Lienholder Rights

In the context of continuing demand for home equity loans (second or subordinate liens), there is a need to clarify the rights of first and second lienholders to avoid a repeat of current frictions in the future and to restore investor confidence that first lienholders will have enforceable priority in the event of default. Any new framework put forward should achieve two key objectives:

>  protecting first-lien priority

>  standardizing treatment of seconds in loss mitigation efforts.

Conflicts between first and second lienholders have been a source of controversy and friction since the crisis began. It is unlikely that private investors will want to commit substantial new investment dollars to private securitizations until this issue is resolved. The industry, perhaps through the auspices of one of its trade association, should take the lead on further developing these options, in the first instance, with involvement from the FHFA, Treasury, and FDIC.  (11, emphasis deleted)

This is a very important issue.  I have been struck since the early days of the crisis how non-lawyers in particular (economists are particular offenders!) assume away the legal rights of seconds in their proposals to address the foreclosure epidemic.  Unsurprisingly, the seconds (knowing what happens to those who “ass-u-me”) have successfully asserted their legal rights to protect their financial interests.  Any solution to the problem of misaligned incentives between first and seconds must take the legal rights of these profit-maximizing entities into account.

Opposition to FHFA Increase in Guaranty Fees for States with Lengthy Foreclosures

Posted on by

Senators from the five affected states have written a letter to the FHFA’s DeMarco.  This debate presents a choice between risk-based pricing on the one hand and what is generally considered a pro-homeowner legal regime on the other.

The FHFA’s notice is here.

New Affordable Housing Goals Set for Fannie and Freddie

Posted on by

The FHFA issued a final rule.  The summary is as follows:

The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) requires the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to establish annual housing goals for mortgages purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (collectively, the Enterprises). FHFA previously established housing goals for the Enterprises through 2011. This final rule establishes new levels for the housing goals for 2012 through 2014, consistent with the requirements of the Safety and Soundness Act.

The new goal levels are lower than those from the last couple of years.  For a taste of the controversy surrounding affordable housing goals see this, this and this on the one hand and see this, this and this on the other.  My own take is that Wallison and Pinto make broad claims about the negative effects of affordable housing goals that attach big effects to long ago events.  Their claims have not been supported empirically and have not gone through a peer review process.  That being said, I think it is valuable to draw attention to the unintended effects of government policies.  Going forward, Congress and the FHFA should be very careful in their program design to ensure that housing policies have their desired effects — no more, no less.